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A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON PHILIPPINE INSURGENCIES

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June 1985-March 1988

*Authors: Barbara A. LePoer
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
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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on insurgencies in the Philippines. It incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subject.

Entries are arranged alphabetically according to author or title. Library of Congress call numbers are included, where appropriate, to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

GLOSSARY

APF	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CNL	Christians for National Liberation
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NDF	National Democratic Front
NPA	New People's Army
PCP	Philippine Communist Party
PKP	Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas
PLM	People's Liberation Movement

**A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
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(Information Received in May 1985)

June 1985

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Engineer, Asghar Ali. "Struggle for a Separate Islamic State." Economic and Political Weekly (Delhi), 22-29 December 1984, pp. 2154-2156.

Traces the historical and ethnic background of the Philippine Muslim (Moro) minority and assesses the status of the MNLF, the leading organization in the separatist Moro armed struggle in Mindanao. The MNLF has divided into three factions since President Ferdinand Marcos failed to implement the 23 December 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine Government. The three factional leaders live abroad and are associated with different Islamic countries. The factions also reflect tribal loyalties and control different areas of Mindanao. Nur Misuari, a Tausug and an adamant secessionist, is associated with Libyan leader Mu'ammarr Qadhafi. The faction of Hashim Salamat, of the Magindanaos, is the most fundamentalist of the three, although he supports Muslim autonomy within the Philippine nation. Salamat is associated with Saudi Arabia and President Zia-ul-haq of Pakistan. Dimas Pundato of the Maranaos, who leads the third faction, takes a middle position. (Pundato reportedly is based in Sabah, Malaysia.) The Muslim movement is further divided on the question of whether Christians should have political rights in a future Islamic state.

"Insurgents Hold Meeting." Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily (Washington, D.C.), vol. 14, no. 77, 24 April 1985, p. 1.

In a recent semi-clandestine press conference in Mindanao, a panel of four members of the CPP and the NPA, and seven members of the NDF told reporters that the NPA is creating new ties with the MNLF and the PLM, an urban guerrilla group known to have conducted assassinations of police officers in the early 1980s. The NDF announced that it will participate in the 1986 local government elections and the 1987 presidential election. During the press conference about 50 NPA guerrillas conducted demonstrations of marching and ambush maneuvers.

Lohr, Steve. "Quelling the Philippine Insurgency: No Easy Task." New York Times (New York), 13 May 1985, p. A2.

The Philippine military estimates that the number of armed NPA guerrillas in five Mindanao provinces has increased from 670 to 2,680 since the arrival of General Jaime C. Echeverria as commander of anti-guerrilla forces in late 1983. General Echeverria states, however, that 16 districts in Davao, formerly controlled by barrio revolutionary committees of the CPP, have been restored to government control. Soldiers of the 3rd Marine Brigade, respected by the populace for their high level of discipline, have been most effective in pacification efforts. In reclaimed areas efforts to get the populace to bear arms in their own defense have been unsuccessful; Marine forces still are stationed in the formerly Communist-controlled areas.

"NPA Boasts a Strength of 20,000 Guerrillas and 6,000 Revolutionary Mass Organizations." Asia Research Bulletin (Hong Kong), 28 February 1985, p. 1253.

According to Ang Bayan, a clandestine propaganda organ of the CPP, the NPA professed that in 1984 it operated in 59 of 73 provinces in the country and commanded 20,000 guerrillas and 60,000 "mass activists." The CPP is directing "people's strikes" in urban areas in coordination with the intensification of rural guerrilla warfare and claims to exercise leadership in more than 350 urban factories and 300 schools.

Tan, Abby. "NPA Increases 'Revolutionary Tax': We Are Hungry and Angry . . ." Asia Research Bulletin (Hong Kong), 31 March 1985, pp. 1268-1269.

Philippine businessmen are concerned about increasing financial and security pressures from the NPA and in some cases are curtailing their sales and distribution activities in areas under NPA control. In January 1985 the Benguet Corporation was asked to pay \$102,040 in "taxes" to the NPA in Mountain Province (Luzon). When the company refused, its logging equipment was destroyed. Under similar pressure, the company has withdrawn its coal exploration operation from Surigao in Mindanao. Businessmen attribute the new pressures to increased logistics problems faced by NPA forces, which now move in groups of from 200 to 300 men. Many firms provide funds or other goods to the NPA and are afraid to inform Philippine Government security forces.

"The Ramos Overview." Asiaweek (Hong Kong), 12 April 1985, pp. 25-26.

In a raid on the Visayan Maritime Academy in Bacolod, Negros Occidental Province on 25 March 1985, some 20 men, believed to be NPA members, stole a large number of weapons, including 400 M-1 Garand rifles, 5 M-16 rifles, 9 Thompson submachineguns, and 3 M-3 "grease-guns," as well as large quantities of ammunition. According to recent Philippine military intelligence, the NPA has 225 regulars operating in southwestern Negros Occidental.

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"The NPA Has Changed Tactics." Asiaweek (Hong Kong), 29 March 1985, p. 16.

In an interview, Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile discusses the NPA insurgency and government responses. He strongly disagrees with US estimates that the NPA will bring government forces to a "strategic stalemate" by the late 1980s, given current government plans and programs. Notes that the Ministry of Defense estimates the number of armed NPA regulars at 8,000 to 9,000 while the AFP estimate places insurgent strength at 10,000 to 12,000.

"The NPA Threat: How Great?" Asiaweek (Hong Kong), 29 March 1985, pp. 14-15, 21.

The NPA and the US and Philippine Governments differ in their estimates of the numbers of armed NPA insurgents. The NPA claims 20,000, the US Government 15,000, and the Philippine Government 8,000 to 12,000. Some 3,660 armed skirmishes between NPA and AFP forces in 1984, a 52 percent increase over figures for 1983, left more than 2,000 soldiers and civilians dead. The US Department of Defense is asking Congress for \$275 million for the Philippines for 1986 as part of the 5-year, \$900-million military bases agreement. Requested military sales credits of \$60 million are intended to show US endorsement of announced reforms in the AFP.

"Philippines: Australia Suspends Aid Project." Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily (Washington, D.C.), 3 May 1985, pp. 1-2.

The Australian Government is making plans to withdraw 42 Australians working on a large rural aid project in northern Samar Province following a seizure of six Australian workers by Communist guerrillas. The workers were released after being made to listen to political lectures for several hours. In an apparent protest against Australian military assistance to the Marcos government, the guerrillas have threatened to step up their activities if the Australian workers do not leave.

"The Sick Man of Southeast Asia." The Economist (London), 1 June 1985, pp. 33-34.

The United States believes that within 3 years Communist guerrillas in the Philippines could achieve parity with the Philippine Army, which is poorly equipped and supplied and in need of reform. The NPA is thought to be active in 59 of the country's 73 provinces and American observers believe that the Communists control at least 20 percent of more than 41,000 villages. The Communists themselves say they will bring government forces to a "strategic stalemate" by 1987. Communist tactics and command structure are decentralized and are aimed at establishing village governments.

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Author: William Shaw

A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON PHILIPPINE INSURGENCIES
(Information Received in July 1985)

Elizalde, Fred J. "One Filipino's Fight Against Communism." The Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 18 June 1985, p. 12.

The chairman of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a sugar grower, discusses his strategy for diluting the appeal of the NPA by helping peasants to buy their own land.

"Marcos Says He Might Ask for Allied Troops." The New York Times, 2 June 1985, p. A19.

On 1 June President Marcos states that he might invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States if NPA pressure "is so massive and if there is a possibility that these groups receive foreign aid and have been trained abroad." Marcos reportedly has brushed off US suggestions that the NPA might take power within the next 5 years.

"Moving in on Marcos." South (London), June 1985, pp. 18-21. HC59.69.S65

The NPA has begun a major guerrilla offensive in support of their predictions of a military deadlock with government forces within the next 3 to 5 years. Though rebels are often poorly fed and clothed, reportedly they are better fighters than the average AFP soldier and have better rapport with the people. The emergence of radical elements in the Roman Catholic Church, including the clandestine Christians for National Liberation (CNL), which provides communications, medical and other support to NPA forces, is a significant development. The CNL is among the groups which make up the nucleus of the NDF. Links between the NPA and the MNLF remain weak and troubled, but the NDF and NPA have had some success in their work among the Igorot tribes in the Luzon mountains.

"Philippines: Government White Paper." Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily (Washington, D.C.), vol. 14, no. 97, 22 May 1985, p. 1.

The Philippine Government White Paper on the NPA insurgency issued on 14 May 1985 states that NPA regulars number 10,000 to 12,000, of whom about two-thirds are armed. The NPA is estimated to influence some 4 percent of the country's 40,000 villages, and receives some financial assistance from leftist individuals and groups in the United States and Europe.

Republic of the Philippines. Ministry of National Defense. Office of Media Affairs. The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines (Manila), 11 May 1985, 40 pp.

This White Paper was prepared in conjunction with the President's Center for Special Studies. It provides intelligence assessments placing the CPP-NPA mass base at less than one percent of the country's population, having between 10,000 and 12,000 guerrilla regulars and says that 4 percent of the country's barrios have NPA political-military

infrastructures. NPA terrorist methods--assassination, kidnappings, robberies, and extortion--are noted, as is its decentralization strategy. NDF, the political arm of the CPP, reportedly is not working well, despite isolated successes. Meanwhile, continuing reforms in AFP command structure and troop discipline have led to the successful neutralization of ranking CPP-NPA leaders and the mobilization of local populations in civic-action programs. The White Paper assesses limited cooperation between the MNLF and NPA, including a joint combat operation against Government forces in March 1983. Such cooperation ended in the outbreak of violence between the two groups in December 1983, and again in late 1984 and early 1985. It is noted that some MNLF leaders have offered to fight with government forces against the NPA.

Spaeth, Anthony. "Rebels Gain on Ailing Philippine Island." The Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 28-29 June 1985, p. 1.

Wealthy sugar planters in Bacolad Province meet in a role-playing seminar to learn "how it feels to be poor, and vulnerable to the siren call of local communist insurgents." Due to the collapse of the sugar industry on Negros, Communist activists are able to leave their mountain strongholds and recruit farm and mill workers in the valleys. As a countermeasure, many sugar growers are giving their workers land on which to grow their food. In other activity on Negros, 60 NPA men routed elite Scout Ranger troops in May.

Whitehall, John. "Options in the Philippines: Part II." Freedom at Issue (New York), May-June 1985, pp. 19-22. D839.F732

In an interview at an AFP base, four captured NPA commanders discuss NPA tactics, weapons, and problems. Allegations of weapons shipments from China and other statements, such as that top NPA leaders are living in a costly bourgeois life style, must be cautiously evaluated, given the circumstances of the interview. However, the personal motives each commander gives for joining the NPA are probably accurate.

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Benigno, Teodoro. "The Philippine Communist Insurgency Has Shifted Tactics." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 29 July 1985, p. 3.

The communist NPA has moved ahead its timetable for takeover in the Philippines, according to recent communist documents made available to the foreign press in that country. NPA tactics have also been shifted to favor the urban proletariat rather than the peasantry as the spearhead of the revolution. NPA guerrilla forces will continue to wage war in the countryside, but there is now an emphasis on subversion and eventual uprisings in the cities. Unarmed underground partisans reportedly are infiltrating almost every organization and level of government. The NPA claims to control one-third of the key labor unions and to have penetrated student and teacher organizations, professional groups, the urban poor, religious bodies, the media, and the military. Widespread Welga Ng Bayan ("People's Strikes") are predicted for late 1985 and 1986.

"Former MNLF Commander Offers to Help Government," Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), June 1985, p. 100.

Former MNLF leaders have offered the Philippine Government their support in fighting against the communist NPA, following an announcement by the NPA that it was linking up with the MNLF. MNLF Commander Amilil Malaquiok said the Moros could mobilize 10,000 men for the effort. President Marcos and the Philippine military were reportedly studying the proposal.

Gott, Richard. "A Revolution According to the Textbook." Guardian (Manchester), 21 August 1985, p. 17.

In the third article in a series entitled "America's Other Cuba," Gott draws parallels between the Philippines, Cuba, Nicaragua, and throws in Vietnam for good measure. The common elements in the comparison between the current situation in the Philippines and revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua include, US involvement, a Spanish colonial background, a repressive government supporting a greedy landlord class, a fragmented bourgeois opposition, and a dedicated communist guerrilla movement. The Philippine Government and military seem to be following the same textbook as the NPA guerrillas and to be demonstrating once again how not to counter insurgency.

Gott, Richard. "Sugar Slavery's Bitter Harvest." Guardian (Manchester), 20 August 1985, p. 19.

Unemployed and hungry, the sugar workers of the Philippine island of Negros are turning to the NPA as their last hope. The guerrillas already control large parts of the island and appear to be winning the struggle for the rest of it, at least in the hearts and minds of its poorest residents. In the second of a three-part series entitled "America's Other Cuba," Gott gives the background of the Negros crisis, which is blamed on the collapse of the international sugar market and the greed of Marcos' cronies who own the remaining sugar plantations in operation.

Jones, Greg. "Philippines Colonel Tries Persuasion." Guardian (Manchester), 3 September 1985, p. 6.

The Philippine military claims it has loosened the grip of the NPA in the country's third largest city, Davao, a key port in Mindanao. Rebel control reportedly has been reduced from 30 percent to 8 percent of the city's districts. Marine Colonel Rodolfo Biazon is given credit for the turn-around, accomplished through a dual policy of addressing grievances, on the one hand, and cracking down on dissidents, on the other. Other sources claim that the NPA is merely lying low for the moment in the Davao area.

Keller, Bill. "Senate Aide Calls Base Security Lax." New York Times, 12 September 1985, p. A15.

A US Senate report sent to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger states that Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base are both poorly protected and extremely vulnerable to terrorist attack. The report by an investigator for the Senate subcommittee responsible for military construction noted, among other things, that an armed NPA guerrilla band was camped within the jungle-covered outer perimeter of Subic. At Clark the investigator found that the fences around the base had been stripped by thieves and the perimeter guard towers abandoned by Philippine Army guards. Pentagon officials state that if the NPA growth continues and "they see victory within their grasp, then an attack on Clark or Subic could be a sign of how confident they are." The Senate report also notes that US Marine patrols had recently been sent into the outer perimeter of Subic to compensate for slack Philippine military protection. "The potential for US troops and NPA guerrillas to become engaged in a violent confrontation is all too apparent."

Molloy, Ivan. "Revolution in the Philippines." Asian Survey (Berkeley, California), vol. 25, no. 8 (August 1985), pp. 822-33.

The Marcos regime greatly fears a military alliance of the communist NPA and the Muslim MNLF and, in fact, claims such an alliance already exists. There is evidence of local cooperation between the two insurgent groups, although both the MNLF and NPA have denied the existence of any formal alliance. Molloy, a political science professor at La Trobe University (Australia), discusses the background of the two groups and examines the possibility of the MNLF and the NPA joining forces against the government in the future. Constraints militating against such an alliance include: factionalism within the MNLF and the antipathy toward atheistic communism by the more traditional elements of the Muslim leadership; fear on the part of the MNLF that the NPA will not recognize autonomy for the Muslim provinces; worry by the MNLF that any formal link with the NPA would jeopardize financial support from other Islamic nations, especially Saudi Arabia; NPA's growing belief that it can gain sufficient strength to defeat the government on its own; and NPA's assessment that the faction-ridden MNLF is too diminished in strength to offer much as an ally. In spite of these constraints, however, there is evidence of cooperation between local commanders at the grass-roots level. Furthermore, as the superstructure of the MNLF disintegrates, the more radically politicized

Moro fighters may cast their lot with the NPA, creating the greatest threat to the Marcos government thus far.

"NPA Plans to Mount Urban Guerrilla Warfare." Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), June 1985, pp. 100-01.

The communist NPA will be militarily strong enough to reach a "strategic stalemate" with Philippine Government forces within 5 years, state leaders of the NDF, an umbrella group that includes the NPA and other left-wing opposition groups. Speaking at a clandestine press conference in Mindanao, Chairman of the NDF Mindanao Provincial Council Lucas Fernandez asserted that the NPA has 20,000 regulars with more than half of them armed, largely with weapons captured during raids. He further stated that the NPA will soon concentrate efforts on urban areas; they already claim influence in 700 towns and cities and 10,000 villages.

Paredes, Joel. "MILF Predicts Victory in Five Years." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 27 June 1985, p. 4.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a major breakaway faction of the MNLF, held a press conference on 22 June 1985 near Marawi, Mindanao, and predicted it will secure its goal of autonomy for the Muslim provinces within 5 years. MILF Vice Chairman Abdul Aziz Mimbantas told reporters the following: the MILF is receiving substantial foreign aid, including arms, from undisclosed sources; the MILF manufactures some of its own weapons, having sent personnel abroad to be trained in arms-production; the MILF has no links with the NPA, although they "respect their struggle;" and the MILF has liberated areas in Mindanao in which it is implementing a new political and economic system based on the Qur'an. The MILF is led by former MNLF Vice Chairman Hashim Salamat, who is still based in the Middle East.

"Philippines: Australia Pulling Out." Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily (Washington, D.C.), 22 August 1985, p. 1.

Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden states that recent NPA guerrilla raids on an Australian rural development site in northern Samar have led to a decision to withdraw 21 Australian consultants and their families from the Philippines. In early 1985 the NPA had threatened to increase its anti-Australian activities if the Australians continued in their efforts, which included building roads, digging wells, and aiding farmers in establishing cooperatives.

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Insurgency in the Philippines Could Provoke Full-scale War Unless Growth Is Checked." Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Massachusetts), 16 July 1985, p. 1.

Some observers in the United States and other Western nations are now describing the NPA as one of the world's most sophisticated and successful insurgent movements. Philippine specialists are warning that a full-scale war between the government and communist forces could come in the next 2 to 3 years. In this "strategic stalemate" the NPA would operate increasingly in large military units while the communist political organizations

would seek to immobilize the machinery of government. The deepening economic crisis in the Philippines has provided fertile recruiting ground for the NPA; however, even the NPA is affected by the slump as their operating costs spiral. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) reportedly has turned down Soviet aid offers, and the Chinese appear to have lost interest in helping. Western observers note that strategy is the strong suit of the CPP leadership, currently headed by a troika (Rodolfo Salas, Rafael Baylosis, and Tony Zuma), all former University of the Philippines graduates. One of the main party aims is to keep the government off-balance and prevent it from concentrating its full power in any one part of the country. By 1987 the NPA plans to have 60,000 fighters in the field, while supporting candidates in the 1986 local and 1987 presidential elections.

Richardson, Michael. "Insurgency in the Philipines: The Militia: Help or Hindrance?" Pacific Defence Reporter (Victoria, Australia), vol. 12, no. 3 (September 1985), pp. 15-17.

The Civilian Home Defence Force (CHDF), the Philippines' largest paramilitary group, is coming under increased fire because of its repeated abuses in dealing with the civilian population. Originally organized by Marcos in 1976 as a village self-defense militia to back up the government's counterinsurgency campaign, the CHDF has an authorized ceiling of 73,000 members. Opposition and church leaders claim that the CHDF has encouraged the rise of insurgency through their violent and unjust activities. Despite criticism and public uproar over the murder of an Italian priest by CHDF members in Mindanao recently, the military continues to arm and to enlarge the responsibilities of the paramilitary force. On Negros the target is to have 3,000 CHDF on duty by election-time next year. Many observers believe this will only alienate more people and aid the efforts of the NPA. Others warn that CHDF weapons will be easy pickings for the NPA, which obtains almost all of its arms by capturing them from government forces.

Sherwell, Chris. "Philippines Disorder Alarms Washington." Bangkok Post, 26 May 1985, p. 6.

Estimates of insurgent activity in the Philippines put the number of incidents last year at 10 per day, resulting in 3,000 deaths roughly divided equally between soldiers, guerrillas, and civilians. In 1984 the majority of incidents were initiated by the NPA, but this year the Philippine military claims that it has seized the initiative in armed encounters. Nonetheless, NPA strength is placed conservatively at 15,000 and the CPP at 60,000. From the Washington viewpoint, all of this activity can only be reversed by fundamental economic and political reforms, which the Marcos government seems unwilling or unable to institute.

Warner, Denis. "Insurgency in the Philippines: Deterioration Marked, Widespread and Demonstrable." Pacific Defence Reporter (Victoria, Australia), vol. 12, no. 3 (September 1985), pp. 10-14.

The NPA insurgency situation in the Philippines is not yet at the point of no return, but it will certainly become irreversible unless there are

major changes and reforms in government policy. The insurgency has spread in the past 12 months to all of the major islands, and incidents have multiplied in number. Currently the main effort of the NPA is devoted to increasing the supply of weapons and ammunition. Raids on military posts to capture small arms are conducted with both careful planning and great skill. One-third of Mindanao is reportedly under effective NPA control, and Davao City is described as an NPA testing ground for urban insurgency. Philippine companies, such as Benguet Corporation, have had their problems with the NPA and often have been burned out if they refused to pay taxes to the insurgency. Hijacking of truck cargoes bound from Manila to the provinces is becoming increasingly common. In the meantime, the Philippine Government is its own worst enemy, with rampant reports of rigged elections and immense investments abroad by the Marcos family and other members of the privileged few. The NPA is winning increased support from Roman Catholics, including priests and nuns, who see the movement as a credible alternative to a corrupt regime. Deep within the military there are rumbles of discontent as loyalty to Marcos and General Fabian Ver continue to be the main criteria for advancement. According to the author, despite the labyrinth of problems into which the Philippines has descended, the only role that its friends can play is one of quiet diplomacy coupled with a willingness to help in non-military areas in the hope that change, when it comes, will not see Soviet ships in Subic Bay.

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Anderson, Harry, et al. "The Philippines: Another Iran?" Newsweek, 4 November 1985, pp. 30-38.

In its cover story Newsweek surveys the current Philippine crisis from the American viewpoint. Sidebar articles analyze the vulnerability of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, assess the state of Marcos' health, and compare US support for Marcos with its support for Ngo Dinh Diem, Anastasio Somoza, and the Shah of Iran. According to US intelligence reports, 15,000 NPA guerrillas operate in 62 of the nation's 73 provinces, with their ranks increasing at a rate of 20 percent per year. Even more worrisome, according to US strategists, is that the one-million-strong NDF may soon foment so much civil unrest that the police and military will be unable to maintain control. A "flash point" may come as early as next year, some officials warn. A stream of messengers sent by the Reagan administration to Marcos has thus far been unable to convince the Philippine president that the situation is serious.

Aznam, Suhaini. "Pirate Report Repressed." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol.129, no. 41, 17 October 1985, pp. 17-18. HC411.F18

Dimas Pundato, leader of the reform faction of the MNLF, accuses the MNLF faction led by Nur Misuari of conducting a raid on a coastal town in Sabah. Pundato expresses anger over the raid, saying it gives a bad name to the entire MNLF. Ten Malaysians were killed in the attack on the town of Lahad Datu by 20 armed Filipinos who robbed a bank and an airline office of US \$82,000. A Malaysian marine police force reportedly made a retaliatory raid on Maldonas Island in the Philippine province of Tawi Tawi, killing or kidnapping 53 persons. After the initial reports, both Manila and Kuala Lumpur appeared to be playing down the incident, if not actually trying to hush it up.

Christian, Shirley. "Marcos Aide Discounts Rebel Threat." New York Times, 22 October 1985, p. A3.

The US Government and the American press are overestimating the strength of the Communist insurgency in the Philippines and underestimating the ability of the Marcos government to bring it under control, according to acting Philippine Foreign Minister Pacifico Castro. Castro acknowledges that the Philippines has insurgency and economic problems but contends that the government is competent to deal with them, as it dealt with the Huk rebellion of the 1950s and the MNLF insurgency of the 1970s.

"Communists to Overrun the Philippines?" Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 28 August 1985, p. 2.

Any Communist takeover in Manila will destabilize ASEAN for many years to come states this Indonesia Times editorial. A Communist Philippines will also force Indonesia to divert funds and forces to the effort of safeguarding its security from Communist infiltration. The editorial warns that, despite Marcos' assurances that the Philippine armed forces are capable of crushing the Communists, the danger should not be underestimated. As part of the solution, the writer urges the Marcos government to enlist the support of Philippine Muslims by granting political and

economic reforms (as promised under the Tripoli Accord). Also recommended is that the Philippine military desist in its harsh and highhanded treatment of the people, which contrasts sharply with the friendlier image of the NPA guerrillas.

"If Marcos Ousted, Communist Takeover of Philippines Would be Averted." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 22 August 1985, p. 7.

Philippine Muslim leaders visiting Washington told US officials that a Communist takeover in the Philippines would pose a serious threat to other ASEAN members. MNLF leaders Dimas Pundato and Macapanton Abas of the reformist faction stated that the MNLF was forging a grand alliance of Philippine opposition groups to present a united front to the Marcos administration. Pundato told US officials that his group was ready to sign a ceasefire pact with the Marcos government, saying "We would welcome any agreement that gives us autonomy from the present government. But if that is not possible, we would agree to participate in free, democratic elections if there are guarantees."

Jones, Gregg. "Left Presents New Threat to Marcos." Guardian (Manchester), 19 September 1985, p. 8.

As a new leftwing Philippine opposition group launches a bold drive for political power through the electoral system, its detractors accuse it of being under Communist control. The Bayan (New Nationalist Alliance) membership includes a mix of old nationalist leaders (such as Lorenzo Tanada) and young businessmen, bankers, peasants, and urban squatters. Its tactics combine militant protest actions with traditional electoral politicking. Bayan leaders concede that communists are a strong influence in the organization, but deny accusations that Bayan is a legal front for the NDF.

Keller, Bill. "U.S. Says It Fears Philippines Faces a Wide Civil War." New York Times, 30 October 1985, pp. A1, A11.

US State Department and Defense Department officials testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that the Philippines was headed toward "civil war on a massive scale." Assistant Secretary of State Paul D. Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L. Armitage testified that, although the Communist insurgency was not close to toppling the Marcos government, trends pointed to a military stalemate in as little as 3 years. Members of the Senate committee expressed frustration at Marcos' refusal to implement political, military, and economic reforms seen as necessary to combat the insurgency. Pentagon officials estimated NPA armed strength to have now reached 16,500.

May, Ronald James. "Muslim and Tribal Filipinos." In The Philippines After Marcos, pp. 110-129. Edited by Francisco Nemenzo and Ronald James May. New York: St. Martins Press, 1985. 239 pp. DS686.5.P486 1985

This chapter gives a useful summary of past relations between the Marcos government and the MNLF, as well as background on the various factions within the Philippine Muslim movement. The author predicts that if Nur

Misuari, former chief spokesman for the MNLF, persists in his demand for secession, he will lose the support of the international Islamic community as well as a large part of the Moro movement. This appears to be what is happening at present. MNLF-NPA cooperation, despite Misuari's alleged NPA connections, seems to be limited to ad hoc arrangements between field commanders. Those who anticipate a solution to the Moro problem in terms of eventual integration of Muslims into Philippine society fail to appreciate the fundamental religious-ethnic aspect of the Muslim rebellion. A post-Marcos government of whatever description will face problems in the southern Philippines.

Milton, Gen. T.R. "The Questionable Future of the Philippines." Air Force Magazine (Washington, DC), vol. 68, September 1985, pp. 142-51. UG633.A65

Air Force General Milton sounds a warning, noting that Manila is not even close to going the way of Saigon, but neither was Saigon in 1960. The NPA has so far not disturbed the US bases in the Philippines, but all rhetoric indicates they are on the target list. NPA armed guerrilla strength is estimated at 10,000, with as many as one million supporters. There are 14 guerrilla fronts in Luzon, 7 in the Visayas, and 19 in Mindanao. Most NPA weapons have been captured from the Philippine military, especially from the Civilian Home Defense Forces, a poorly-trained, undisciplined paramilitary force charged with local security. Outside material support is minimal. The author points out, however, that with the USSR firmly entrenched at Camranh Bay, supply runs across the South China Sea would be child's play, if it should ever come to that. The "seedy reputation" of the Philippine armed forces is a major contributor to the unpopularity of the Marcos regime. According to Milton, "A reformed military, adequately paid, trained, and disciplined could deal with the NPA in short order." In a call for new leadership, the author regrets that, just as the United States has no more MacArthurs, the Philippines has no more Magsaysays.

"Murder City." Asiaweek, vol. 11, no. 37, 13 September 1985, pp. 6-18. DSl.A715

The Philippine military claims to have gained the upper hand in the country's third largest city, Davao. The city, which has seen 600 murders already in 1985, suffers as a major battlefield for a variety of contending forces, including the Philippine military, paramilitary groups, the NPA, the MNLF, and ordinary gangsters. Often described as a laboratory for NPA urban guerrilla tactics, Davao was reportedly one-third under Communist control in 1984 and early 1985. The military claims they have now turned the tide; the NPA says they have simply made a tactical retreat. NPA coercive measures, including heavy taxation, are cited as causes for dwindling support for the guerrillas. NPA stock among MNLF sympathizers also has fallen considerably since two MNLF men were killed by NPA sparrow units (assassination teams) in Davao in 1983. In a recent change of tactics, the Davao NPA has announced it will support "progressive, pro-people candidates" in the May 1986 local elections, in contrast to its boycott of the 1984 elections. The NPA continues to do a considerable amount of experimenting in its Davao laboratory.

Mydans, Seth. "Marcos Reassures Laxalt on Rebels." New York Times, 17 October 1985, p. A3.

President Marcos assured President Reagan's personal envoy that the Philippine Government will defeat the NPA just as it defeated the Huk rebellion of the 1950s and the MNLF insurgency in the 1970s. Senator Paul Laxalt met with Marcos on 16 October, reportedly to ask the Philippine president for a frank assessment of his government's stability. In contrast to Marcos' optimism, US Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth stated last week that the NPA rebellion "is widespread, better organized, and even more committed than previous insurgencies."

Nemenzo, Francisco. "The Left and the Traditional Opposition." In The Philippines After Marcos, pp. 45-69. Edited by Francisco Nemenzo and Ronald James May. New York: St. Martins Press, 1985. 239 pp. DS686.5.P486 1985

The NPA has at least 12,000 fulltime guerrillas and 35,000 part-time militiamen; it operates in 400 of 1,500 municipalities, and controls 20 percent of the small towns and villages of the Philippines. A large percentage of the non-Communist leftist opposition in the Philippines has been driven underground and into the camp of the NPA and its parent organization, the CPP, by martial law and other repressive actions of the Marcos government. The main Christian leftist group that has struggled to remain outside the Communist movement is the underground Philippine Democratic Socialist Party (PDSP). Government harassment of the PDSP, however, has driven its membership increasingly to join forces with the NDF, the political arm of the CPP. The author envisions three possible scenarios for the post-Marcos days to come and speculates as to how the Communist and Christian leftist opposition, as well as the traditional opposition, would respond to each. He predicts that the left will neither be a contender for power nor a participant in a ruling coalition in the early post-Marcos years, but it will be able to influence events by use of its enormous capacity for political destabilization. The chances of a successful NDF-led revolution thereafter will depend in part on how well the CCP can deal with the non-Communist elements in such a coalition. An arrogant CCP leadership could, he notes, commit fatal errors that would quickly wipe out the Communist gains of the Marcos years.

Keller, Bill. "Marcos Reported to Offer Pledges on Political and Military Changes." New York Times, 23 October 1985, pp. A1, A6.

Following his meeting with President Marcos, US Senator Paul Laxalt reported that the Philippine president had agreed to permit American observers at the 1986 and 1987 elections and to relax his control over the Philippine Armed Forces. Laxalt also brought back from Manila a long report by the Philippine military asserting that the government is successfully containing the Communist insurgency. Other accounts of the meeting stated that Marcos listened to Laxalt's presentation of Reagan administration concerns about the spreading NPA insurgency and the need for economic, political, and military reform, but "dismissed Laxalt's points one by one."

"Police Kill Anti-US Protester in Manila." New York Times, 22 October 1985, p. A3.

Rock-throwing demonstrators who protested in front of the American Embassy painted the initials NPA in red on buildings as they retreated before Manila riot police yesterday. The 3,000 demonstrators, including mostly young provincial farmers and some militant radicals, were protesting rural poverty and government rice-pricing policies. Witnesses reported that the police fired at the demonstrators who attacked them with rocks after a police jeep moved into their line of march to the presidential palace. One protester was killed and another critically injured. This was the second farmers' rally in a month to end in the shooting of demonstrators. Rural militia forces fired at a rally in Escalante, Negros, on 21 September, killing at least 21. Yesterday's demonstrators carried signs protesting the "Escalante massacre."

Rush, James R. "The Philippine Church." UFST (Universities Field Staff International) Reports. (Hanover, NH), nos. 31-32, 1984.

In a two-part report the author explores the role of the Catholic Church in contemporary Philippine life and traces its historical evolution from pillar of the state to supporter of liberation theology and social activism. Part 2 of the report deals with BCCs (Basic Christian Community), a concept introduced into the Philippines from Latin America in the early 1970s. These small, organized communities led by lay people have proliferated, especially in remote areas where the clergy is thinly spread. The BCCs, as well as many of the clergy that support them, have come under increasing attack for alleged NPA connections. Indeed, in some cases, the BCCs have made pragmatic accommodations to NPA units operating in their areas. Hundreds of BCC lay leaders have reportedly been arrested, interrogated, tortured, and killed. BCC supporters among the clergy have also been attacked, jailed, or deported (in the case of foreign missionaries). Whatever the outcome of the current Philippine political crisis, the Church will play a primary role, both as an institution and a cultural, moral force.

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Benigno, Teodoro. "Another Alarm Bell from Reagan to Marcos." Indonesia Times, (Jakarta), 19 October 1985, p. 4.

The loss of the Philippines to communist forces and a subsequent Philippine-Soviet alliance would be a graver setback to US policy in the Pacific than the Vietnam debacle, according to foreign affairs analysts. The most dire consequence would be the loss of Subic Bay facilities, which service the 7th fleet. If these subsequently came under Soviet control, Moscow would be provided with a "naval fork" (one prong Camranh Bay, one prong Subic Bay) aimed at the Strait of Malacca, Japan's lifeline to Middle East oil. Also threatened by a Soviet presence at Subic would be the security of the other ASEAN countries, the Pacific Basin Community project, and US strategic ally, China.

Branigin, William. "Philippine Insurgency." Washington Post, 11 November 1985, pp. A1, A28.

Of recent revolutionary struggles, the Philippine communist insurgency compares most closely to Nicaragua, rather than Iran or Vietnam with which some observers have tried to draw parallels. Both Nicaragua and the Philippines are former Spanish colonies strongly influenced by Roman Catholicism. In both there is a merging of the communist and legal opposition groups to form a united front. The CPP itself notes that the political struggle could outpace the armed struggle. "We never delude ourselves that we can achieve power through elections," according to a NDF activist. "We only look at elections as one of the possible ways of strengthening our forces." Meanwhile the rapidly expanding NPA is feeling the pinch of a lack of outside materiel assistance. One observer notes that it has gone about as far as it can with M-16s and bolos (knives). The insurgents would welcome support from the Soviets, but have little hope of receiving any. The Soviets, who view the CPP as a Chinese influenced adventurist movement, have carefully cultivated good relations with the Marcos government and support only the Philippine Communist Party (PCP). The PCP, after waging an unsuccessful rebellion in the 1950s, (the Huk movement), reached an agreement with the Marcos government in 1974 by which it formally renounced armed struggle.

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The Chinese stopped supporting the CPP in the 1970s, forcing the Philippine communists to adopt a program of extreme self-reliance. According to NPA sources, most of their support now comes from leftist groups in Western Europe, rather than the socialist bloc. Some observers feel it may be too late for the Soviets to make inroads with the CPP that would lead to a major presence should the US withdraw from its bases. A recent NDF document states that the Philippine communists seek the political and material support of other countries and revolutionary movements and organizations abroad," however, "no foreign power shall be allowed to set up military bases on Philippine soil."

Buruma, Ian. "Salvaging, Liquidating, and Winning Hearts and Minds." Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), vol. 130, no. 46, 21 November 1985, pp. 59-61. HC411.F18

Mindanao's urban poor find themselves caught in the crossfire between NPA coercion tactics and government military and paramilitary units that swoop through their neighborhoods look for NPA members, often looting homes in the process.

Jones, Gregg. "Philippines Governor Murdered." Guardian, (Manchester), 24 October 1985, p. 8.

Gregorio Nurillo, governor of Surigao del Sur Province in Mindanao, was killed yesterday by suspected communist guerrillas. He was the highest Philippine public official to be killed by the NPA in recent years. In another Mindanao development, the commander of the Bangsa Moro Islamic Army, Al Haj Murad, announced yesterday that the Muslims are preparing for a new jihad (holy war) on the southern island.

Keller, Bill. "Study Warns of Soviet Moves in the Philippines." New York Times, 1 November 1985, p. A11.

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Unless the Philippine Government undergoes major reforms in the next two or three years, democracy will collapse in that country under the combined weight of military insurgency, economic decline, and political unrest, according to a report released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senior Pentagon and State Department officials testifying this week before another Senate committee estimated that without government reforms the NPA will achieve military stalemate in 3-5 years. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dave Durenberger stated that, based on the report prepared for his committee by US civilian and military intelligence agencies, the 3-5-year timeframe is not realistic. "The committee is saying the Philippines has about a 2-year window of opportunity in which to insure a democratic leadership in the country rather than some kind of an anarchical, potentially Marxist-oriented leadership," according to Durenberger. The situation is so grim, he said, that President Reagan should be preparing to adopt "a democratic alternative" in Manila in the event that the Marcos Government begins to collapse.

Lohr, Steve. "Inside the Philippine Insurgency." New York Times Magazine, 3 November 1985, pp. 40-60.

This rambling background piece is the result of numerous interviews with NPA leaders and soldiers, Philippine military and political officials, opposition leaders, and Manila businessmen. Not surprisingly, their views on the NPA, its intentions, and its prospects for success vary widely. While Marcos supporters call US estimates of NPA control of 20 percent of barrios as exaggerated, Filipinos living in NPA areas report that communist Barrio Revolutionary Councils control as many as 50 percent of the barrios in their areas. Although the NPA is not above extorting funds (taxes) by force and using coercion to gain support, it is still widely perceived as a benevolent organization, performing tasks for the community that the government should but doesn't. The communists have also developed a great deal of flexibility in the past decade, adapting their strategies to Philippine conditions. On the question of foreign support, NPA officials state it

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will be difficult to win without military materiel from overseas, especially such heavy weapons as artillery.

"MNLF Ceasing All Guerrilla Activities." Indonesia Times, (Jakarta), 18 October 1985, p. 7.

The MNLF faction led by Dimas Pundato said in a statement sent to the Manila bureau of Agence France Presse that it was stopping all guerrilla activities in order to pave the way for a peaceful solution of the 13-year-old rebellion. In the statement Pundato urged President Marcos to guarantee "freedom of entry and exit" of MNLF leaders for a peace conference to be held in Manila November 24-25, 1985. The convention was reportedly being organized by 37 moderate Muslim groups comprising the Conference of Bangsa Moro Islamic Organizations. The goal of the convention organizers was "to work out the resumption of the peace process for the full and faithful implementation of the Tripoli agreement of 1976." Pundato said his group was calling off a major offensive on Mindanao so the convention could take place.

Moffett, George D., III "Gathering Storm in the Philippines." Christian Science Monitor, (Boston), 31 October 1985, pp. 1, 36.

The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony this week on what approach to take toward the faltering government of President Marcos in order to avoid another Iran. Debate centers around US security assistance to the Philippine Government, which Reagan administration critics say should be tied to achievement of substantial reforms by the Marcos regime. The flaw in this logic, according to US Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Armitage, is that without US support, the Philippine Army, which is already "flailing about in an agony of shortages," will be unable to fight communism and make needed reforms at the same time.

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Mydans, Seth. "Philippine Aide Says Defeat of Rebels May Take A Decade." New York Times, 12 November 1985, p. A14.

It will take at least a decade before the Philippine communist insurgency can be contained, stated Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile in an interview this week. This prediction differed sharply from President Marcos' statement last week that the insurgency would be defeated in one year. Last month Marcos and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos disagreed on estimates of the fighting strength of the insurgency, Marcos putting it at 9,000 and Ramos at 12,500.

"Philippine Communist Insurgency Incidents Increase by 25 Percent". Indonesian Observer, (Jakarta), 9 September 1985, p. 4.

Philippine communist insurgency-related incidents have increased 25 percent in 1985, according to Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos. Incidents have averaged 13 per day this year with daily fatalities averaging 7 NPA rebels, 3 government soldiers, and 4 civilians. Ramos warned that although the NPA is more visible, more dangerous in terms of national security are the propaganda and recruitment tactics of the NDF.

"Philippine Government Accused of Seeking Malaysian Aid." Indonesia Times, (Jakarta), 28 October 1985, p.7.

The CPP today accused the Philippine Government of seeking Malaysian aid for its counterinsurgency campaign in Mindanao. Specifically the CPP charged the Marcos government with blocking moves in the National Assembly to probe an alleged Malaysian raid on Maranas Island in the Philippines Sulu Province, in September. "The regime has been maintaining its relations with Malaysia in an unprincipled manner because it wants the latter's cooperation in its counterinsurgency operations in Mindanao." Earlier in the month the MNLF faction led by Dimas Pundato accused the Nur Misuari MNLF faction of

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perpetrating the pirate raid that precipitated the Malaysian attack on Maranas.

"Philippines: In the Wake of Laxalt." Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, (Washington, DC), vol. 14, no. 212, 1 November 1985, p. 1. UAl0.D428

Estimates of NPA strength given by Philippine Acting Armed Forces Commander Lt Gen Fidel Ramos are at variance with those maintained by President Marcos. Both, however, are considerably lower than those of a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) issued by an interagency commission comprising US intelligence-gathering bodies. The SNIE report gives the strength of the NPA as 15,000 with up to 35,000 if unarmed guerrillas are counted, and the CPP is estimated to have 60,000 members and a million supporters. Although publicly discounting reports of growing NPA strength, Marcos has recently taken steps to began building up the Philippine Army. He has released \$27 million to form 5 additional battalions as part of an overall plan to form at least 11 new infantry battalions, a Marine battalion landing team, and an engineering brigade. He has also ordered an overhaul of the 70,000-man Civilian Home Defense Force.

Sacerdoti, Guy and Ian Buruma. "From Huks and Maoists into a Filipinized Party." Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), 21 November 1985, pp. 56-57. HC411.F18

As this brief background article on the CPP points out, the party leadership has developed its own Filipino brand of communist ideology, selecting and rejecting tenets at will from models presented by Soviet, Chinese, Cambodian, and Nicaraguan communist parties. Mostly the CPP has learned from the mistakes of its Philippine communist predecessor, the PCP, which led the Huk movement of the 1940s and 1950s. Unlike the PCP, the CCP has insisted on military rather than a parliamentary struggle, decentralized operations, and a widening of the leadership so that slain or captured leaders can be easily replaced.

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Sacerdoti, Guy and Philip Bowring. "Marx, Mao, and Marcos." Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), vol. 130, no. 46, 21 November 1985, pp. 52-57. HC411.F18

In this lengthy and informative cover story, the authors examine the problems and prospects of both the CPP/NDF/NPA and the noncommunist forces opposed to the Marcos government. Even more dramatic than the military success of the NPA in the past two years has been the political success of the NDF, which has exploited military abuses, the Aquino assassination, corruption, and the economic crisis to create a CPP-influenced united front that will continue to cause problems for both the Marcos and post-Marcos governments. Some CPP cadres see a danger in too close an association with noncommunists, fearing the party could "lose its way" if it becomes too involved with groups that lack an ideological base. The CPP has learned from the mistakes of the communist-led Huk movement of the 1940s and 1950s, particularly in decentralizing implementation of its programs and establishing a nationwide cell structure. This decentralization carries with it, however, the danger of disintegration of the party's power into warlordism. The CCP/NDF/NPA also face problems caused by too rapid growth, which strains available resources and opens the possibility that the leadership could be swallowed up by opportunistic groups and individuals. In time the party could also fall prey to two problems that plague other Philippine political groups--lack of discipline and emphasis on personalities rather than policies. Other problems the communists face include a post-Marcos moderate government that enjoys a honeymoon period with the Philippine people and an economic surge supported by the US, Japan, and the Western allies, causing the NDF to lose much of its support. Another scenario, the return to martial law, might also cause a falling-off of NDF support. This change-of-pace article points out that, for all the recent success enjoyed by the communists, many pitfalls line the road to Malacanang.

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Crossette, Barbara. "Why the Philippines Is Making Its Neighbors Nervous." New York Times, 24 November 1985, p. E2.

The member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) fret about their Philippine partner and the current economic and political instability in that country. Pledged not to interfere in each others' internal affairs, the ASEAN states can only offer financial and moral support. Meanwhile, perhaps their biggest fear is the possibility of an NPA-MNLF alliance, which could have repercussions in the neighboring Muslim countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei.

Dominguez, Captain Roberto I. and Sta. Ana, Anna P. "The Philippine Scout Ranger." Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii), vol. 10, no. 2, fall 1985, pp. 47-49.

An elite military combat unit, the Philippine Scout Rangers is being used against both the MNLF and NPA insurgencies. The Scouts, who are trained in both jungle and urban counterinsurgency tactics, were originally activated during the 1950s to fight the communist-led Huk insurgency. In 1971 they were reactivated to fight the MNLF in Mindanao but are now being used to counter the NPA insurgency as well.

"Excerpts from Aquino Interview on Candidacy". New York Times, 16 December 1985, p. A10.

Philippine presidential candidate Corazon Aquino tells a New York Times interviewer that, if elected, she will call for a 6-month cease-fire and dialogue with the NPA. The majority of NPA supporters, she says, are not Communists but have joined that group because they cannot obtain justice under Marcos. According to her advisors, Aquino states, "Communism has no chance in the country because it goes against the grain of Filipino culture."

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"Excerpts from Marcos's Interview on His Soldiers and Foes".
New York Times, 17 December 1985, p. A10.

Factionalism in the Philippine military caused by rivalry between Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver and his deputy Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos has hampered efforts to combat the NPA insurgency, according to President Ferdinand Marcos. He estimated that of 42,000 villages in the country, the Communists definitely control 4,000 and influence another 5,000 through coercion and intimidation.

Nevertheless, he predicts the Filipino people will never accept Communism. Marcos blamed American pressure to oust Ver as a source of the factionalism, which he said led to a slowdown in counterinsurgency efforts. The president indicated that this problem had been ended and revealed that six new battallions were being trained and that total autonomy would be given to some local commanders who are particularly effective.

Iten, Oswald. "Smouldering Philippine Civil War." Swiss Review of World Affairs (Zurich), vol. 35, no. 7, October 1985. D839.S9

The Philippine military continues to make serious mistakes in its efforts to counter the NPA insurgency in Mindanao. Commanders are divided between those favoring a tough approach and those who see as a priority the need to win the hearts and minds of the people. Militating against the latter approach is the use of the paramilitary Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), which employs heavy-handed tactics in dealing with the people. Even worse are the tactics of bands of armed marauders led by former CHDF officers known as "lost command" officers. The government has also been accused of supplying members of religious cults with arms to fight against the NPA. Meanwhile, little is done to address the grievances of the NPA supporters in such places as the impoverished slums of Davao City.

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"Manila's Other Insurgency". Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 11 November 1985, p. 8.

More dangerous than the NPA is the NDF, according to this editorial warning. Although technically banned, the 100,000-strong NDF works through dozens of front groups, including labor unions, student and teacher organizations, journalist groups, and religious bodies. In a country still skittish about Communism, NDF rhetoric talks about Marcos rather than Marx. Philippine moderate oppositionists led by Agapito (Butz) Aquino walked out of a conference to form a broad opposition alliance called Bayan when it became clear that NDF leftists were bent on controlling the organization. In several demonstrations since then, the Communists have rallied under red banners and democratic oppositionists have marched under yellow banners.

Munro, Ross H. "The New Khmer Rouge." Commentary (New York), vol. 80, no. 6, December 1985, pp. 19-38.

The author makes the valid point that the media have at times tended to romanticize the Communist insurgency in the Philippines and have not always provided a balanced view of abuses by both the Philippine Government and the NPA. The author, however, falls prey to the same lack of objectivity of which he accuses other journalists, using emotionalism and sensationalism to make his case.

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "History of Philippines Communist Party." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 26 November 1985, p. 12.

The CPP is now headed by a three-man politburo including: Party Chairman Rodolfo Salas, a former university lecturer; Party Secretary-General Rafael Baylosis, another former academic; and Tony Zumel, former journalist and brother of one of the youngest generals in the Philippine military. The NPA, according to independent sources, has about 32,000 fighters, including 12,000 regulars and

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20,000 local guerrillas. The party and the NPA claim to operate in 58 of the country's 73 provinces and control 5 million people. They also claim to engage in about 12 military operations a week.

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Philippine Insurgents Are Turning Down Soviet Support." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 2 November 1985, pp. 1,12.

The CPP leadership has rejected a Soviet offer of substantial military aid according to well-informed sources in Manila. The offer, which reportedly was made to the West German support organization of the NDF, proposed to supply the guerrillas with enough weapons to "consolidate their advantage" over the government troops. Exact numbers of weapons reportedly were not mentioned, but the terms of the offer may have coincided with CPP plans to increase its fighting strength by 40 percent over the next 3 years. The offer, described as the most concrete offer from Moscow, was relayed to the Communist leadership in the Philippines. Reported reasons for turning down the offer include CPP suspicion of Soviet expansionism, fear that Soviet assistance would bring US intervention, and the problems of ensuring a regular supply of outside weaponry. Presumably the aid would be channeled through Moscow's ally, Vietnam, which reportedly has sent feelers in the past. The CPP, however, continues to oppose Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Spaeth, Anthony. "Media Discover 'Crisis' in Philippines." Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 14 November 1985, p. 1,9.

The crisis in the Philippines is taking place largely in the foreign press, on US television screens, and in the American imagination, according to foreign diplomats and Philippine Government officials in Manila. Life goes on as usual in the Philippines, and little has changed in the past two years since the Aquino assassination brought droves of journalists to Manila. The current crisis began

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in October 1985 when President Reagan sent Senator Paul Laxalt to deliver a message of personal concern to President Marcos. The media, according to the author, interpreted this as a sign that the United States believed the situation in the Philippines was deteriorating drastically. "I think that Americans see on TV something they think is familiar, something they saw before on the same tube from Argentina, Iran, Vietnam, and Nicaragua," states Philippine Labor Minister Blas Ople. "And if something is missing in the comparison, their imagination supplies it."

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"Aquino Says Communists Wouldn't Join the Cabinet". New York Times, 7 January 1986, p. A3.

Opposition presidential candidate Corazon Aquino says she will not form a coalition cabinet with Communists. She would, however, welcome Communists into the government as long as they renounce all forms of violence and opt to be a part of the electoral process. Aquino also denies President Marcos' allegations that she is being supported and advised by Communists.

"Back with the People". Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol. 131, no. 1, 2 January 1986, pp. 14-15.
HC411.F18

The NPA lacks the war materiel necessary to supply all the men and women who want to join the insurgency, according to Satur Ocampo, a leading Philippine Communist and journalist who recently escaped after 9 years in government detention. In an interview at a secret rendezvous with US journalist Charles Steiner, Ocampo discusses Communist fundraising methods, the insurgency's view of the Aquino-led opposition, the CPP's views of foreign investors, and possible socialist government role models, including China and Nicaragua.

Barnes, Fred. "The Shaking of a President." New Republic (Washington, DC), vol. 194, no. 6, 10 February 1986, pp. 6-20.. AP2.N624

President Marcos' campaign rhetoric includes accusations that his opponent, Corazon Aquino, has close connections with both the Communists and the Muslim MNLF. He has repeatedly accused her of having Communist advisors and supporters. A recent meeting between Aquino's brother-in-law, Agapito (Butz) Aquino, and MNLF leader Nur Misuari in Madrid sparked charges that a deal had been made to create a separate Muslim state in the southern Philippines. Both Aquinos deny the charge and insist they oppose secession.

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Bonner, Raymond and Singer, Max. "What Will Happen After the Philippine Election?" New York Times, 12 January 1986, p. E27.

In juxtaposed articles the two authors give differing answers to the title's question. Bonner states that the Philippines appears to be hurtling toward a full-scale civil war that will not be averted by an election, no matter how fair, even if Marcos loses. The NPA will not give up its aim of establishing a Communist state, even if a central government institutes economic reforms. Bonner also notes that arms are pouring into the country, not for the NPA, but for the private armies of the wealthy, particularly the sugar barons of Negros. Singer believes that Marcos can win the election without force or fraud, and that, if he does, "he could well move toward some important reforms of the Philippine system."

Madison, Christopher. "Rare White House-Congress Consensus Emerges on Policy Toward Philippines." National Journal (Washington, DC), 30 November 1985, pp. 2702-12. JK1.N28

The Reagan administration, although in agreement with Congressional Democrats on the seriousness of the Philippine situation, would fight a cutoff of aid to the Marcos regime on the theory that it would hasten the day when the Communist insurgency may topple the Manila government. However, the Reagan administration believes the Filipino people will reject the Communist insurgency only if there is a democratic alternative, which Washington is urging Marcos to provide in the form of free elections. Both Congress and the White House have concluded that the Philippine Armed Forces would have difficulty in defeating the insurgency and that, because of military corruption and abuse of civilians, they lack the support of most Filipinos.

"Marcos Alleges Election Threats". Guardian (Manchester), 6 January 1986, p. 6.

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President Marcos claims the Communists have threatened to wipe out entire villages if their residents vote for Marcos in the 7 February elections. Speaking at a fishing community near Manila, he repeats a charge that "our opponents helped organize the Communists and enjoy the support of the New People's Army."

Murphy, Denis. "Violence in the Philippines." America (New York) 2 November 1985, pp. 278-81. BX801.A5

The level of violence on both sides--the NPA and Philippine Government forces--continues to escalate. Political violence in the Philippines has caused more than 100,000 deaths since martial law was declared in 1972--more Filipinos than were killed in World War II. Bearing the brunt of the killing are poor, rural Filipinos, with those involved in religious or farmers' movements living the most dangerously.

Mydans, Seth. "Close Call for Plane Carrying Marcos." New York Times, 19 January 1986, p. A3.

Communism continues to be a major issue in the Philippine presidential campaign. President Marcos accuses Corazon Aquino of being soft on Communism and her assassinated husband, Benito Aquino, as having been a founder of the CPP. Aquino calls Marcos "the no. 1 recruiter of Communists" because the insurgency has escalated under his rule. In areas where Communist influence is strong, she repeats her campaign promise that "if I win I will call a cease-fire and call the rebel leaders to come down from the hills and hold a dialogue with us."

Mydans, Seth. "Philippine Rebel Calls Vote Irrelevant." New York Times, 29 December 1985, p. A5.

A Marcos victory in the upcoming elections is a "forgone conclusion" and this will lead to a further polarization and radicalization of the nation, according to a regional

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NDF leader known as Nilo. A Marcos victory, he forsees, will push the moderates to align with the progressive left. "For us that's very favorable. That ripens the conditions for a popular uprising." Nilo said the NPA will push ahead with its armed insurgency regardless of whether the NDF boycotts the election or takes part." We do not have a policy of disrupting the election. It is the military who themselves will disrupt it. You can expect us to hit the military if they do not stay in their barracks," he said.

"Opposition Victory Could Trigger Civil War, Marcos Suggests". Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 17 December 1985, p. 7.

President Marcos warns that an opposition victory in the 7 February election could trigger civil war. In a speech before a youth assembly, the president again accuses his rival, Corazon Aquino, of having links with Communist rebels and, therefore, not being able to stand up to them. "What is going to happen to our people? Are we going to have another Vietnam, another Kampuchea, another Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador?" he asked. "I say no, we are not going to. I profoundly believe that in this crucial electoral exercise...the wisdom of the Filipino people will shine through."

Smolow, Jill. "Inside the Communist Insurgency." Time (New York), 3 February 1986, pp. 36-37. AP2.T37

Flexibility and discipline are the keys to the success of the Communist insurgency in the Philippines. Whether working in poor, remote areas or the affluent sections of major cities, NPA cadres adjust their tactics and lifestyle to suit. In a newly-targeted NPA area, benevolent tactics soon give way to coercion and killing. Among methods employed by the Philippine military in countering NPA activity is the showing of the film "The Killing Fields," which depicts the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

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Spaeth, Anthony. "Marcos Uses Media to Polish His Image." Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 31 October 1985, p. 1.

Three thousand former NPA sympathizers pledge their loyalty to the Philippine Government of President Marcos in a ceremony in Polanco, Mindanao. Local observers predict that, after the journalists and Manila officials leave, however, the area and its people will return to the NPA.

Suryohadiprojo, Sayidiman. "How Will the Philippines Solve Her Problems?" Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 17 December 1985, p. 4.

The member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are watching with concern the deteriorating economic and political situation in the Philippines. This Indonesian author plots in some detail the probable stages of a Communist takeover in the Philippines, comparing the situation to Cuba and Nicaragua. He also gives a blueprint for what the Philippine Government and people must do to avoid a Communist takeover, without sounding very convinced that the necessary steps will be taken. The Moro problem, which he considers even more difficult, will not be solved until the Communist problem is solved. He asks, but never answers, the intriguing question, "How will ASEAN proceed if one of its members turns Communist?"

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines. S. Prt. 99-99, 99th Cong., 1st sess., November 1985.

This report by Congressional Research Service staff member Larry A. Niksch discusses in some detail Communist strategy and tactics in the Philippines and the response, or lack of response, by the Marcos government. Once the CPP has organized the villages in an area, main force NPA guerrilla units operate from that area, which is called a base. Recruits and supplies are provided locally.

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Available data suggests that one-third to one-half of the NPA regulars are in Mindanao, with Samar Island, the Bicol peninsula, and Cagayan Province in northern Luzon having sizeable concentrations as well. Company and even battalion-sized attacks have been mounted by the NPA, but the insurgents are, as yet, unable to supply and protect such large units on a permanent basis. Payments extracted from local and multinational businesses are the major sources of funds for the insurgency. The CPP reportedly plans to stage popular uprisings in the major cities of Mindanao within the next three years, to be coordinated with NPA attacks. The CPP states it is ready to participate in a coalition government, but views such a coalition as an interim step toward a "socialist government."

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"ASEAN and Communist Insurgency." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 15 January 1986, p. 4.

This editorial discusses a 3-day conference held in January by ASEAN foreign ministry officials to assess the impact of the Communist threat on regional stability. The meeting was expected to focus special attention on the NPA insurgency in the Philippines, with the writer stating that, if the Philippines is lost to Communism, ASEAN will be in great difficulty. He urged the diplomats to come up with a joint means of overcoming the Communist threat and noted Indonesian Armed Forces Commander General L. B. Murdani's recent trip to Manila to deliver two Casa aircraft, loaned to the Philippines for their counterinsurgency efforts.

"ASEAN Officials to Discuss Communist Insurgency." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 11 January 1986, p. 1.

Senior ASEAN foreign ministry officials met for 3 days in Manila to discuss possible areas of cooperation in countering the rising tide of Communist insurgency in the region, particularly the Philippines. The meeting followed a visit to the Philippines by a 10-member Indonesian military delegation led by Armed Forces Commander General L. B. Murdani to turn over two military transport aircraft for use by Filipino troops in fighting Communist guerrillas.

Butterfield, Fox. "Rebels to Fight On, a Communist Says." New York Times, 27 February 1986, p. A14.

The NPA will continue its insurgency, despite the departure of Ferdinand Marcos, according to a CPP official. Speaking unofficially, Ka Joyce (Comrade Joyce, a CPP founder), stated that the new government was expected to pursue the same repressive policies as the Marcos government, with President Corazon Aquino serving as a figurehead for the real power, which will be wielded by Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos. The CPP official predicted that the Aquino government would not tackle the major problems of

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poverty, unequal distribution of wealth, and peasant landlessness because most of the new leaders have large landholdings and fortunes they will want to protect. Communist sources also said that Marcos' ouster was stage-managed by the United States, which will continue to retain its military bases in the Philippines.

Deming, Angus. "Targeting the NPA." Newsweek (New York), 17 February 1986, pp. 20-21. AP2.N6772

According to this report, Pentagon officials have been studying options to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) fight the NPA more effectively. These include: sending two companies of US advisors, probably Army Green Berets, to the AFP training base at Ft. Magsaysay to help train new recruits and retrain and reequip existing battalions; redirecting AFP procurement practices away from hi-tech weapons and back toward the sort of materiel needed to fight an insurgency; encouraging the AFP to undertake more civic action programs, such as road, dam, and bridge construction; and revising the US base agreement to make the US more responsible for base defense, freeing that part of the AFP involved in protecting the bases for counterinsurgency efforts.

Guyot, Erik. "Hearts and Minds (Again)". The Progressive (Madison, WI), vol. 50, no. 1, January 1986, pp. 28-31. AP2.L28

The Pentagon approach to the Philippine Communist insurgency has a familiar ring to it, according to the author. In the recommended three-pronged approach, combining civic action, psychological operations, and tactical operations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is being outperformed by the Communists on all fronts. Very little of Marcos' \$55 million civic action program funds seems to have reached the areas where it is most needed. The NPA is easily winning the "propaganda war" over the sadly discredited AFP. The NPA, which initiates most military encounters, also has the tactical

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edge on the badly demoralized, corruption-ridden AFP. All attempts at military reform under the Marcos government have failed dismally. General Fidel Ramos' past as head of the notorious Philippine constabulary weighs against future reform efforts, according to the author. A US State Department paper leaked to the press in early 1985 recommends the use of US advisors for training, something that also has a familiar ring to it.

"Indonesia Sending Two Military Planes to Manila." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 10 January 1986, p.1.

Indonesian Armed Forces Commander General L. B. Murdani flew to Manila for the turnover ceremony of two Indonesian aircraft to the Philippine military to be used in that country's counterinsurgency efforts. The two Casa planes will be used for transporting troops and supplies to counter Communist guerrillas in the countryside. The planes are being loaned for a 3-month period, renewable on request. Indonesia is the first ASEAN member to extend military assistance to the Philippines for use against Communist insurgency. It was not known whether other ASEAN countries would follow suit. Murdani was also scheduled to receive a briefing on the state of the insurgency.

Kaylor, Robert. "Rebels Take to Offensive." US News & World Report (Washington, DC), 10 February 1986, pp. 34-35.
AP2.U18

Part of a longer report on the Philippines, this article reviews the current estimated strength of the NPA (30,000 guerrillas, including 15,000 who are armed) and quotes US analysts who warn that in another 3 to 5 years the Communist insurgents will be too powerful to be defeated by the Philippine military without outside help. In a related sidebar commentary, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Paul Wolfowitz also warns that the NPA can be beaten, but it must be done soon or it will take a protracted and difficult struggle to do so.

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"Manila's Troubled Outlook." US News and World Report
(Washington, DC), 17 February 1986, p. 3. AP2.U18

Time is running out for the Philippine military. Unless there is a major reform and reorganization, "the future of the Philippines remains in serious doubt, no matter who sits in the presidential palace," according to a senior Philippine military officer. Without a major overhaul the military has no hope of checking the NPA. "The armed forces are all that stops the NPA,...and we're getting clobbered everywhere," he states.

Mydans, Seth. "The Philippine Middle Class: Turning Against Marcos." New York Times, 2 February 1986, pp. 20-59.

The radicalization of an upper-middle-class Philippine family is chronicled in this report. The author notes that many new Marcos opponents have a somewhat "Robin Hood" image of the NPA as an avenger of the abuses of corrupt government officials, who are otherwise left unchecked, particularly in rural areas.

"The Philippines: After Marcos, What?". Current Affairs Bulletin
(Sydney), vol. 62, no. 2, July 1985, pp. 18-25.

Exploring the various possible successors to the Marcos government, the author concludes that a CPP road to power is apt to be long and difficult. The Communists will benefit from any prolongation of the Philippine economic crisis, a major recruiting incentive for the NPA. Rapid expansion is not without problems for the NPA, however, as it struggles to train and equip new recruits and sort out the promising ones from the thugs and opportunists. The Philippines' archipelagic geography also continues to present formidable supply and communications problems for the NPA, who are a long way yet from being able to "encircle the cities." One of the most serious problems the Communists would face, should they ever come to power, is the MNLF in Mindanao, who have a far longer history of resistance to central authority of any kind than do the Communists.

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Rosenberger, Leif. "Philippine Communism and the Soviet Union."
Survey: A Journal of East & West Studies (London) vol.29,
no. 2, Spring 1985, pp. 113-45. DK1.S549

In a long background piece on the CPP, the author makes a case for much closer support of the Philippine Communists by Moscow than is usually acknowledged.

Sacerdoti, Guy. "The Left Sees Long-Term Gain." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 27 February 1986, pp. 15-16.
HC411.F18

CPP spokesman Anthony Zumel stated soon after the Philippine election that the CPP supported Corazon Aquino's decision to move her battle against the Marcos government to the streets. He praised the parts of Aquino's program that call for repeal of Marcos' presidential decrees, release of all political prisoners, and dismantling of the sugar and coconut monopolies. Zumel criticized Aquino, however, for not demanding an end to US bases, for supporting foreign investment, and for not making land reform a higher priority in her program. CPP's miscalculation of Aquino and the Philippine moderates was reflected in Zumel's statement that, "As we see it, this revolutionary situation that we have--as the forces of fascism intensify and as the people themselves develop their political consciousness to the point that they advance against them--it is logical that the moderate opposition will tend to contract as forces go to one side or the other."

"Sparring over Communists." Asiaweek (Hong Kong), 12 January 1986, p. 13 DS1.A715

The Communist insurgency was a major issue in the recent Philippine election. Marcos asserted that if Cory Aquino won she would name an all-Communist cabinet and the NPA would make a grab for power within 6 months. Aquino, in turn, attacked the Marcos government for its ineffectualness in dealing with the insurgency. Injected into the fray was a statement from jail by former CPP

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chairman Jose Maria Sison endorsing the Aquino-Laurel ticket as "far, far better and more acceptable."

Sun, Lena H. "Marcos Supporter Plans to Lead Opposition in Philippines." Washington Post, 27 February 1986, p. 27.

Former Marcos government Labor Minister Blas Ople states that the election of President Corazon Aquino lends new credibility to the struggle against the NPA. "The guerrillas are like fish in ponds," he noted, "and Aquino is in an unsurpassed position to drain the ponds." Ople intends to seek the leadership of Marcos' KBL party.

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Branigin, William. "Aquino Set to Declare Provisional Rule Today." Washington Post, 25 March 1986, pp. A1, A10.

The NPA and NDF announced in separate statements that they were ready to talk to the Aquino administration about a ceasefire with government troops. This was the first formal response to President Aquino's call for a ceasefire and negotiation. The NDF statement, however, made it clear that the guerrillas rejected Aquino's demand that they give up their weapons. In a related development, the Philippine military reported that more than 1,000 Communist "cadres" gave themselves up on the island of Negros in the first "mass surrender" since Aquino came to power.

Branigin, William. "Aquino to Name Group for Negotiating Truce with Leftist Guerrillas." Washington Post, 4 March 1986, pp. A1, A23.

President Corazon Aquino stated that to negotiate with Communist insurgents she will soon name a "commission on reconciliation," which she hopes will be headed by ex-Senator Jose Diokno, a former political prisoner under the Marcos government who now heads a human rights group. The commission would offer insurgents safe passage, Aquino said, "so that we can find out just what are they asking for and in return what are they offering the government." Previously, Aquino has said that she would declare a 6-month ceasefire in the war against the insurgents and offer the guerrillas amnesty. If they continue to battle the government, however, she will "use the power of the state to fight them." Communist leaders reportedly are willing to negotiate a ceasefire if they are given certain unspecified "concessions" and do not have to surrender their weapons. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile expressed reservations about the called-for ceasefire, saying such measures are "good only if there are defined political objectives to be obtained." Enrile's statement reflects what seems to be an emerging carrot-and-stick approach to the insurgency.

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Branigin, William. "Rebels Termed Willing to Talk to Aquino." Washington Post, 28 February 1986, pp. A21, A22.

The Communists are willing to negotiate a ceasefire with President Corazon Aquino but will not surrender their arms, according to a source who has authoritatively stated CCP positions in the past. The source noted that in President Aquino's new cabinet "there are no workers or peasants, just the same ruling class." He was also critical of the presence in the cabinet of four former members of Marcos' ruling party and two other members whom he said represent "big business." Meanwhile a Western military attache stated he thought that the "NPA is back to square one. Their mass base will be stripped away and a lot of their soldiers will be stripped away. The reason they joined the NPA is gone."

Butterfield, Fox. "Communist Influence Divides Church." New York Times, 2 March 1986, p. A14.

Support for the NPA continues to be a divisive issue among the clergy of the Philippine Catholic Church. Clergy opposed to cooperation with the NDF say that priests and nuns involved in such cooperation are merely being used by the Communists. Clergy who are sympathetic to the Communist cause point out that the poverty and oppression of the people that they see every day can no longer be ignored.

Clines, Francis X. "Aquino Plans a Pilot Program for Rebel Amnesty." New York Times, 19 March 1986, p. A8.

President Corazon Aquino is proposing a pilot amnesty plan for Communist insurgents in Mindanao, which includes job training and safe haven for rebels and their families. Senior Communist officials have said they are willing to discuss a cease-fire if certain conditions are met. including reform of the military and an end to the "fascist structure" of private armies and local politicians who supported Marcos. Recently freed CCP

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founder Jose Maria Sison said amnesty talks should concentrate on such "common goals" as ending land monopolies and American imperialism. In a related development, Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos visited Negros Island, where the Communist insurgency is particularly strong, to urge civilians to speak to the rebels about accepting an amnesty.

Crossette, Barbara. "Manila Delays the Release of Four Jailed Communists." New York Times, 2 March 1986, p. A14.

Some 440 Philippine political prisoners have begun to be released from 12 detention centers around the country. The release of four top guerrilla leaders, however, has been delayed for further consideration. The four include CPP founder Jose Maria Sison, former NPA commander Bernabe Buscayno, Ruben Allegre (reported to be involved in the murder of a police general), and Alex Birondo (charged with involvement in an assassination attack on security forces). Among those released so far are former government official Horatio Morales, former university president Nemesio Prudente, and a prominent priest, Edicio de la Torre. The Aquino government has also announced that it will not arrest leftists who fled the country during the Marcos years. The first to respond to that directive was reportedly Chito Santaromana, who was due to arrive shortly from China.

"Insurgency to Come to a Head on Negros Island?" Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), December 1985, pp. 160-61.
UA830.A8

CPP-NPA spokesmen predict they can reach "strategic stalemate" with government forces on the island of Negros by 1987. The collapse of the sugar market and decades of exploitation and abuses by the "sugar barons" have made the masses of unemployed peasants and workers ripe for revolution, they report. The spokesmen also announced the opening of a new guerrilla front in northern Negros, the fourth on the island. Both official and unofficial sources reported that the NPA on Negros has about 500

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regulars backed by 2,000 rebel militia members against 5,000 government security forces and several thousand government militia units. A recent NPA raid on a maritime school's armory netted 400 M-1 rifles. Both the NPA and government forces report that they receive support from various sugar planters, in return for providing protection. An NDF spokesman stated that a number of "small and medium landlords contribute to the development of the revolution and will surely be given consideration when liberation comes."

McAmis, Robert Day. "Mindanao Impressions '85." Solidarity (Manila), no. 102, 1985, pp. 120-25. AP8.S58

The NPA appears to be losing some of its popular support in Mindanao because of its inability to fulfill its promises of economic and political reforms, according to the author. He also casts doubt on any meaningful alliance between the NPA and MNLF because of deep ideological and religious differences between the two groups. The article also surveys the government response to the insurgencies and the serious economic problems facing the people of Mindanao. This journal is published, in part, with support from the Rockefeller Foundation.

"Moros Preparing for Second Showdown with Government." Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), December 1985, pp. 161-62. UA830.A8

Philippine Muslims are preparing for a new jihad (holy war) in Mindanao, according to the commander of the Bangsa Moro Islamic Army, Al Haj Murad. Murad is also the vice chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which came into existence in 1985, splitting the MNLF into three factions. Murad, who received guerrilla training in both Pakistan and Libya, says all Muslim youths over the age of 12 are required to undergo training in the mountains, where the Muslims also reportedly have factories for manufacturing small arms and M-79 grenade launchers.

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Mydans, Seth. "2 Marcos Backers Sought by Manila." New York Times, 12 March 1986, pp. A1, A8.

Three MNLF officials, Abdullah Sangkupan, Hajji Farook Mohammad Hassan, and Hadji Napis Bidin, arrived in Manila from Malaysia for talks with the Aquino government on the issue of Muslim autonomy in the southern Philippines. The three leaders, dressed in camouflage fatigues bearing the MNLF and Bangsa Moro insignias, were an advance party for Dimas Pundato and M. Y. Abbas, leaders of an MNLF faction who are living in Sabah. The three MNLF officials issued a statement saying: "We consider the assumption to power of the new leadership under President Aquino as a historic opportunity to culminate the revolution and unite with the new leadership."

Mydans, Seth. "4 Key Communists Freed by Manila." New York Times, 6 March 1986, pp. A1, A14.

Over the objections of her military advisors, President Aquino ordered the release of four key Communist leaders, including the founder of the CPP. The four included party founder Jose Maria Sison, former NPA leader Bernabe Buscayno (alias Commander Dante), and two men described as members of assassination teams, Ruben Alegre and Alex Birondo. A total of 517 persons were in the process of being released by the Aquino government to fulfill a campaign pledge by President Aquino to free all political prisoners of the Marcos government. In interviews following his release, Sison refused to disavow the use of armed force as a means of social change. He said he might go back to writing or teaching, "or I might even volunteer my help to her government." Many leftists reportedly consider Aquino's victory as a setback to their cause. A sidebar article gives further details on Sison and Buscayno.

"Released Communist Leader Says Party Strategy to Change." Washington Post, 3 March 1986, p. A17.

Former NDF chairman Horatio Morales states that the new Aquino administration is forcing the Communists to rethink

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their strategy for gaining power. Morales, who was among the 450 political detainees recently released by the Aquino government, said the CCP will not give up its armed struggle, but will concentrate its efforts on gaining political power through infiltration. The NDF released a statement warning the Aquino government against "midnight or eleventh-hour defectors" from the Marcos government, and said the new government should not allow itself to be "entrapped within the military, constitutional, and legal machinery laid out by the previous regime over 20 years of legalized terror."

Southerland, Daniel. "Aquino Government Frees 4 Communists from Prison." Washington Post, 6 March 1986, pp. A1, A26.

Overriding objections from her military advisors, President Corazon Aquino released four Communists, including two top leaders, CCP founder Jose Maria Sison and former NPA head Bernabe Buscayno (alias Commander Dante). Although Sison did not renounce violence as a means of social change when speaking with reporters, he did say that he had signed a document promising "not to seek to overthrow the government by violent means or force." Sison, on one hand, hailed Aquino for seeking the cooperation of a broad range of forces, including the Communists, but criticized, on the other hand, her selection of a cabinet largely from the Philippine upper class and business community. Sison and Buscayno met with President Aquino, thanked her for their release, and offered to support positive aspects of her administration.

Southerland, Daniel. "Insurgency Continuing on 3 Islands." Washington Post, pp. A1, A26.

Sporadic clashes between NPA guerrillas and Philippine government forces have continued in southern Luzon, Negros, and Samar, despite efforts of the new Aquino government to seek an accommodation with the Communists. Since taking power, President Aquino has released more than 500 political prisoners and established proposals for a cease-fire. NPA spokesmen say, however, that they want

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Aquino to remove Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos, as well as meet other demands, before they will give up their arms. Statements by other NPA spokesmen have stressed the standing guerrilla requirement that the US bases in the Philippines be dismantled.

Southerland, Daniel. "Philippine Rebels Ignoring the Cease-fire Call." Manchester Guardian Weekly, 23 March 1986, p. 15.

The war goes on between the Philippine Communist insurgents and government troops, despite calls for a ceasefire by President Corazon Aquino. "It's business as usual," according to Bishop Antonio Fortich of Bacolod, Negros. "We've still got killing, ambushes, and private armies."

Stannard, Bruce. "Cory the Fairy Godmother Must Keep Her Magic Wand Working." Bulletin (Sydney), 11 March 1986, pp. 111-14.

In an interview with the author, Manila's Cardinal Sin, who reports that he has met recently with high-level Communist leaders, expresses optimism that the NPA soon will begin coming down from the hills to lay down their arms and surrender. Even if the Cardinal's optimism proves justified, Aquino still must face the problem of the Muslim insurgency in the south. Although no Muslims are in her recently announced cabinet, Aquino promised to appoint Muslim leaders to government posts and start talks on the question of autonomy for the southern Muslim-majority provinces.

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"Aquino and the Muslims." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 8 March 1986, p. 3.

President Corazon Aquino, in the midst of her problems with the Communist insurgency, is urged by this editorial writer not to forget the problems of Philippine Muslims. Aquino is praised for sending her representative to Singapore to escort the Sabah-based MNLF leaders to Manila for talks. She is also urged to meet with Middle East-based MNLF leaders, including Nur Misuari. For the sake of the Philippine Muslims and stability in Southeast Asia, the writer expresses the hope that President Aquino's reconciliation policies will be successful.

"Autonomy for Philippine Muslims." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 13 March 1986, p. 4.

The government of President Corazon Aquino will be better able to face the Communist insurgency and embark on national development if it first solves its problems with Philippine Muslims by granting autonomy to the 13 southern provinces of the country, according to this Indonesian editorial writer. Expressing brotherly Muslim concern, the writer details the struggle of the MNLF against the Marcos regime. Aquino's offer to negotiate autonomy with the MNLF is lauded and optimism is expressed about the prospects for success of the upcoming talks.

Baum, Julian. "Insurgency Issue Tests Aquino's Power." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 31 March 1986, p.7.

President Corazon Aquino faces great obstacles in bringing about a truce between the NPA and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), both of which seem to put more credence in military solutions than political solutions. In a recent statement, the NPA indicted that "with just, sincere, and prudent moves of the concerned parties, a negotiated ceasefire is possible on a nationwide scale." Communist sources indicate, however, that before a substantial political settlement is possible, the Aquino government must address the problems of land reform and demilitarization of the countryside, including reform and

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reduction of the AFP. Meanwhile, the AFP has reportedly begun strengthening military operations in areas targeted by the NPA in recent works.

Burgess, John. "Aquino Stresses Bid for Talks with Communists." Washington Post, 21 April 1986, p. A15.

Philippine President Corazon Aquino announces that she will soon make a formal call for a ceasefire, during which negotiations for the "reassimilation" of Communist insurgents will take place. After that, Aquino stated in a commencement address at the University of the Philippines, insurgents remaining in the field will face the full force of the Philippine Armed Forces again. Aquino said she will deal only with top leaders of the CCP in negotiations and warned that, if the talks failed, "it will not be the old, dispirited army of Marcos that the insurgents will face." Government forces have ceased most offensive operations since the change of government, but Communist attacks have continued in some areas, including two recent highway ambushes in which 35 soldiers were killed. Aquino described these attacks as a sign that "the message of peace has not filtered down to all combatants," but warned that she could not stand idly by for long. So far, Communist leaders have rejected of peace agreement that requires them to surrender their arms.

Colome, Robert. "Marcos's Prized Pact Is Aquino's Key to Solving Moslem Rebellion." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 18 March 1986, p.4.

Many Philippine Muslim leaders see the Tripoli Agreement, signed by President Ferdinand Marcos and MNLF leaders in 1976, as the key to ending the Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines. The agreement, which broke down within a year after it was signed, calls for the establishment of autonomy in the 13 Muslim-dominated provinces within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The key elements of the agreement give the Philippine

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Muslims the right to set up their own administrative system (including an elected parliament and executive council), judicial system (using Islamic shariah courts), education, economic, and financial systems.

Cumming-Bruce, Nicholas. "Aquino to Offer Truce Incentives to Rebels." Guardian (Manchester), 10 March 1986, p. 5.

Philippine Deputy Minister for Political Affairs Antonio Cuenco yesterday announced plans by the government of President Corazon Aquino to offer incentives to insurgents who abandon armed struggle. The offer is part of a government plan to promote national reconciliation as it prepares to negotiate with the leaders of the Communist and Muslim insurgencies. Cuenco said the government would form a council to reintegrate the former rebels into society by helping them find jobs or by providing funds for education or loans to start up their own businesses. Both the Communists and the Muslims are anxious about President Aquino's ability to keep control over the Philippine military, which continues to be led by supporters of former President Ferdinand Marcos, including Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos. A difficult problem Aquino faces in dealing with the Muslim insurgency is the divided nature of the MNLF. Leaders of the MNLF faction based in Sabah were expected to return to Manila soon for talks with the new government. Nur Misuari, leader of the MNLF faction based presently in Kuwait, has reportedly been in contact with the MNLF leaders in Sabah and states that he intends to "give peace a chance."

Cumming-Bruce, Nicholas. "Guerrilla Raids Threaten Manila's Political Course." Guardian (Manchester), 26 March 1986, p. 8.

How to react to continuing attacks by Philippine Communist insurgents is an increasingly divisive issue faced by the government of President Corazon Aquino and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Aquino has taken a position of reconciliation toward insurgent elements since

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her takeover of the presidency. Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos have called for more aggressive action against the NPA. Following a recent insurgent attack, Enrile declared, "While we respect the call of our president for unity and reconciliatin, we cannot allow innocent civilians to be butchered by dissident elements." Meanwhile the CCP has raised questions about the degree of President Aquino's authority over the military.

Cumming-Bruce, Nicholas. "Rebels Demand Purge." Guardian (Manchester), 7 March 1986, p. 9.

The NPA stated yesterday in a press release that it objected to the presence in the government of President Corazon Aquino of her two chief security advisors, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Fidel Ramos. "We cannot accept the fact that Enrile, Ramos, and their stooges in the military who faithfully served the Marcos regime can now be called a revolutionary government of the people just because they hurriedly aligned themselves with the new government," the release said.

"Exiled Moslem Leaders Called Back Home." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 5 March 1986, p. 7.

The government of President Corazon Aquino sent Colonel Hernani Figueroa to Singapore to meet with Dimas Pundato and Macapanton Abbas, leaders of the MNLF faction based in Sabah. Figueroa stated that his mission was to escort the MNLF leaders back to Manila, rather than to discuss any agenda for the upcoming talks with the Philippine Government. Accompanying Figueroa was the brother of Abbas, Sultan Firdausi I. Y. Abbas. The Sultan, who leads the Manila-based legal-political arm of the Abbas-Pundato group, claimed it had 15,000 armed troops and 50,000 reserves. Sultan Abbas stated to the press that his group was seeking full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement made between the MNLF and the government of former President Ferdinand Marcos. In her election campaign,

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President Aquino pledged to grant autonomy, but not independence to the estimated 4 to 5 million Philippine Muslims.

Grey, Denis D. "Communist Insurgency Set Back in Philippines But Still Major Threat." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 18 March 1986, p. 4.

Based on discussions with Philippine insurgents, Philippine Government leaders, and Western diplomats, the author presents two scenarios for the future of the Philippines in the next 10 years or so. According to the first scenario, the Aquino government is successful in converting people power into an attractive substitute for armed insurgency. Aided by US, Japanese, and World Bank funds, the economy rebounds and its fruits are more equitably distributed. Conditions on plantations are reformed. Corrupt officials are purged from the government and the military. Peasants and students reject the NPA and NDF as the means of seeking justice. An amnesty persuades most insurgents to disarm, and in several years only a small band of Communist ideologues remains in the hills. According to the second scenario, the legacy of President Ferdinand Marcos' government proves too entrenched. The military and civilian leadership lock horns. An elitist cabinet lacks the will to tackle such problems as land reform. Political warlords and private armies continue to terrorize the countryside. The Communist insurgency maintains its "Robin Hood" image. Strategic stalemate occurs in 3 to 5 years and eventually leads to the establishment of the People's Democratic Republic of the Philippines.

Haberman, Clyde. "Communists Offer Aquino Peace Talks." New York Times, 25 March 1986, p. A3.

The NDF, CCP, and NPA issued separate statements to Philippine reporters today saying they were prepared to negotiate a ceasefire on a nationwide scale with the government of President Corazon Aquino. The Communist leaders praised Aquino and held forth the prospect that

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"more than just a ceasefire can be pursued afterwards." They rejected, however, her call for them to lay down their weapons, saying the insurgency will not end until the government undertakes "fundamental economic and political changes." The Communists also insisted that there are "reactionaries in and out of the government" who are trying to undermine Aquino's efforts to institute changes. Although it praised Aquino for releasing political prisoners, restoring civil liberties, and "carrying out measures to dismantle the fascist structures," the NPA warned that the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the "heavily armed private armies of warlords loyal to the Marcos regime continue to terrorize the masses in the countryside and urban areas alike."

Lachica, Eduardo and Lescaze, Lee. "Decision on Freeing Communists to Test Aquino's Hold on Military." Wall Street Journal (New York), 4 March 1986, p. 34.

When he heard on the radio in his prison cell that a crowd was gathering outside Camp Crame to prevent former President Ferdinand Marcos' troops from attacking Philippine rebels led by Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel Ramos, NPA founder Bernabe Buscayno reportedly sent his wife and children to join the crowd. Buscayno, known as Commander Dante, has spent the past decade in prison, reading newspapers and books and occasionally publishing articles in Manila newspapers under a pseudonym. The former NPA head stated that, despite the Aquino takeover, "the root causes of rebellion are still there." When asked about his plans Buscayno declared, "My revolution ended 10 years ago when I was arrested. I haven't the least intention of going back into the hills."

Lescaze, Lee. "Filipino Leftists Show a Willingness to Talk to Attain Social Goals." Wall Street Journal (New York), 13 March 1986, p. 1.

Although Manila has undergone tremendous changes since the Aquino takeover, life has changed little so far in the

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provinces. Military repression and landlessness of Philippine farmers (the highest in Asia) are two problems that church and social workers say must be addressed before the Aquino government can hope to begin putting a stop to the Communist insurgency. Jose Ayala, a wealthy Mindanao businessman who has dealt frequently with the NPA, claims to have a plan to deal with the insurgents. Under this plan, the Philippine Government would pay each rebel cash for his weapon, as well as providing a piece of farmland, some farm implements, seed, and a loan to help him until his first harvest. Ayala claims the cost to the government would be about \$1,000 per rebel--far cheaper, he says, than expanding the Philippine armed forces. Meanwhile, a number of released leftist leaders, including former NDF head Horacio "Boy" Morales and Father Edicio de la Torre, have expressed interest in talking to the Aquino government. Morales and de la Torre both reportedly have been writing social action proposals and sending them to President Aquino. "We're writing software for those who have the hardware," de la Torre said.

"MNLF Urges Mrs. Aquino to Grant Autonomy," Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 17 March 1986, p. 1.

The MNLF will not lay down its arms until the Philippine Government grants autonomy to the Muslim areas of the southern part of the country, according to MNLF political officer Macapanton Abbas. Abbas, who was invited to Manila for peace talks by the government of President Corazon Aquino along with other leaders of the MNLF faction based in Sabah, stated that, "the Muslims were not fighting Marcos but the system of government. And they are not going to accept Aquino but a system." Abbas said people close to Aquino have impeded efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement and are "trying to manipulate the situation. Muslims have always received all types of promises from those aspiring to national leadership and, almost always, these promises are broken once they are in power," Abbas said.

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"Moslem Leader Urges Autonomy for Southern Philippines."
Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 17 March 1986, p. 1.

Macapanton Abbas, the political officer for the Dimas Pundato-led faction of the MNLF, urged President Corazon Aquino to implement the 10-year-old Tripoli Agreement, which calls for granting autonomy to the southern Philippines. The agreement, signed by the MNLF and former President Ferdinand Marcos, provides for the creation of autonomous executive, legislative, and judicial councils to govern the 13 southern Muslim-dominated provinces. Muslim leaders say the MNLF insurgency has continued because the Marcos government failed to carry out the terms of the Tripoli Agreement. Abbas, who was invited to Manila along with other leaders of the Sabah-based Pundato faction, says he will ask the Aquino government to invite the leadership of the two other MNLF factions, which are based in the Middle East.

"Muslims Awaiting a Gesture from Mrs. Aquino." Le Monde,
(Paris), 2 April 1986, p. 5.

On 22 March, President Corazon Aquino created a commission charged with beginning a dialogue with the MNLF on autonomy for the Muslim areas of the southern Philippines. Only two provinces, Zamboanga and Cotabato, have obtained any degree of the autonomous rule promised to the 13 southern provinces by the 1976 Tripoli Agreement signed by former President Ferdinand Marcos and MNLF leader Nur Misuari. One problem the Muslims will face in negotiating with the government is their lack of unity. The three major MNLF factions are divided roughly along tribal lines: the Nur Misuari faction is supported by the Taosugs of the Sulu Archipelago; Hashim Salamat's faction is backed by the Maguindanao tribe of the Cotabato region; and Dimas Pundato and Macapanton Abbas recruit mainly from the Maranao tribe of Lanao del Sur. Among the problems expected to be discussed during negotiations are the creation of a regional military force integrated with the regular army, financial autonomy for the region, and allocation of profits derived from extraction of Mindanao's rich natural resources. Meanwhile, Christians

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in Mindanao worry about becoming "second class citizens" if the Tripoli Agreement is applied to the letter. Massive immigration into the region in the past 50 years has resulted in an overall Christian majority in Mindanao, with Muslims predominant in the Sulu Archipelago and the region around Lanao del Sur. In the Zamboanga Peninsula Christians and Muslims are about equal in number.

"Philippines: Negotiations with the MNLF." Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily (Washington, DC), vol. 15, no. 58, 24 March 1986, p. 1. UA10.D428.

A ceasefire between Philippine Government troops, the NPA, and the MNLF in Central Mindanao reportedly was underway in early March, following the withdrawal of troops from the mountainous areas of Maguindanao Province. Meanwhile, the government of President Corazon Aquino is faced with trying to negotiate with several Muslim factions. Nur Misuari's faction, which has observer status at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), states that the Aquino government has been negotiating with various Philippine Muslim leaders who are "not legitimate representatives of the Moro people."

Pons, Philippe. "Under Aquino or Marcos, Sugar Still Tastes Bitter." Manchester Guardian Weekly, 6 April 1986, pp. 11-12. In French.

"There won't be any peace on Negros without social justice," according to Bishop Fortich of Bacolod, Negros. Agrarian reform is urgently needed, he stated, in this area where a majority of land is owned by 7 percent of the property owners. Landlessness has been a major contributor to the success of the Communist insurgency. As the NPA grew, the sugar barons strengthened their private armies, made up of mercenaries and members and former members of paramilitary forces. Three private armies remain in Negros, including the forces of "Sugar King" Roberto Benedicto, Marcos crony and coconut baron Eduardo Cojuangco, and the former governor of Negros de Norte. The Aquino government--fearing that these armies,

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whose employers have left the country or been deposed, will turn to banditry--reportedly is trying to persuade the militiamen to lay down their arms.

"Preliminary Agreement of Ceasefire with Muslim Guerrillas." Le Monde (Paris), 11 April 1986, p. 4. In French.

The MNLF signed a preliminary ceasefire agreement with the Philippine Army in the southern Philippines on 9 April, according to a Muslim spokesman in Manila. By the terms of the accord, MNLF forces and government troops will cease all fighting, pending the creation of a commission charged with examining the demands of the guerrillas and working out a truce agreement. Meanwhile President Corazon Aquino named a personal emissary, whose name is being kept secret for security reasons, to explore ceasefire negotiations with the Communist insurgents.

Southerland, Daniel. "Skeptical Rural Filipinos See Land Reform as Key." Washington Post, 17 March 1986, pp. A1, A15.

Although a euphoric atmosphere still pervades Manila following the Aquino takeover, skepticism reigns in the countryside, as Filipino peasant farmers wait to see if the new government is going to tackle what they view as the key issue: land reform. About 70 percent of the 55 million Filipinos live in rural areas. One of the areas in which the Communist insurgency has the most sympathy is the plains of Central Luzon. Because its flat rice fields offer little cover for guerrillas, Central Luzon is not usually the scene of major armed clashes between the insurgents and government forces. It is, however, a major recruiting ground for the insurgency and, because of popular support for the NPA, a place where Communist leaders can meet and rest with a feeling of security. Communist leader Rodolfo Salas (alias Commander Bilog) reportedly moves frequently through the region. The people of Central Luzon have a long history of revolt against the Manila government, going back to anti-landlord battles in the 1920s. The Communist-led Huk rebellion of the 1940s and 1950s was strongest in the Central Luzon

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area. Although many of the Manila elite have predicted that the overthrow of Marcos will bring the demise of the insurgency, some analysts predict that this result is unlikely until the problems of the Philippine farmers are addressed. Both Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base are located in Central Luzon in areas with strong support for the Communist insurgency.

White, Michael. "Waiting for the Volcano to Erupt." Guardian (Manchester), 11 March 1986, p. 21.

If President Aquino's "yellow revolution" doesn't succeed in making a difference in the impoverished sugar cane country of Negros Island within a couple years, it will be swept away by the red revolution of the Communists, according to labor leaders, clergy, peasants, and moderate landowners alike. In a recent meeting in the provincial capital, 200 planters drafted a proposal calling for government financial support for crop diversification in return for giving workers part of the land to till in the off season.

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"Aquino Gives Insurgents 6 Months to Hold Talks." New York Times, 8 May 1986, p. A5.

President Corazon Aquino said today during an interview on the government television station that the leaders of the Communist insurgency had not yet responded to her offer to hold talks and that she would give them about 6 months to do so.

"Aquino Hardens Rebel Stance." Washington Post, 25 May 1986, p. A27.

President Corazon Aquino warned Communist rebels that "should talks fail through no fault of the government, or should the ceasefire be grossly violated by the insurgents, the government will embark on a contrary course of war from which there will be no return except victory." Aquino's tough speech was made to soldiers at a military camp near Davao on the island of Mindanao. About 800 people have died in fighting since Aquino took office in February. The president said that rebels as well as soldiers would be liable for prosecution of human rights violations. Aquino also reportedly backed away from suggestions that she might disband the Civilian Home Defense Force, which, despite popular criticism, acts as an auxiliary support for the Philippine Army.

Branigin, William. "Aquino Meets With Ex-Rebels," Washington Post, 24 May 1986, p. A27, A31.

President Corazon Aquino met with 168 Communist surrenderees in Davao City as part of a rebel rehabilitation program developed by local church leaders and businessmen in cooperation with the military. Aquino ordered the southern commander, Brigadier General Jose Magno, to protect the former rebels. She also announced that she would discuss with Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile the possibility of negotiating regional ceasefires with the rebels, instead of having one national truce. Aquino rejected the idea of withdrawing the armed forces from truce areas as well as the practice of the Marcos regime of giving rebels who surrender cash for their

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weapons. Instead, she said, guns would be exchanged for rehabilitation, which could include job training and possibly plots of land, including parts of an 83,000-acre tract of military-controlled land on the island of Mindanao.

Branigin, William. "Aquino Reports Progress in Efforts to Reach Truce." Washington Post, 13 May 1986, pp. A25, 31.

There are two major sticking points in efforts by President Corazon Aquino to get ceasefire negotiations with the Communist insurgents off the ground. The first is the refusal, so far, of the top Communist leaders to negotiate with the government, and the second is the government's lack of resources to offer a rehabilitation program for surrendering rebels. Nonetheless, Aquino stated in a news conference today that definite progress is being made in dealing with the Communists and secret contacts on a proposed truce were underway. She also expressed confidence that she could handle the situation without the "help" in averting a Communist takeover or a military coup offered yesterday by former President Ferdinand Marcos. The military is maintaining a "defensive posture" while waiting for the Communist leadership to respond to negotiations on a ceasefire, according to Aquino. But the military in Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile's home province of Cagayan appears to have gone on the offensive in response to increased NPA activity there. Enrile also appeared to be attempting to capitalize on the defection of former NPA field commander Father Conrado Balweg, who has formed his own rebel group of 80 to 100 followers. Enrile today broached the prospect of creating an "autonomous region for the breakaway rebels," who are located in the mountains of Northern Luzon.

Burgess, John. "Manila Unable to Set Accord with Moslems." Washington Post, 20 May 1986, pp. A21, A25.

Factionalism in the MNLF continues to block efforts of President Corazon Aquino to reach a negotiated settlement

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of the Philippine Muslim problem. Recent ceasefire agreements made by regional military commanders and the MNLF faction led by Macapanton Abbas have been played down by the Aquino government in Manila, which believes that real peace is dependent on reaching agreement as well with the factions led by Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat. The delegation led by Abbas met with Vice President Laurel and other senior government officials, but not with Aquino, who is wary of jeopardizing contacts with leaders of the larger MNLF factions, especially Misuari. The Muslim insurgency in the Philippines has been largely on hold in recent years and greatly overshadowed by the Communist insurgency. Large stocks of weapons, however, reportedly remain in MNLF hands, and the Aquino government is anxious to negotiate a surrender and disarming of the rebels. Aquino has stated that she favors autonomy for the Muslim region but strongly opposes secession of these provinces, a course which the Misuari faction reportedly favors.

"Chinese Have 'Moral' Relationship with Philippine Communists."
Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 1 April 1986, p. 7.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a "moral" relationship with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Wu Xingtang told newsmen in Beijing yesterday. According to Wu, China recognizes the independence of other Communist parties. "We do not want to comment on the policies of other parties. It's an internal affair of the Communist Party of the Philippines," he said. China ceased active support of the Maoist CPP in 1975, when Beijing established diplomatic relations with Manila. Thereafter, China cultivated cordial relations with the government of former President Ferdinand Marcos. When President Corazon Aquino came to power in February 1986, the Chinese Government quickly welcomed the new government and invited Aquino to visit Beijing.

Dalton, Keith. "Aquino Takes up Offer of Dialogue with Communists." Times (London), 5 April 1986, p.6.

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Presidential spokesman Rene Saguisag said yesterday that a Philippine Government emissary chosen by President Corazon Aquino will begin exploratory ceasefire talks with leaders of the Communist insurgency "in a few days." The announcement came just hours after the presidential palace had received a two-page statement from the NDF declaring its willingness to begin a preliminary dialogue on ceasefire terms. Since Aquino took office, 360 people have been killed in clashes between insurgents and government troops. Although no conditions for the ceasefire talks were mentioned in the NDF communique, Saguisag said the long-standing Communist demand for dismantling US military bases in the country could not be part of the negotiations.

Dalton, Keith. "Mrs. Aquino Threatens to Unleash Army If Communists Fight On." Times (London), 21 April 1986, p. 11.

Following a Communist ambush in which 20 Philippine Government soldiers were killed, President Corazon Aquino warned that, if insurgents spurn her offer of a ceasefire and peace negotiations, she will strike back with a better-equipped, trained, and more mobile army. She will interpret the latest attack, Aquino said in a commencement address at the University of the Philippines, as meaning that the "message of peace has not filtered down to all combatants....But I shall not allow this state of affairs to continue for long. The soldiers of the republic are under my wing. I have obligations to the security of the people, the stability of their new democracy, and the honor of the Army. I will not renege on any," she stated.

Fisher, Richard D., Jr. "The Communist Threat to Reviving Democracy in the Philippines." Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center Backgrounder, no. 45 (Washington, DC), 23 April 1986.

The author states that the CPP poses a serious threat to Philippine democracy with a nationwide political organization, guerrilla army, and a united front strategy

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aimed at infiltrating union, student, church, and political groups. He contends that the CCP is funded by a sophisticated tax system and receives financial and political support from Europe, Australia, the US, and the Soviet Union. The latter maintains a low-level relationship with the CPP that could be easily and rapidly upgraded. If the CPP comes to power through military or political means, the author maintains, it will create a brutally repressive regime based on institutionalized terror and will end US access to bases in the Philippines.

Jones, Gregg. "Guerrilla Priest Defects." Guardian (Manchester), 30 April 1986, p. 6.

Philippine Communist guerrilla leader Father Conrado Balweg announced yesterday his break with the NPA. The renegade Catholic priest had been a popular NPA field commander in the mountains of Northern Luzon since 1978. Father Balweg accused the NPA of carrying out civilian executions not sanctioned by local residents. Communist leaders claim Father Balweg was expelled from the NPA for misappropriating funds and other violations of guerrilla discipline. Father Balweg, who was the best known NPA field commander and a sort of folk hero, has appeared on television and in newspapers as a guerrilla army spokesman. The former NPA commander and two other guerrilla commanders have reportedly formed a new guerrilla force called the Cordillera People's Liberation Army.

Jones, Gregg. "Rebel Priest Splits Filipino Communists." Guardian (Manchester), 9 May 1986, p. 7.

Some observers believe that the break of NPA commander Father Conrado Balweg with the Philippine Communist guerrillas last week is the first open sign of the serious internal debates that are gripping the NPA. The rebel priest, who for seven years has commanded a few hundred guerrillas in the mountains of Northern Luzon, has become somewhat of a folk hero. A leading NDF official, Father Edificio de la Torre, said that the Philippine military

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would be able to "exploit" the rift between Father Balweg's faction and the NPA.

"Journalist Dies in Filipino Ambush". Guardian (Manchester), 26 April 1986, p. 9.

A Philippine Communist ambush in which six soldiers and two journalists were killed has dimmed prospects for a speedy reconciliation between the government and the insurgents, President Corazon Aquino stated yesterday. Among those killed was Filipino photographer and Reuters Manila bureau chief Willie Vicoy, well known for his coverage of the Vietnam war, and a Manila reporter, Pete Mabazza. Following the ambush, which took place in the Northern Luzon province of Cagayan, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile (who is from that province) warned of a huge military counter-offensive.

La Guardia, Anton. "Muslims Express New Hope." Arabia (London), April 1986, pp. 19-21.

Philippine Muslim scholars warn the government of President Corazon Aquino of the danger of trying to negotiate a peace with the Muslim insurgents without including MNLF leader Nur Misuari, saying it would be like an attempt by the Israelis to settle the Palestinian question without Yasser Arafat. Many Muslim leaders consider the Tripoli agreement signed by former President Ferdinand Marcos and MNLF leaders unworkable. Muslim scholar Almuzrin Jubaira stated that the agreement is "not a solution but a political expedient to appease the rebels." He concludes that the agreement could never work because it does not take into consideration the Christian populace that would be included in the autonomous Muslim region stipulated under the accord. Another Muslim leader stated that "the Tripoli agreement favored rebel returnees for positions in government at the expense of ordinary qualified Muslims. The important thing for us is not autonomy, but to be given a fair chance." Philippine Muslims occupy an area rich in fertile farmland, fishing grounds, lumber, and minerals. What they seem to lack is

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the political organization necessary to protect and administer the wealth and ensure that its benefits reach all levels of Philippine Muslim society.

"MNLF Faction Threatens Bombings". Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 8 April 1986, p. 2.

The Philippines' two major insurgencies are continuing to be a problem for the new government of President Corazon Aquino. According to a recent report in the Manila Times, the Bangsa Moro Islamic Party (BMIP) has given Aquino 15 days within which to state the government's policy on the MNLF question. The newspaper quoted BMIP chairman Firdausi Abbas as having said that if she does not meet this deadline, "we'll blow up government buildings and installations to make them feel our presence." Meanwhile, according to the same report, former CPP head Jose Maria Sison recently stated that a ceasefire was not possible between the NPA and government forces until Aquino gains full control of the military.

"MNLF, Military Sign Preliminary Ceasefire Accord in Mindanao." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 10 April 1986, p. 1.

Following two days of truce talks, MNLF leaders and local Philippine military commanders signed a preliminary ceasefire agreement binding throughout Mindanao, which stipulated that armed forces on both sides would refrain from attacking each other while a joint committee to deliberate Muslim demands is being formed. The joint panel will be constituted in the next few days in further meetings in Zamboanga between MNLF leaders and Mindanao military chief Jose Magno.

"Moslem Rebels, Military Agree on Ceasefire." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 14 April 1986, p. 2.

Philippine Muslim guerrillas and regional military officials announced last week that they have agreed on a

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ceasefire in five southern provinces pending negotiations on autonomy for the country's Muslim region. Regional military commander Brig Gen Jose Magno and MNLF leader Macapanton Abbas released a joint statement saying the two sides have set up a committee to enforce the ceasefire. Abbas reportedly negotiated a similar ceasefire earlier in the week with another regional commander covering five other provinces of Mindanao. According to the statement, the military has agreed to give the rebels safe-conduct passes from the hills to attend negotiations on Muslim autonomy with the government of President Corazon Aquino in Manila at an unspecified date. The leaders of the other two major MNLF factions, Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat, have yet to respond to President Aquino's call for negotiations.

Murphy, Denis. "Winners and Losers in the Philippines." America, 26 April 1986, pp. 337-39.

In assessing the outcome of the Philippine revolution, the author declares the Communists to have been the big loser: a revolutionary party that sat out the revolution. But as a major factor in social change in the Philippines since the 1930s, the Communists may be down, but they are far from being out. If the Aquino government stumbles badly, they will be back in strength. The only other group in Philippine history to ever organize the poor on a large scale is the Catholic Church, the big winner in the recent revolution. In past attempts by church people and leftists at working together, the left has overwhelmed the church people. The author suggests that perhaps the relationship between the two groups will be healthier in the light of Mrs. Aquino's democracy.

Mydans, Seth. "Aquino Sees Progress in Cease-fire Attempts." New York Times, 14 May 1986, p. A5.

In her first press conference in more than 2 months, President Corazon Aquino reported that progress is being made in efforts to reach a ceasefire between Philippine Government forces and the Communist insurgency. She

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refused to disclose the identity of her emissaries, who have held preliminary talks with some of the rebels, and said she is waiting for the top Communist leadership to respond to her offer to negotiate. Aquino reported that her program to bring insurgents back from the hills was being slowed by a lack of funds with which to finance their reintegration into society. She said the greatest boon she could offer surrenderees is "the chance to live in freedom and not be hounded by the military" and "a chance to be one with the Filipino people again."

Mydans, Seth. "Philippine Communists and Manila Trade Blame." New York Times, 29 April 1986, p. A12.

President Corazon Aquino told reporters in Manila today that she insists that the government will only hold ceasefire negotiations with top Communist leaders. "There have been some people negotiating on the lower levels, but we have not been able to talk to the top yet," she said. In related developments, both Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the NDF voiced their support today for a ceasefire. But each accused the other of continuing violent actions that threatened the possibility of reconciliation. In the past week, more than 70 people have been killed in clashes between the military and insurgents. Enrile has vowed to avenge the military and civilian deaths, many of which have occurred in his home province of Cagayan.

Niksch, Larry. "The Communist Party of the Philippines and the Aquino Government: Responding to the New Situation." (Paper presented at a conference in Washington, DC, on "Crisis in the Philippines," sponsored by the Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 30 April-1 May 1986.)

The author surveys the problems faced by the CPP as a result of the accession to power of President Corazon Aquino and the likely response of the Communists to the new situation. The problems include: the threat to the CPP's united front strategy posed by the broad popular

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support for Aquino; the possible erosion of rank-and-file insurgents and even local party and NPA leaders; and the commitment of the Aquino government to a reformed and revitalized Philippine armed forces. Future strategies that the CPP will likely employ in confronting these problems include the following: not attacking Aquino personally; developing nationalist issues such as land reform and opposition to the US bases and multinational corporations; attacking "reactionary" elements in the Aquino government; ceasing direct action, such as strikes and demonstrations, against the government in the cities; entering into negotiations with the government; and perhaps supporting the establishment of a legal political party on the left.

Noble, Lela Garner. "Muslim Grievances and the Muslim Rebellion." (Paper presented at a conference in Washington, DC, on "Crisis in the Philippines," sponsored by the Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 30 April-1 May 1986.)

The author provides an excellent review of the background of the Philippine Muslim insurgency, the legacy of the policies of the Marcos regime toward the insurgency, an agenda for the Aquino government in dealing with the Muslims, and the implications of that agenda for US policy. Although the Marcos Muslim policy of cooptation and coercion had many failings, it also included some programs of value. The author urges the Aquino government to continue the improvement of Muslim schools, the use of Muslim courts, and the development of relations with Muslim countries. A sense of national identity that recognizes the plurality of Philippine society should be encouraged. Philippine Muslims have much to offer and need to be assured that their faith and traditions are respected. The new government should also encourage the Muslims toward cooperation with each other, rather than following the "divide and rule" strategy of every Manila government since the Spanish colonial period. The Tripoli agreement, the author states, "represents compromises among a particular group of participants at a particular point in history....Negotiations must continue among relevant parties until agreement on implementation is reached among

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the majority....the ambitions of all will never be satisfied." There is little the United States can do; and "for this we should be grateful," according to Dr. Noble.

"One Thousand Alleged Communist 'Cadres' Surrender." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 25 March 1986, p. 7.

More than 1,000 alleged Communist "cadres" reportedly surrendered to Philippine military authorities on Negros Island this week. It was not clear whether the surrender was authentic or a rerun of the mock surrenders staged for propaganda purposes during the Marcos regime. The people who surrendered were reportedly not fighters but recruiters and propagandists and surrendered only about 20 weapons.

"Philippine Military Declares Ceasefire." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 18 March 1986, p. 1.

Manila newspapers have reported this week that Philippine military authorities in central Mindanao have declared a ceasefire with Muslim and Communist insurgents in that region. The Manila Bulletin featured a front-page picture of a truckload of soldiers and a tank in Maguindanao Province with streamers saying "we are on ceasefire" and "no shooting please." Regional military commander Brigadier General Rodrigo Gutang was reported as saying their declaration of truce was "in line with the policy of reconciliation of President Corazon Aquino." Gutang said he had asked religious groups and civic leaders to help them convince rebels to participate in peace talks. According to Gutang, "The result of the dialogue will become the eye opener to the national leadership and the [military] as to what course of action it shall undertake in solving the insurgency problem." Manila military spokesmen were reportedly not available for comment.

"Philippine Military Favors Talks with Rebels." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 31 March 1986, p. 2

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Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos recently issued a directive to his field commanders encouraging them to seek talks with rebels to persuade them to surrender but ruling out any military withdrawal from rural areas. "There shall be no withdrawal of tactical deployments," Ramos said in his directive. "Be sincere in your reconciliatory efforts without dropping your security posture," he said. While rejecting a military pullout, Ramos indicated that there should be "no belligerent advances" while negotiations are going on. In a related event, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), which took part in the revolt that toppled former President Ferdinand Marcos, claimed that Communists had infiltrated the government of President Corazon Aquino.

Richardson, Michael. "No Quick End to Insurgency in the Philippines." Pacific Defence Reporter. May 1986, pp. 7-8.

Although the Aquino government appears to be sincere in its search for a just and lasting end to the conflict between the Philippine Government and the Communist insurgency, neither the armed forces nor the CPP seem to believe a durable solution can be found without one or the other side, in effect, surrendering to the other.

Wren, Christopher S. "Filipino Muslims: A New Piece to Fit in the Puzzle." New York Times, 13 May 1986, p. A2.

It is unclear whether threats by Muslim insurgents in the southern Philippines to stage a new "holy war" are serious, or merely an attempt to gain the attention of the government of President Corazon Aquino, which is currently focused on the Communist insurgency. The Muslim insurgency is badly fragmented, mainly along tribal lines, which hinders its military effectiveness as well as frustrating government efforts to reach a settlement. Aquino's government reportedly believes that MNLF chairman Nur Misuari is key to any lasting agreement. According to some reports, Misuari commands about 15,000 armed men, while factions led by Hashim Salamat and Dimas Pundato

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include 6,000 and 1,500 armed men, respectively. Muslims claim that government figures that estimate the Philippine Muslim population at 2.5 million amount to "statistical genocide." They claim there are 5 million or more Muslims out of a total Philippine population of 55 million. Many Philippine Muslims are grateful to Libya for its past support to the MNLF and for health and education aid. About 20,000 Muslims held an indignation rally following the US bombing of Libya.

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Berger, Joseph. "'Not Many' Rebels, a Filipino Asserts." New York Times. 31 May 1986, p. A3.

"We have some Communists, but they are not very many," and their forces are weak, Jaime Cardinal Sin, archbishop of Manila states at a news conference in New Jersey. The Roman Catholic prelate is in the United States to receive honorary degrees from six universities. The Communists estimate they have 30,000 NPA guerrilla fighters and more than one million members in the NDF. American officials put the number of NPA guerrillas at 20,000 and say the rebels control 20 percent of the country's 40,000 villages. Many people, according to Sin, went to the hills out of discontent with the government of Ferdinand Marcos; they remained rebels only because they feared imprisonment. "But they are now surrendering, coming down from the hills and surrendering by groups," he said.

Branigin, William "Killings by Filipino Communist Rebels End Lull in Mindanao." Washington Post, 2 June 1986, pp. A17, A21.

The NPA in Mindanao is combating defections from its ranks with harsh tactics, including purges of suspected infiltrators and liquidations of defectors and suspected civilian informers. The result is that the Communist insurgency has lost its "Robin Hood" image for many civilians in the Davao area, which has been under heavy NPA influence in recent years. Meanwhile, public attitudes toward the Philippine Armed Forces has improved significantly since the government of President Corazon Aquino came to power. Since that time the number of "salvagings" (killing of NPA "suspects" by the military) has fallen sharply.

Branigin, William. "Aquino Cites Gains During First 100 Days." Washington Post, 5 June 1986, pp. A1, A30, A31.

Communist rebel influence is spreading and the situation "may deteriorate seriously if political and economic instabilities persist," warns Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos in a report assessing the

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military outlook under the government of President Corazon Aquino. Although the new government can boast impressive achievement in many areas during its first 100 days, hopes are fading that large numbers of Communist rebels will give up their 17-year struggle against the government now that the "Marcos dictatorship" is ended. According to a military intelligence report, the number of rebels surrendering nationwide since the overthrow of Marcos comes to a disappointing 1,652, of which only 102 are listed as NPA regulars. The rest include 489 rebel "activists," and 1,061 members of the Communists' "mass base," meaning civilians in rebel-controlled areas. Also, according to the report, only 73 guns have been turned in by the former rebels.

Branigin, William. "Communist Rebels Battle On in Luzon."
Washington Post, 4 June 1986, pp. A25, A26.

While NPA guerrilla fronts in most of the Philippines have scaled down their activities or taken a wait-and-see attitude toward the new government of President Corazon Aquino, Communist rebels in the Northern Luzon province of Cagayan appear to have escalated their attacks on the government. Some observers believe that the purpose of the increased attacks is to bait Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, whose home province is Cagayan, into a harsh military response that will further divide him from Aquino's more dovish cabinet ministers. Other analysts state that the NPA in this region has a reputation of being more radical than elsewhere. Leading the government's counterinsurgency struggle in this region is Col. Rodolfo Aguinaldo and his unconventional fighting unit composed of about 100 Philippine Constabulary Scout Rangers and 50 former rebels. Known as "the Rambo of the Philippines," Aguinaldo is one of a few colonels who personally leads patrols. His men continue to suffer from a lack of supplies and equipment and often face a better-dressed and better-armed NPA force in the field. According to Aguinaldo, 30 Soviet-designed Kalashnikov automatic rifles reached NPA hands in Cagayan in late 1981, by way of Manila and Spain.

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Branigin, William. "Manila Rebels Pick Cease-Fire Envoy."
Washington Post, 6 June 1986, pp. A29, A35.

Satur Ocampo, a former business editor of the Manila Times jailed for 9 years under the Ferdinand Marcos regime, has been named by the CPP as its representative for ceasefire talks with the government of President Corazon Aquino. Ocampo, who was arrested in 1976 and accused of being a member of the Central Committee of the CPP, escaped in 1985 when he was taken to vote in National Press Club elections. He has remained underground since then. Jose Maria Sison, founder of the CPP, stated yesterday that the Communists want a "lasting ceasefire with the formation of a coalition government." Other major conditions for a ceasefire include the right to "maintain the integrity of the NPA as part of the Communist Party" and recognition of the NPA as part of a new "national revolutionary army" under the coalition government. The Communists' delay in responding to the Aquino government's call for a ceasefire was reportedly caused by a continuing debate among the CPP leadership on how to respond to the new government. Sison indicated that "those who carried out the rigid boycott policy" that caused the CPP and the NDF to sit out the "people's revolution" that swept Aquino into power, "have already done some self-criticism." Manila newspapers have published unconfirmed reports that CPP Chairman Rodolfo Salas and Secretary General Rafael Baylosis face ouster for having advocated the boycott.

"British Embassy Evacuated." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 22 April 1986, p. 7.

A Muslim group calling itself Moro al Fatah claimed responsibility for a dynamite bomb discovered in the former headquarters of President Corazon Aquino in Manila.

An open statement to Aquino read by an anonymous telephone caller to Agence France Presse after the bomb was discovered and disarmed said, "Perhaps it was God's will that the bomb did not explode. Perhaps it is true that you are not the obstacle to national unity and Bangsa Moro autonomy."

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Fenton, James. "Dialectics and Doughnuts." Guardian (Manchester), 17 May 1986, p. 17.

The author recounts his experiences of living and traveling with the NPA in late 1985. He found the people he met to be more interested in finding Filipino solutions to Filipino problems than in subscribing to the ideologies of either Chinese or Soviet Communism. There were hints from the guerrillas he talked to of a willingness by the NPA to reach some sort of compromise on the US-bases issue, in the form of a reduced American presence, in order to avoid direct conflict with the United States. Some interesting glimpses of NPA life are provided by this account. Pictured was a rather austere existence devoted to training, propaganda sessions, and weapons-grabbing forays. This routine may occasionally be punctuated by parties at which the guerrillas might sit around the Betamax and watch Rambo movies while sipping Gilbey's gin and eating homemade doughnuts.

"Filipino Delegate Sees Long Peace Discussions." New York Times, 12 June 1986, p. A5.

Satur Ocampo, CPP delegate to ceasefire talks between the Communists and the government of President Corazon Aquino, said in a letter distributed to the press that the negotiations would be long and difficult but that the rebels were "determined to seek the road to peace." The letter also indicated that the rebels are taking the truce talks seriously and confirmed earlier reports that they are rethinking their strategy of armed struggle.

"Filipino Moslems Burn U.S. Flag." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 21 April 1986, p. 8.

A congress of 5,000 Philippine Muslims meeting on the campus of Western Mindanao State University in Zamboanga burned an American flag to protest the recent US air raids on Libya. The congress approved a manifesto calling for international support for Libya and denouncing the US raid as "barbarous and heinous." The manifesto was presented to President Corazon Aquino's brother-in-law Agapito

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(Butz) Aquino, who was an invited guest at the congress, and a request was made that he transmit the document to President Aquino for delivery to the US Government. The congress also passed a resolution urging the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to declare its recognition of Filipino Muslim insurgent leader Nur Misuari as the legitimate head of the MNLF.

Gordon-Bates, Kim. "Philippine Communists Agree to Negotiate." Le Monde (Paris), 7 June 1986, p. 1. (In French).

The decision of the Philippine Communist leadership to accept President Corazon Aquino's offer to negotiate a ceasefire is viewed as a success for the national reconciliation program engaged in by the new government over the past 3 months. The first emissaries proposed by the CPP were turned down by Aquino because she considered them to be lacking in authority. The CPP countered that the Philippine military was lacking in sincerity. The Philippine Communist movement itself appears to be going through a period of adjustment. A recent issue of the CPP clandestine journal Ang Bayan contained a document criticizing the decision to boycott the February election. Some members of the CPP Central Committee reportedly have fallen into decline because of this tactical error, according to Manila newspapers. The boycott supporters were said to have underestimated the capability of the reform movement and to have failed to realize how isolated Marcos had become.

Jones, Gregg. "Filipino 'Rambo' Takes on Rebels." Guardian, (Manchester), 4 June 1986, p. 9.

In a major show of force, the Philippine military has escalated the war against the Communist insurgency in Cagayan Province, using helicopters, planes equipped with rockets and machineguns, artillery, and even tanks. The Philippine Constabulary commander in Cagayan Province, Colonel Rodolfo Aguinaldo, blames the problems of the Philippine military on the lack of training, discipline, and supplies that were provided to the troops under the

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regime of former President Ferdinand Marcos. Aguinaldo, at 38 the youngest colonel in the Philippine military and affectionately known as "Rambo," is seeking to turn the situation around.

Monjo, John. "U.S. Assistance to the Philippines." Current Policy, No. 834. U. S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs (Washington, DC), May 1986, pp. 1-4.

US Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John Monjo testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 15 May 1986 on the subject of US assistance to the Philippines. He discussed the security threat posed to the new government of President Corazon Aquino by the Communist insurgency, stating that the number of NPA victims had jumped markedly during the past month. He noted that armed clashes are merely one tactic used by the Communists to further their goals. "There is also an intense lower profile campaign for the control of local government being waged by the CPP backed by the force of the NPA, and supplemented by the political activities of the NDF," he stated. "The effort of intimidation, kidnaping, and assassination is directed against government and military officials, as well as businessmen, clergy, teachers, and others who resist the Communists," stated Monjo. He recommended a joint civilian-military strategy that would address the root causes of the insurgency: poverty, ineffective and unresponsive local government, and military abuses. He further recommended US military and economic assistance to the Philippine Government to enable it to meet the challenges facing it.

"More Troops Sent to Battle Communist Rebels in Northern Province." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 21 April 1986, p. 9.

Some 800 Scout Rangers from Manila and Isabela Province were trucked into Cagayan Province in the northeastern part of Luzon to aid in a new offensive against Communist guerrillas. The arrival of the Rangers brought to about

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3,000 the number of government troops being deployed against an estimated 250 NPA guerrillas in an area where more than 50 people have been killed by rebel attacks in the past two weeks. Helicopter gunships and World War II light bomber planes are being used to back up the ground troops.

"Moslem Warlord's Army Repulsed." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 28 April 1986, p. 7.

Philippine Government troops used artillery fire to repulse 80 armed supporters of a Muslim warlord aiming to seize Marawi City, the capital of Lanao del Sur Province in Mindanao. The armed supporters of Ali Dimaporo, provincial governor under the Ferdinand Marcos regime, had earlier barricaded Marawi after government troops seized control of the capital and installed a new governor appointed by officials of the new government of President Corazon Aquino.

Mydans, Seth. "Giving Up: A Filipino Rebel's Ordeal." New York Times, 24 May 1986, p. A3.

NPA guerrillas who are interested in surrendering are finding the government of President Corazon Aquino unprepared to deal with them. The government is insisting on negotiating only with the leaders of the Communist insurgency. In the meantime, no policy is being developed to deal with rank-and-file rebels who have decided they are ready to come down from the hills. These surrenderees look to the government for such assistance as job training, a plot of farmland, and protection from their former NPA comrades, as well as the military. No such provisions have yet been made. One observer warns that the top Communist leaders, with whom the government insists on dealing, have different needs and motives than the average guerrilla. "The government will start negotiating about the American bases and about political questions, and in the meantime, what about those small people who are just asking for something for their stomach?" he asks.

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Mydans, Seth. "Philippine Military Chief Asserts the Rebels Have Resumed Fight." New York Times, 5 June 1986, pp. A1, A3.

Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos reports on the progress of the Philippine military during the first 100 days of the presidency of Corazon Aquino. Speaking at a press conference, Ramos said the military is struggling to dig itself out of a "big black hole" of inefficiency and corruption so it will be able to effectively combat the growing Communist insurgency. Changes made so far include: removal of most generals past retirement age and their replacement with younger officers; recall of officers assigned to civilian affairs; reallocation of men and equipment from the Manila area to areas of need around the country; and the holding of seminars designed to reorient the values of the Filipino soldier. Ramos said the number of villages infiltrated by the Communists had increased 9 percent over last year to 7,631 or 18 percent of the country's 41,615 villages, located in 62 of the 74 provinces. Commenting on forces led by warlords still loyal to ex-President Ferdinand Marcos, Ramos said that if they do make a serious armed effort, they will easily be repulsed by the army on one side and the Communists on the other.

Mydans, Seth. "Rebels to Discuss Truce, Aquino Says." New York Times 6 June 1986, p. A3.

Upon hearing that the CPP had selected Saturnino Ocampo as its delegate to ceasefire negotiations with the Philippine Government, President Corazon Aquino announces that she will name her representatives within 48 hours. Ocampo, former business editor of the Manila Times, spent 1976-85 in prison as an accused member of the CPP Central Committee during the regime of ex-President Ferdinand Marcos. Ocampo's lawyer during his years of detention was Joker Arroyo, who serves as President Aquino's executive secretary and also represented her husband, Benigno, during his 8 years of imprisonment.

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Oberdorfer, Don. "Aquino Names Negotiators to Meet Communists."
Washington Post, 27 June 1986, pp. A21, A28.

Philippine President Corazon Aquino announces the names of her two emissaries to negotiate a ceasefire with the leaders of the Communist insurgency. Agriculture Minister Ramon Mitra and former Senator Jose W. Diokno will meet soon with a CPP team led by Saturnino Ocampo, a former business editor of the Manila Times. Mitra is considered a centrist and Diokno is known for his opposition to the US military bases in the Philippines. In announcing her choices, Aquino said she is determined to "exhaust all efforts" to achieve peace through negotiation, but also ruled out acceptance of a coalition government, a central demand of the Communists. Both sides appear to be going into the negotiations with no illusions about their chances for success, but with the feeling that there is some advantage to be gained through talking.

Oberdorfer, Don. "Manila Officials Tell Shultz Rebel Talks Would Be Useless." Washington Post. 26 June 1986, pp. A1, A28.

There is no basis for a "substantive negotiation" with the Communist insurgency, top officials of the government of President Corazon Aquino told US Secretary of State George Shultz in Manila yesterday. Aquino, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos all seemed to concur on this view. The Philippine leaders "don't expect the insurgency is going somehow to fade away or that there is any real basis for a substantive negotiation with the insurgency, because the demands of the insurgency are such as to be basically nonnegotiable," according to a US official who sat in on the talks between Shultz and the Philippine leaders. The CPP demands include representation in a coalition government and expulsion of the United States from its Philippine military bases.

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"Philippine Secessionists Hoist New Flag." Indonesian Observer
(Jakarta), 26 April 1986, p. 8.

Some 200 delegates to a Muslim secessionist convention in Cagayan de Oro, Mindanao, met to write a constitution, sing a new national anthem, and hoist the flag of the Federal Republic of Mindanao. The delegates avoided arrest, however, by not signing any declaration of independence from the Philippines, which military officers had warned would result in their arrest. Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos said that the separatist movement would cause instability. "The danger here is from other groups domestic or even foreign that have evil designs on our government, especially at this time," he said. The leader of the convention, Reuben Canoy, is a former minor party presidential candidate.

Richburg, Keith B. "Senate Panel Told Insurgency Is on the Rise in Philippines." Washington Post, 4 June 1986, pp. A1, A27.

Reagan administration officials painted a bleak picture of the Communist insurgency problem facing the new government of Philippine President Corazon Aquino at hearings held this week before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Under discussion was an administration proposal for \$100 million in economic aid and \$50 million in security assistance to Manila for the current fiscal year. "The military situation is serious and getting worse, with the Communists enjoying the initiative and assuming de facto control in areas where government influence has eroded over the years," according to Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Recent ambushes of government troops by the NPA "leave little doubt in our mind that, at the end of the day, military action will be required to defeat the insurgency," he said. Commenting on the situation following the hearing, Philippine Ambassador Emmanuel Pelaez said, "I think it's better than the way it's been assessed. They [the Communists] have lost their civilian base."

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"Unfulfilled Promises." Asiaweek (Hong Kong), 11 May 1986, pp. 32-33. DSl.A715

The island of Mindanao, known as the Philippine "Land of Promise," continues to be a land of problems for the new government of President Corazon Aquino. Fighters of the NPA, MNLF, and various warlord armies tie up about half of the Philippine military's 220,000-man force. The nearly dormant MNLF has been increasingly active since Aquino came to power, and Marcos-connected warlords, such as Sultan Ali Dimaporo, are reportedly stockpiling arms to mount a resistance against Manila. The various MNLF factions continue to squabble among themselves, making negotiations with the government difficult, if not impossible. A map accompanying the article identifies the various incidents that have occurred around the troubled island in the past few months.

Winchester, Simon. "Mad Dog Defies Aquino's Reforms." Times (London), 18 May 1986, p. 17.

This British correspondent presents a rather cynical view of the situation in the Philippines, concluding that President Corazon Aquino will have to adopt the corrupt ways of her predecessor, Ferdinand Marcos, or be forced out of office. He indicates that in order to fight the NPA and the MNLF in Mindanao, she must have the backing of such Marcos supporters as warlord Sultan Mohammed Ali Dimaporo. Dimaporo still commands a private army of 500 and maintains his privileged status with local Philippine military commanders, who ignore orders from Manila to arrest him and disband his army.

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"Aquino Calls for Caution." Washington Post, 15 July 1986, p. A15.

The recent abduction in Mindanao of 10 Filipino nuns and a US missionary is believed to be the work of two Muslim insurgent groups, according to Philippine Government officials. Deputy Chief of the Southern Command Brigadier General Pedro Balbanero said the military is investigating reports that the Protestant missionary, Brian Lawrence, was taken by members of an armed Muslim group called the Barracudas. Initial leads indicated that the nuns were kidnaped by the "Lost Command" faction of the MNLF, consisting of former guerrillas who have turned to banditry.

Asani, Abdurasad. "An Historic Change for Accommodation." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 22 May 1986, pp. 30-31. HC411.F18.

A compromise between the demands of the MNLF and the position of the Philippine Government is suggested by the information officer of the MNLF in this news magazine's regular "5th Column" feature. Asani points out that the MNLF considers their Bangsa Moro homeland as a colony the Philippines inherited from the United States and that the central issue is decolonization and independence for Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Palawan. MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari continues to maintain this position, although reportedly he has ordered recently a "scaling down of military actions in the field to remove obstacles to a peace initiative" from the government. As a compromise, Asani suggests including in the new Philippine Constitution a guarantee of autonomy for the Muslim areas under which the Manila government would retain only two specific powers over an autonomous Bangsamoro state: power over the region's foreign affairs and power over external defense. This constitutional guarantee, according to Asani, would compensate the Moro people for the loss of their sovereignty.

"Attempt at National Reconciliation in the Philippines." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 14 May 1986, p. 4.

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This Indonesian newspaper editorial urges the government of Philippine President Corazon Aquino to use the Tripoli Accord signed by former President Ferdinand Marcos and MNLF leaders as a basis for settlement of the Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines. Failure by the Marcos regime to fully implement the Tripoli agreement led to the current division of the MNLF into factions, according to the editorial. Aquino's campaign promise of full autonomy for the Muslim areas is recalled, and the new president is urged to settle first the Muslim insurgency before tackling the more complicated Communist insurgency. "By reaching national reconciliation with the Muslims, the position of the government will be strengthened, and the government can face the Communists with the full support of the Muslims," the editorial states.

"China Has Cut Contacts with Philippine NPA." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 18 June 1986, p. 2.

Philippine Vice President Jose Laurel has been assured by top Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang that the Chinese Communist Party has "stopped all contacts with the Communist Party in the Philippines" and there is now "no contact whatsoever." Laurel made his remarks during a 3-day official visit to Beijing in mid-June. China may continue to extend fraternal greetings to the CPP, Laurel said. Chinese leaders admitted China extended material support to Communist insurgencies throughout the world during the first 10 years after the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, he said. "They will not encourage revolution or subversive activities on the part of overseas Communist parties," Laurel said.

Clad, James. "Aquino's Tricky Gamble." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 19 June 1986, pp. 16-17. HC411.F18.

The Philippine military holds the wild card in the three-handed poker game, known as the ceasefire talks, being played in the Philippines these days. Both of the other two players, the CPP and President Corazon Aquino's

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closest advisors, seem to have concluded that the risk of not holding the talks outweighs the danger of doing so. The military, without whose implementation any ceasefire agreement is impossible, remains unconvinced. The author states that Aquino's plan to coax the Communists back into the nation's embrace enjoys widespread support. He also suggests that many of Aquino's programs--agricultural credit schemes, rural public works projects, redistribution of idle land, and ending of commodity marketing monopolies--if implemented, will cut the ground out from under the insurgency.

Crossette, Barbara. "Filipinos Find 62 Rebel Dead; Purge Reported." New York Times, 26 June 1986, p. A15.

An NPA defector has led Philippine Army troops to the gravesite in Mindanao of 62 Communist guerrillas who were reportedly killed by fellow rebels in a purge in October 1985, stated an Army spokesman. According to the defector's account, the victims had been identified by the NPA as possible traitors, called "zombies." Army officials also reported that NPA guerrillas are beginning to take up the government's offer of a trial return to society. Under the program, guerrillas are allowed to come down from the hills, check their weapons with a trusted organization, live among the local population, and volunteer for government projects under which agricultural land is made available. If the ex-rebels are not satisfied, the officials say, they can pick up their guns and return to the hills.

"Differences over Rebels Emerge Between Aquino and Defense Chief," Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 22 May 1986, p. 2.

Philippine President Corazon Aquino and her Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile continue to take widely different approaches toward the Communist insurgency. Both deny that there is any contradiction in their carrot versus stick approaches. Aquino persists in her policy of patience and reconciliation toward the rebels, however,

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while Enrile continues to threaten to stage a major offensive against the Communists.

"Enrile Supports Continued US Military Presence." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 31 May 1986, p. 7.

Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile said in a speech in Manila that he opposes any provision in the new Philippine constitution that would prohibit foreign military bases in the Philippines. A constitutional ban on the bases "will trap (the Philippines) if there should be any need for a facility like that to be established in the land for the survival of the nation," he said. Enrile cited the Communist insurgency, the Muslim separatists, and political warlords associated with former President Ferdinand Marcos as sources of instability for the new government.

"Enrile Vows Pressure on Rebels Until Ceasefire." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 21 May 1986, pp. 1,7.

Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile tells Manila reporters he will keep continuous military pressure on the Communist guerrillas until a ceasefire is declared. Enrile discounted the strength of the NPA, saying it would take them 5 to 10 years to pose a real military threat. When asked to comment on a statement to the US Congress by US Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage that the insurgency problem is "serious and getting worse," Enrile said, "we always do things like that when you go to Congress to ask for money."

"Finally, Talking About Peace, Asiaweek (Hong Kong), 22 June 1986, pp. 21-22.

Under a cloak of security, peace talks have begun in the Philippines between the government and the Communist insurgency. The first objective is to arrange a ceasefire, then hold broader negotiations. The NDF paper

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Liberation has said that a reasonable short-term goal would be abolition of the highly unpopular Civilian Home Defense Force and dismantling of the private armies commanded by various warlords, something President Corazon Aquino has already promised to do. Both Aquino and the Communists appear to agree that a lasting peace will necessitate addressing the causes of the insurgency, which are rooted in the economic and social problems of Philippine society. The voices of pessimism are loud on both sides. And yet there are hopeful signs that a reviving economy and a new constitution will give the government the stability it needs to negotiate from a position of strength.

Jones, Gregg. "Rebels Name Emissary for Ceasefire." Guardian (Manchester), 6 June 1986, p. 7.

The CPP has named former journalist and member of the party's Central Committee Saturnino Ocampo as its emissary for ceasefire talks with the government. President Corazon Aquino's Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo has said one of the first issues to address is each side's definition of a ceasefire. Aquino has said she will only agree to a ceasefire if the army remains in place in the field. Communist officials, however, are demanding a pullback of the military to the barracks. Armed Forces Chief General Fidel Ramos recently stated that the number of Communist-influenced barangays (political districts) increased by 9 percent in the first 5 months of 1986 and now totals 17 percent of the country's barangays.

Lande, Carl and Hooley, Richard. "Aquino Takes Charge." Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 64, no. 5, Summer 1986, pp. 1087-1107. D410.F6.

Noted Philippine expert Carl Lande assesses President Corazon Aquino's first few months in office and the problems she faces. He draws an interesting comparison between Aquino and former President Ramon Magsaysay, both immensely popular leaders who faced a Communist insurgency. Magsaysay, Lande notes, dealt with the

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Hukbalahap rebellion with the promise of land reform and homesteads for surrendering guerrillas. The Philippine economy in those post-World War II years was expanding, employment growing, and prices stabilizing. A different set of conditions exists today. There are no longer any vast areas of frontier land, and the Philippine economy has hit rock bottom. Another difference lies in the nature of the leadership of the two insurgencies. The Huk movement was largely a peasant rebellion, and its adherents lost interest as their demands were addressed. The CPP, however, is led by intellectuals in search of utopian goals who are not likely to be diverted by piecemeal reforms. Lande describes the Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines as being no longer a serious military threat but a continuing political and social problem. He notes former President Ferdinand Marcos' success at dealing with the MNLF through a policy of cooptation of Muslim leaders, the granting of partial autonomy, and the providing of development aid to Muslim areas. Aquino will have to continue and extend Marcos' policy if she hopes to discourage new resistance from the Muslim minority, according to Lande.

Le Vine, Steve. "Marcos Is Gone, But Rebel Fight Continues Unabated Under Aquino." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 13 June 1986, p. 4.

The Communist insurgency continues to be the most serious external security problem as well as the most divisive internal issue facing the new Philippine Government of President Corazon Aquino.

"Lengthy and Difficult Ceasefire Talks: Ocampo." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 12 June 1986, p.1.

CPP negotiator Saturnino Ocampo stated in an open letter to President Corazon Aquino that negotiations could be lengthy and difficult but he hoped they would result in a lasting peace. He also noted that "there are elements in and out of the government who would rather not see the negotiations proceed and succeed." The CPP and the NPA

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have accused the military and the US Government of trying to sabotage the ceasefire talks. Ocampo recalled in his letter a visit by Aquino to a military camp where he was a political detainee and noted that she had impressed him with her candor and desire for justice and freedom. "I hope that these qualities will continue to mark her dealings with me and my comrades as we begin this enterprise," Ocampo said.

Magno, Jose P., Jr. and Gregor, A. James. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines." Asian Survey, (Berkeley, CA), vol. 26, no. 5, May 1986, pp. 501-17.

This article, a thinly-veiled plea for US economic assistance for the Philippine military for its counterinsurgency efforts against the Communists, is coauthored by the Commander of the Southern Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Major General Jose P. Magno, Jr. The authors hold out no hope that political efforts to diffuse the Communist insurrection will have any success. At least as long as the economy remains in the doldrums, "the Philippine military will have to assume the responsibility of engaging, containing, and ultimately defeating the armed elements of the Communist insurgency." The reported success of the Philippine military in combatting the insurgency in the Arakan Valley of Mindanao is suggested as a model for future counterinsurgency efforts. The biggest threat to the gains made by the military in the Arakan Valley and to the whole counterinsurgency effort, according to the authors, is the budgetary restraints imposed on the military. The article closes with a four-page pitch for US assistance, the gist of which is that now is the time: they can do it with a little help from their friends--who, say the authors, have a large stake in seeing it done.

Marks, Tom. "Don't Discount the Philippine Communists." Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 28 April 1986, p. 6.

The author is a former military intelligence analyst who specialized in revolutionary warfare and recently spent 5

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weeks in the Philippines, several of them on combat patrols with government troops. He states that the Communist insurgency is sure to continue since the CPP does not want social reform, "but seeks instead the fundamental reordering of Philippine society along Marxist-Leninist lines."

Marks, Tom. "Island Fighting: 52 IB Tracks Elusive NPA." Soldier of Fortune (Boulder, CO). G539.S64.

A former US military officer and student of counterinsurgency tactics reports on Philippine Government efforts to deal with the NPA on the island of Samar. NPA and Philippine Army field tactics are explored at length, based partly on the author's observations while accompanying a government unit on patrol. NPA tactics focus on forcing the government to spread its forces in a static defensive posture. Slowly the military in Samar under Brigadier General Salvador M. Mison has begun to use countermobilization tactics to force the NPA to dissipate its strength, thus preventing it from providing a shield for large areas behind which the CPP can effect its political mobilization. The struggle against the insurgency is far from over on Samar, according to the author, but it going a lot better than on some of the other islands where the military continues to be locked into a defensive posture.

"Missionary Warns Against Philippine Rescue Bid." New York Times, 18 July 1986, p. A3.

An American missionary kidnaped by an armed band of Muslims in the southern Philippines warned in a letter to his wife that he might be killed if the military tried to rescue him. Brian Lawrence was abducted from his home in Marawi City, Mindanao, on 12 July, reportedly by an armed group called the Barracudas, which is linked with Muslim warlord Ali Dimaporo. Meanwhile, 10 Filipino Carmelite nuns, who also had been kidnaped from Marawi City at about the same time by another group, were released unharmed.

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"Philippine Communist Party Regrets Election Boycott Policy."
Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 7 June 1986, p. 8.

The Philippine Daily Inquirer, a Manila newspaper, reported in early June that CPP top leaders Rodolfo Salas and Rafael Baylosis have been eased out of their party positions as a result of their disastrous decision to have the party and the NDF boycott the Philippine presidential election in February 1986. The paper said Saturnino Ocampo and Antonio Zumel were believed to be next in rank to the two ousted leaders. The May issue of the CPP official organ, Ang Bayan, tended to confirm the reports in an article characterizing the boycott policy as a "major political blunder." "Where the people saw in the February 7 snap election a chance to deliver a crippling blow on the Marcos regime" the CPP Executive Committee saw it merely as a "noisy and empty political battle among factions of the ruling classes," said Ang Bayan. "When the aroused and militant moved spontaneously but resolutely to oust the hated regime...the party and its forces were on the sidelines unable to lead or influence....," the article stated.

"Philippine Govt, Communists Hold Preliminary Talks."
Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 13 May 1986, p. 1.

Top secret negotiations on a ceasefire were underway somewhere on Luzon between Philippine Government emissaries and Communist leaders in early May, according to a report from Agence France-Presse. Informed sources told the news agency that problems being thrashed out in the preliminary negotiations included the following: delineation of a ceasefire line; positioning of the two sides during a ceasefire; the manner of determining culpability in ceasefire violations, whether by a joint panel or a third party; and duration of a ceasefire. Political observers point out, however, that ceasefire talks are meaningless unless they address the problem of subversion by the NDF, which many analysts consider to be as dangerous as the military might of the NPA. The NDF, they point out, can bring the insurgency to Manila itself through crippling work stoppages and mass street rallies.

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"Progress of Govt-Rebels Talks Kept Secret, Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 24 June 1986, p. 1.

The progress and even location of the ceasefire talks between the Philippine Government and the Communist insurgency are being kept secret for fear that premature publicity by Manila's avid press will do more harm than good. President Corazon Aquino confirmed in late June that talks had begun between five unnamed government emissaries and a rebel panel led by former journalist Saturnino Ocampo.

"Rebel Envoys Make Contact with Aquino." Guardian (Manchester), 3 July 1986, p. 8.

The first meeting between the representatives of the Philippine Government and the Communist insurgents is set for about 7 July. The government will be represented by Agriculture Minister Ramon Mitra and human rights lawyer Jose Diokno. These choices reportedly have been praised by the Communist negotiators, both former journalists, Saturnino Ocampo and Antonio Zumel. In a related report, Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile told a woman's club gathering that there was no doubt that talks would be held, but added, "Whether it will result in something concrete and for the better is a big question mark. I must admit I am sceptical."

Sacerdoti, Guy. "Reds See Their Missed Chances." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 12 June 1986, pp. 45-46. HC411.F18.

The CPP, while admitting its mistake in boycotting the Philippine election in February 1986, sets forth its new policy of "active defense" in the May issue of its official organ Ang Bayan. The party proposes to "immediately reestablish its clear leadership over the political struggle. Accordingly, the CPP has decided to take part in ceasefire negotiations, campaign for its positions during the Constitutional Convention hearings,

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and for the next few months concentrate on political gains and propaganda. The NPA will continue its guerrilla strikes at a reduced rate, sufficient to keep the Philippine military from taking the offensive.

"Talks with Rebels Have Begun, Says Enrile." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 19 June 1986, p. 7.

Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile made the first official confirmation on 18 July that ceasefire talks had begun between the government and the Communist insurgency. Saturnino Ocampo leads the CPP delegation, while the government is represented by five persons, most of whose names have not been revealed. Enrile, when asked about the prospects for the talks' success, replied, "I'm a very optimistic person."

Tatad, Francisco S. "Trifling with Revolution." Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 12 May 1986, p.6.

The Philippines Communist insurgency is "back with a vengeance," states the author in a highly-critical discussion of President Corazon Aquino's policy toward the guerrillas. Tatad, who was information minister under the Ferdinand Marcos regime (1969-80) and a member of Parliament (1978-84), is currently a columnist for the Manila newspaper Business Day. Many observers interpret increased NPA activity as a move to strengthen the Communist bargaining position. Tatad, however, concludes that the Communists are merely taking advantage of a situation in which the military is divided and the new president has no firm grasp of the problem. Aquino's ceasefire proposal has failed, he says, because it was made without consultation with the military. "Despite its violent repudiation by the guerrillas, Mrs. Aquino has not withdrawn her offer....This has created a psychological block in the minds of those trying to pacify the countryside," Tatad states. The counterinsurgency effort has depended heavily in the past, and will continue to depend, on US economic and military aid. But "all the gold in Ft. Knox" isn't enough to instill the necessary

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fighting spirit; the will to fight and the will to win must be restored in the common soldier, states Tatad.

Weintraub, Richard M. "Philippine Cabinet Riven by Antagonisms." Washington Post, 13 July 1986, p. A17.

Philippine Cabinet members have begun to show their irritation at US Government attempts to influence Manila's policy toward the Communist insurgency. Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo stated in an interview: "They (US officials) keep advising us just like in Marcos' time. We can't have another Vietnam, blindly following Washington's advice." He cited as evidence a long list of public and private statements on the insurgency by US officials, including Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage. The latter was quoted recently in the Manila newspapers as saying, "The military situation is serious and getting worse....Mrs. Aquino is going to have to let her forces take the proper actions against the insurgents."

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Author: Barbara A. LePoer

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"Aquino Bans Use of Torture Against Rebels." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 4 July 1986, p. 1.

President Corazon Aquino has banned the use of torture by security forces in the fight against rebels. "This government will not tolerate the use of torture," Aquino told some 200 military and civilian officials attending a national conference on peace and order at a military camp near Manila this week. "That hideous practice has no place in a democracy and no justification in the accepted wisdom on counterinsurgency," Aquino said.

"Aquino Rejects Kidnappers' Demand for Ransom," Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 16 July 1986, p. 1.

Muslim kidnappers of a US missionary and 10 Filipino nuns demanded a ransom of US\$100,000, but President Corazon Aquino rejected the demand saying her government will not be blackmailed. Aquino said that kidnaping is part of "the problem of warlordism and banditry" on the southern island of Mindanao and "now it is the army's turn to act decisively and settle the problem once and for all. The government cannot be blackmailed nor will it adopt a policy of appeasement toward kidnappers who have abused the military's attitude of tolerance." Besides the money, the kidnappers were demanding the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Accord negotiated by former President Ferdinand Marcos and MNLF leader Nur Misuari and also that the commission currently writing a new national constitution in Manila include a provision granting autonomy to the Muslim region.

"Aquino to Allow Communists in Government." Washington Post, 14 August 1986, p. A16.

President Corazon Aquino will not include any Communists in her cabinet but will allow Communists who renounce violence to work in the government, according to deputy presidential spokeswoman Alice Villadolid. Aquino reportedly discussed the issue of Communists in government during a cabinet meeting following recent statements by

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Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile that Communist Party leaders have infiltrated the government.

"Aquino to Negotiate with Moslem Separatists." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 22 July 1986, p. 8.

President Corazon Aquino has appointed her brother-in-law Agapito ("Butz") Aquino as her emissary in discussions with exiled MNLF leader Nur Misuari, according to press reports. There were no indications in the reports whether the MNLF leader has stated any willingness to settle for local autonomy rather than his demand for full independence for the Muslim areas of the southern Philippines.

Coloma, Roberto. "Moslem Princess Emerging As a Top Aquino Ally in Mindanao." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 28 July 1986, p. 7.

A Muslim princess has been instrumental in negotiating the release of a number of recent kidnap victims in the Philippines. Tarhata Lucman, a member of a Muslim royal house dating to pre-Spanish times, volunteered to help negotiate the release of French missionary Michele de Gigord in June. The government then requested her services in obtaining the release of 10 Filipino nuns and an American missionary in July. Princess Tarhata is the widow of a former congressman, Rahid Lucman, who went into exile during the regime of former President Ferdinand Marcos. The Lucmans were close friends with Benigno and Corazon Aquino. Princess Tarhata plans to run for governor of Lanao del Sur Province next year to reclaim a post taken away from her by Marcos when he imposed martial law in 1972. She expects her biggest foe in the fight for the governorship will be Muslim warlord and Marcos supporter Ali Dimaporo.

"Communists Criticize President Aquino." Indonesian Observer, 5 August 1986, p. 1.

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The latest issue of the CPP organ Ang Bayan criticizes President Corazon Aquino for naming "almost no direct representatives" of workers and peasants to the constitutional convention now meeting in Manila. The magazine said that a proposal to remove US bases from the Philippines would undoubtedly be rejected by a plenary vote of the constitutional commission later this month. "We can only expect a draft constitution that formally upholds the people's interests but essentially perpetuates those of imperialism and its local lackeys," the CPP said, adding that only "cosmetic reforms" would emerge.

"Dissension in the Ranks?" Asiaweek (Hong Kong), vol. 12, no. 28, 13 July 1986, pp. 14-15. DS1.A715

Not everyone shares President Corazon Aquino's optimism on ceasefire talks with the CPP. The military says the insurgency is growing in strength. Last week Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile put NPA numbers at 17,000, the highest government estimate so far. Of these he estimated 12,000-15,000 were armed.

"Foreigner Kidnapped on Mindanao." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 21 July 1986, p. 1.

Armed men kidnaped a Swiss man and a Filipino woman companion at sea off the southern Philippine island of Mindanao last week. Hans Kunzle and his unidentified companion were intercepted in their inflatable boat as they headed for Santa Cruz Island near Zamboanga City. It was not known whether any ransom demands had yet been made. The abduction followed the recent kidnappings and release of a French missionary, a US missionary, and 10 Filipino nuns.

"Giving Peace a Chance." Asiaweek (Hong Kong), vol. 12, no. 33, 17 August 1986, pp. 10-13. DS1.A715

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On 5 August, peace talks between the Philippine Government and the CPP began somewhere south of Manila. According to the government representative, Ramon Mitra, the two sides reached agreement on several points during the course of the 3-hour meeting: to continue the talks; that the format would be informal with no record of the conversations made until an agreement is reached; that a third or fourth person would be named by both sides; and that the media briefings could be made either jointly or separately. CPP representative Saturnino Ocampo suggested that there be a permanent venue for the talks, but Mitra discouraged that because "the meeting could turn into a circus with mediamen around." Mitra, Ocampo, and the other CPP representative, Antonio Zumel, are all former Manila reporters. Following the meeting, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile pledged that "whatever is agreed upon by the negotiators, once approved by the president, will be followed and respected by the defense establishment." Army Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos said he welcomed the start of the negotiations but was not about to drop his guard. All "search and destroy" operations against the rebels would cease, but the army would continue to secure the civilian population and protect town halls, public utilities, and other government offices and facilities. The biggest immediate disagreement between the government and the rebels is over the definition of a ceasefire. The government would like an immediate cessation of hostilities while the CPP favors a "negotiated ceasefire," one that comes after the main issues are settled.

"Government, Communist Emissaries Meet." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 3 July 1986, p. 8.

Philippine Agriculture Minister Ramon Mitra, one of two government negotiators in talks with the CPP, said that he and President Corazon Aquino's Executive Secretary Jose Diokno had a 2-hour meeting with two "nice-looking Communist emissaries" this week. Mitra refused to give the names of the CPP emissaries or the location of the meeting, but said it was held in a "relaxed and cordial" atmosphere. Mitra predicted that in 5 days the government

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would make an announcement of the timetable, agenda, and schedule of the proposed ceasefire talks.

Hanley, Charles J. "Communist Leader Looks Forward to Beverly Hills and Revolution." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 1 July 1986, p. 4.

CPP founder Jose Maria Sison, recently freed after 8 years in prison, is a popular speaker at civic and church group meetings these days. His assessment of the situation in the Philippines is that the rural guerrilla conflict may soon spread to the cities, unless the Communists are taken into a coalition government. Sison's present relationship with the CPP is unclear. He says an implied condition for his freedom was that he engage only in non-Communist activities. Currently he is helping to organize a new "people's party," which he says has no contact with the Communists. Sison is scheduled to deliver 10 lectures in the United States, although he is not sure he will be able to obtain a US visa. Sison would like to visit his widowed mother and physician brother at their home in Beverly Hills, California. Sison holds a visiting fellowship at the University of the Philippines Asian Center and will be awarded a Southeast Asian literary prize in October for a volume of poetry written while he was in prison.

Jones, Clayton. "Talks Soon between Aquino, Communists." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 6 June 1986, p. 9.

CPP leaders have sent a secret message to President Corazon Aquino proposing a negotiator high enough in party ranks to be acceptable to the government. The proposed negotiator, Saturnino Ocampo, is a former client of Aquino's executive secretary, Joker Arroyo, who was a human rights lawyer during the regime of President Ferdinand Marcos. Ocampo is presumed to be on the CPP Central Committee and may be on the five-man Politburo, the body that Aquino wants to deal with directly.

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Jones, Clayton. "Test Talks for Philippine Cease-fire."
Christian Science Monitor (Boston) 1 July 1986, pp. 9, 11.

Four local CPP leaders met with Davao del Norte provincial government officials and religious leaders last week to see if they could work out a satisfactory ceasefire. Both the national CPP organization and the government of President Corazon Aquino gave approval for the regional peace talks, which may become a model for future nationwide negotiations. The provincial capital of Tagum is the location of the government's only rehabilitation school for rebels who have left the hills to surrender. The Davao del Norte talks are expected to deal with local problems rather than get into such national issues as the US bases in the Philippines. A local ceasefire would have advantages for both sides: it would give the Communists a chance to rest and regroup, but it would also provide an opportunity for many NPA rebels to surrender under a government amnesty program.

Jones, Gregg. "Filipino Muslims Release Kidnapped Catholic Nuns." Guardian (Manchester), 18 July 1986, p. 8.

Muslim rebels at dawn released unharmed 10 Filipino Catholic nuns kidnaped last week from their convent in Marawi City, Mindanao. Government negotiators were still working to secure the release of an American Protestant missionary also kidnaped by Muslims in Marawi City. Military authorities said no ransom was paid to the kidnapers, but a prominent Muslim who helped negotiate the release said the kidnapers had been given guns and money. The prioress of the kidnaped nuns said they were well cared for during their 8-day captivity. "We were almost spoiled," she said. Another described the affair as "like a picnic."

"Kidnappers Free American Missionary." Indonesia Times
(Jakarta), 19 July 1986, p. 7.

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American missionary Brian Lawrence was released 6 days after his kidnaping by Muslim armed men, according to the Philippine Defense Ministry. The military earlier reported that the kidnapers included a nephew of Muslim warlord Ali Dimaporo. Dimaporo held a news conference to deny any part in the kidnapings, which he said were a protest against the US bombing of Libya and the Catholic Church's role in Philippine politics.

Le Vine, Slex. "After 15 Years in Mountains Philippine Rebel Leader Won't Quit." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 12 July 1986, p. 4.

Communist leader Concha Araneta typifies what Philippine Government officials refer to as "hardcore" rebels, who have not been moved to "come down from the hills," despite the end of the Ferdinand Marcos regime. A seemingly cohesive insurgency of about 16,500 is a source of frustration for President Corazon Aquino, who has freed political prisoners, reinstated habeas corpus, and begun to deal with the country's economic problems. Araneta says she and most other insurgents will not give up until their demands for massive redistribution of land to farmers, withdrawal of soldiers from areas where guerrillas are strong, removal of US military bases and economic influence, and establishment of some form of coalition government are met.

"Mindanao's Problems Discussed." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 16 July 1986, p.7.

Following a cabinet meeting to discuss the recent kidnapings in Mindanao, presidential spokeswoman Alice Villadolid told reporters that President Corazon Aquino will form a committee to study the political problems on Mindanao and the kidnapers demand for autonomy. Armed men, identified by the military as renegade Muslim separatists, last week abducted 10 Roman Catholic nuns from a convent in Marawi City, the center of the MNLF rebellion. A day later, armed men kidnaped Protestant missionary Brian Lawrence from his apartment near the

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Mindanao State University campus in Marawi City. Candu Muarip, the Philippine minister for Muslim affairs, told the cabinet that the groups involved in the kidnappings were "not rebel groups, but small independent units who are capitalizing on the current political instability in the area to further their nefarious actions."

"Moslem Rebels Free Woman Companion of Kidnapped Swiss Tourist."
Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 26 July 1986

Major General Jose Magno, head of the Philippine military's Southern Command, told reporters that Muslim rebel kidnapers had released the Philippine woman abducted with Swiss tourist Hans Kunzli, who is still being held for a ransom of US\$100,000. Adelaida Gamboa, who was abducted at sea off Zamboanga City with Kunzli, appeared to be in good health. Kunzli had sent letters indicating his willingness to pay the ransom and begging the military not to mount any rescue attempt because their lives were in danger. Magno said he doubted whether Kunzli could pay the amount and stressed the government's policy of not giving in to kidnapers' ransom demands.

Mydans, Seth. "Aquino Aide Begins Talks with Rebels." New York Times, 6 August 1986, p. A3.

The government negotiator in peace talks with the CPP characterized the opening session of the talks as a reunion of old friends. Ramon Mitra, President Corazon Aquino's representative in the talks, and CPP emissaries Antonio Zumel and Saturnino Ocampo were all former Manila newspaper reporters and friends. Mitra stated, however, "I have no illusions that there will be an easy settlement of the basic issues involved, or about finding the answers to the causes of their alienation." The CPP negotiators turned down Mitra's proposal to agree first on a ceasefire and then discuss the other substantive issues. Mitra said his only instructions from Aquino were: "Listen to them. Hear them out. What do they want from us? What can we give them? Bring the message that we want peace and an end to the killing." Although the Philippine military is not

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involved in the negotiations, Mitra said he would be briefing military leaders regularly.

Mydans, Seth. "On Island in Philippines, Fear and Burned Homes." New York Times, 28 July 1986, p. A3.

Philippine Government troops searching out Communist rebels recently shelled hamlets near the village of Bactolon on Negros Island and set fire to some 50 houses. The local commander, Col Rene Cardones, asserted that only rebel military installations had been destroyed, but Bishop Antonio Fortich of Negros said no rebel camps had been found, "only houses." The soldiers reportedly were acting in retaliation for recent attacks on government troops in the area.

"Not the Communist Party." Asiaweek (Hong Kong), vol. 12, no. 33, 17 August 1986, p. 12. DS1.A715

Founder of the CPP Jose Maria Sison is busy founding a new, legal political party, Partido ng Bayan (People's Party). The new party, according to Sison, "is not a rival or competitor to, nor an extension nor replacement for the CPP. The Communist Party will remain the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party of the proletariat." Sison denies having links with the CPP any more and insists he knows nothing about its internal affairs. He hopes to recruit 10,000 charter members, mostly from the Manila area.

"OIC Arranging Talks Between Aquino and MNLF." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 19 July 1986, p. 1.

MNLF leader Nur Misuari has informed the Philippine Government through emissaries that he is only prepared to talk to government representatives through the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Philippine Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mamintal Tamano told the Malaysian news agency Bernama this week. Tamano was in Jiddah recently to explore the possibility of arranging

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talks between MNLF leaders and the government. Tamano said he did not meet Misuari personally because the MNLF leader had already left Saudi Arabia when he arrived there.

"Philippine Communists Now Seeking Foreign Aid, Says General."
Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 14 July 1986, p. 7.

The Philippine military is checking reports that some NPA guerrillas have undergone training in an unspecified Asian country, stated Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Eduardo Ermita in an interview published in two Manila newspapers. The military has previously said that the NPA relies mainly on firearms captured from government troops and receives no support from any foreign government. According to Ermita the Communist leadership has realized that its 16,500-man guerrilla army cannot advance its cause by relying on indigenous sources of firearms. One possible source, stated Ermita, was the unspecified Asian country, which has a large stockpile of US-made weapons similar to those used by the NPA.

Tan, Abby. "Enrile to Reassess Tactics." Washington Post, 7 August 1986, p. A27.

Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile said the military will reassess its "active defense" position against the NPA following the start of formal peace talks between the CPP and the government. Following a cabinet meeting with President Corazon Aquino, Enrile said the military position will depend on the agenda in the next round of talks. Enrile seemed to indicate that the Philippine military, which has scaled down its activity against the guerrillas since Aquino came to power, might further scale down its activity if there were progress toward a long-term peace agreement. Aquino, who welcomed the start of the peace talks, announced that she has revived the national security council by naming five other cabinet ministers to assist her as an advisory body: Enrile, Army Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos, Vice President and Foreign Minister Salvador Laurel, Justice

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Minister Neptali Gonzales, and Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo.

Tan, Abby. "Manila Minister Meets with Rebels." Washington Post, 6 August 1986, p. A20.

Philippine Agriculture Minister Ramon Mitra said he met today for several hours with CPP representatives Saturnino Ocampo and Antonio Zumel, the latter believed to be chairman of the NDF. Mitra said both sides agreed that the negotiations will be called "peace talks" rather than ceasefire talks to give them a more permanent meaning. Mitra noted that he and the CPP representatives agreed to exchange papers in the next two days on the agenda, venue, and plans on how to brief the press on future meetings. They also agreed the talks would be broken down into two sections--the more immediate question of a ceasefire and the "root causes" of the insurgency. Teofisto Guingona, chairman of the government's commission on audit, will take the place of Jose Diokno, the other government negotiator, who is in the United States for medical treatment.

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"Aquino and Misuari Emissaries in Mindanao." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 3 September 1986, p. 1.

An estimated 30,000 Muslims, some of them armed rebels, attended the opening session of a 4-day congress of the MNLF in Zamboanga this week, according to Philippine military reports. An aide of MNLF leader Nur Misuari, who is scheduled to meet with Philippine President Corazon Aquino in the southern Philippines this week, stated, "The congress will determine whether or not the Muslims want autonomy or complete independence."

"Aquino Seals Cease-Fire Pact with Rebel Priest." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 15 September 1986, p. 2.

President Corazon Aquino flew unannounced to the Cordillera Mountains of northern Luzon this week to preside over the signing of a local ceasefire pact with Roman Catholic priest and former NPA commander Father Conrado Balweg. The agreement called for cessation of work on a giant dam on the Chico River and on a paper mill in the region. Balweg's Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA), which split from the NPA in April, is campaigning for autonomy for the mountain region inhabited by Igorot tribespeople. The signing, which followed a "very cordial" 95-minute meeting between Aquino and Balweg, took place at the Mt. Data Hotel, 300 km north of Manila.

"Aquino, Misuari Agree to 1-Week Cease-Fire." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 6 September 1986, p. 1.

President Corazon Aquino and MNLF leader Nur Misuari agreed to continue an informal ceasefire and to open peace talks during a meeting in Jolo on 5 September. The two leaders agreed to form panels "for substantive negotiations to be carried out in the future under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference." Maj Gen Jose Magno, the Philippine Armed Forces commander for Mindanao and the other southern islands, will head the government panel. The MNLF panel will be headed by Abdul Sharin, chief of military intelligence for the MNLF armed

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forces. Aquino appointed her brother-in-law, Agapito "Butz" Aquino, as civilian coordinator for the talks. Misuari appointed his aide, Ustadz Shariff Jain Jale, as civilian coordinator for the MNLF.

Bates, Kim Gordon. "Informal Ceasefire and Pursuit of Negotiations." Le Monde (Paris), 7-8 September 1986, p. 6. (In French)

A joint guard of Philippine government soldiers and MNLF guerrillas provided the security for the meeting between President Corazon Aquino and MNLF leader Nur Misuari at a Carmelite convent in Jolo on 5 September. The soldiers of the two camps reportedly fraternized with each other, and the MNLF guerrillas posed for the cameras standing on the vehicles of the government troops. The two leaders refrained from discussing the question of autonomy versus independence.

Bates, Kim Gordon. "The Communist Party at a Time of Negotiations and Self-criticism." Le Monde (Paris), 27 August 1986, p. 3. (In French)

Communist negotiator Satur Ocampo, in an interview, discusses the intense internal debate that has taken place within the CPP this year. Refusing the term "purge," Ocampo admits that the direction of the CPP has undergone a "certain readjustment." He also acknowledges the unjustified execution of NPA guerrillas by overzealous NPA commanders, who suspected the soldiers of being government agents. Ocampo stated, however, that it was irresponsible to speak of "killing grounds" and to compare the NPA to the Khmer Rouge.

Branigin, William. "Aquino Goes to Moslem Stronghold to 'Talk Peace' with Rebel Leader." Washington Post, 6 September 1986, p. A8.

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President Corazon Aquino and MNLF leader Nur Misuari met "to talk peace" for an hour in a Roman Catholic convent on the island of Jolo on 5 September. A joint statement issued later in Manila said Aquino and Misuari "agreed to support the continued cessation of hostilities" and hold "substantive negotiations" in the future under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference. Misuari had returned to the Philippines earlier in the week to attend a Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation) Congress on Jolo.

Branigin, William. "Filipino Rebels Flexible, to a Point." Washington Post, 15 September 1986, pp. A1, A18.

Philippine Communists appear to have more in common with Nicaragua's Sandinistas than with the Khmer Rouge they have sometimes been compared with, according to the author. Since the February election, the Communists have thoroughly reassessed their political strategy. Former hardline leaders Rafael Baylosis and Rodolfo Salas have been replaced. The author reviews the new crop of leaders, including Benito Tiamzon, Ignacio Capegsan, Romeo Kintanar, Benjamin de Vera, and Antonio Zumel. A review of long-term Communist strategy seems to indicate more flexibility and a longer range viewpoint, but with the same result.

Branigin, William. "Philippine Rebels Push Cease-Fire." New York Times, 5 September 1986, p. A27, A33.

Philippine Communist leaders in Mindanao recently disclosed that the NPA shot two regional Communist leaders as punishment for ordering "arbitrary executions" as part of a purge of suspected military agents in their ranks. They said 38 persons were killed in the purge before it was stopped. In a related development Communist guerrilla leaders sent an open letter of condolence to families of the military men killed by NPA forces in an ambush in Mindanao. The letter blamed the incident on Philippine military officials, who they said sent the ambushed patrol to track down guerrillas in a ceasefire zone. The

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ceasefire had been signed by Davao del Norte Governor Prospero Amatong, other local officials, and representatives of the NPA, CPP, and NDF. The Philippine military stated that such ceasefires were designed to "drive a wedge between the local government and the military."

Branigin, William. "Poverty on Negros Island Breeding Filipino Rebels." Washington Post, 21 September 1986, pp. A1, A25.

In this long article surveying economic conditions on Negros Island, the author concludes what numerous other writers have been saying for the past two years. The Communist insurgency is growing faster on Negros than anywhere else in the country, and, unless something is done to alleviate the grinding poverty, Negros is likely to be the first province to explode into revolution.

Clad, James. "The Misuari Gamble." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 11 September 1986, pp. 18-19. HC411.F18

President Corazon Aquino's meeting in early September with MNLF leader Nur Misuari was in a large part prompted by intense diplomatic pressure from Southeast Asian capitals and the Middle East. Jakarta is particularly interested in not receiving any spillover affect from the Philippine Muslim insurgency into its own Muslim-dominated society. Malaysia would just like to have the Sabah issue settled (in its favor) once and for all. The author suggests that, whatever happens, the near-term future of Philippine Muslims is not very bright. The Moros are falling farther and farther behind in economic, educational, and social areas, as well as seeing the geographic area in which they are a majority grow smaller and smaller, because of the influx of Christian immigrants. Factionalism and tribal feuding continues to deprive the Muslims of a united front from which to deal with the Manila government.

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Claver, Francisco F. "Church and Revolution: The Philippine Solution." Etudes (Paris), June 1986, pp. 749-64. (In French)

The author reviews the role of the Catholic Church in the Philippine revolution of February 1986, tracing the growing involvement of the church and increased activism of the Philippine Catholic bishops after 1984. Excerpts from relevant statements and letters help document the evolution of the hierarchy's involvement in the growing Philippine crisis. The author concludes the church's role was a decisive element in the success of the revolution and that increased social activism by the church is necessary in order to combat the economic conditions that make the country ripe for a Communist takeover.

"Eight Filipinos Killed in Attack on Wedding." Washington Post, 8 September 1986, p. A16.

Muslim rebels tossed a grenade into a Roman Catholic church in Lanao del Norte Province, Mindanao, during a wedding on 7 September, killing 8 persons and injuring 56.

Two of the attackers, who were later killed by government soldiers, were reported to be members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), one of the three major Philippine Muslim factions. Military officials speculated that the MILF was trying to get attention because it was not included in talks held the day before between President Corazon Aquino and MNLF leader Nur Misuari.

"Enrile Pledges Full Support for Peace Talks with Communist Rebels." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 7 August 1986, p. 8.

Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, who has repeatedly denied rumors that the military is against negotiations with the Communists, stated that, "When the President enters into any agreement with the other side, we will implement her orders all the way to the last man in the field." He also gave strong guarantees for the safety of

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the rebel negotiators during the talks. In a related development, President Corazon Aquino named economist and human rights lawyer Teofisto Guingona as a replacement negotiator for Jose Diokno, who is in the United States for medical treatment.

"Filipino Refugees in Sabah Seek Permanent Solution." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 3 September 1986, p. 1.

An organization of Filipino refugees in Sabah has sent a memorandum to President Corazon Aquino requesting the Philippine Government to hold talks with Malaysia on a permanent solution to the refugee problem in Sabah. Copies of the memorandum were also sent by the Refugee Standing Committee (RSC) to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, Sabah Chief Minister Joseph Pairin Kitingan, the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The memorandum stated RSC support for President Aquino's government and said Filipino refugees in Sabah would return home if the Philippine Government grants autonomy to the southern part of the country. The memorandum called for a voluntary repatriation program under UN auspices and the setting up of a Philippine consulate in Sabah, so that refugees wishing to work there could be issued Philippine passports.

"Full Autonomy for Moro Muslims." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 27 August 1986, p. 4.

This editorial reiterates Indonesian Government support for autonomy for Philippine Muslims and states that Jakarta stands ready to help Manila solve its Moro problem. Minister of State Sudharmono, speaking for President Suharto, recently stated, "We believe that a settlement of the Moro problem can be achieved, among other things by giving more attention to the aspirations of the Muslims in their area and improving their wellbeing."

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Jones, Clayton. "In a Communist Stronghold, Where Rebels Have Worn Out Their Welcome." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 20 August 1986, p. 3.

Agdao, Davao's harbor slum area, was the first part of the city to accept Communism and is the first to reject it, according to the author. Local officials estimate that by 1985 80 percent of the city of 1.2 million people were under either the influence or control of the NPA. This figure they say has now dwindled to 40 percent. Davao, which the Communists referred to as their "laboratory" is now becoming a "laboratory" for non-Communist government, according to the author.

Jones, Gregg. "Moro Guerrillas Discuss Autonomy Plan." Guardian (Manchester), 19 August 1986, p. 7.

Most Philippine Muslims favor autonomy under the Philippine Government rather than an independent state, according to Haji Ustaz Gulam Abdullah, a member of the MNLF's central commission. Abdullah is also vice chairman of a consultative commission that is meeting with Muslim groups throughout the southern Philippines. Meanwhile, other MNLF leaders have vowed to launch a new round of fighting if Muslim demands are not met. Guerrilla leader Randy Karon stated that Libyan leader Col Qadhafi is providing the MNLF with "financial, political, and military support" and that Iran and Syria are also assisting the MNLF.

Komisar, Lucy. "To Promote Philippine Democracy." New York Times, 4 September 1986, p A27.

The author criticizes the Reagan administration for pressuring President Aquino to use military force as its major means of dealing with the Philippine Communist insurgency, rather than political and economic reforms favored by Aquino. While the US administration sees the Communists as enemies who must be vanquished, Aquino, and many in her administration, view the guerrillas less as

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enemies than as fellow victims of the 20-year Marcos regime, according to the author. Citing many of the abuses of the Marcos years, the author states that Washington should help Aquino with increased economic aid that would advance national reconciliation instead of promoting a wider war.

Lava, Jose. "Philippines: Blind Alley of Neocolonialism."
World Marxist Review vol. 29, no. 7, July 1986, pp. 92-98.

Jose Lava is a member of the Central Committee Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, PKP), which, partly under his leadership, mounted a serious insurrection in the central Luzon region in the 1940s and 1950s. In this article he surveys the new administration of President Corazon Aquino, praising some aspects of it and finding fault with others. He is mostly critical of the continued US military, political, and economic influence in the Philippines. He states that the democratization process that the Aquino administration has embarked on should "have the ultimate aim of freeing the Philippine economy and society as a whole from the fetters of foreign domination and of dismantling the entire system of neocolonial dependence." In this effort, he states, the Aquino government will have the "unstinting support" of the PKP.

"Leftist Party May Join Banned Communist Party If Legalized."
Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 2 September 1986, p. 1.

Leaders of a new leftist Philippine political party denied recently that they are fronting for the outlawed CPP but said they might be willing to merge with the Communists if they became a legal party. Partido Ng Bayan Vice President Joe Castro said, "We have no intention of becoming illegal by coalescing with an illegal organization." Chairman Rolando Olalia said the party will "concentrate on the electoral process." A recent

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party convention was led by ex-CPP Chairman Jose Maria Sison and former NPA leader Bernabe Buscayno.

"Mrs Aquino Voicing Concern over Continuing Clashes." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 30 August 1986, p. 7.

Philippine President Corazon Aquino summoned officials negotiating a ceasefire with Communist rebels last week and asked them to convey to the guerrillas her concern over recent NPA ambushes. Aquino also said that she wanted the peace talks, which have become stalled recently over the issue of safe conduct passes for rebel negotiators, to be speeded up.

"Mrs Aquino, Misuari Support Cessation of Hostilities." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 6 September 1986, p. 1.

President Corazon Aquino and MNLF leader Nur Misuari met at a convent in Jolo on 5 September to negotiate a solution to the Muslim insurgency problem. On the eve of the talks, Misuari told supporters that he still favored an independent Islamic state in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, but would settle for autonomy, if that is what Filipino Muslims want. Aquino has ruled out secession but is willing to grant Filipino Muslims autonomy. She told government troops in Jolo and Zamboanga that the Mindanao region "belongs to all, whether Muslim or Christian." A commission drafting a new constitution in Manila has approved a provision on Muslim autonomy in a draft charter.

Mydans, Seth. "Communists Warn Manila Over Peace Talks." New York Times, 4 September 1986, p. A22.

Communist negotiators accused Philippine Government officials of bad faith and warned of a possible failure in ceasefire talks, in a statement given to reporters. "We deplore the cavalier, if not insolent, attitude displayed by certain officials of the Aquino government toward

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earnest and reasonable proposals we have submitted," according to the statement signed by negotiators Saturnino Ocampo and Antonio Zumel. If these officials "are bereft of good faith and continue behaving in the manner they have done, we are truly sorry to say that current efforts toward lasting peace in our land may come to naught," according to the statement. The Communist negotiators said they had called for holding the talks at a Manila location accessible to the public, and had suggested publication in full of their proposed negotiating conditions in order to counter the affects of "distorted versions of our proposals that have been maliciously leaked to certain segments of mass media."

Mydans, Seth. "Dilemma of a Priest in the Philippines." New York Times Magazine, 14 September 1986, pp. 68-71, 144, 150, 152, 153.

The author observes the dilemma of Philippine priests assigned to poverty-stricken areas of the country, where they find themselves forced by their consciences to go beyond their religious mission, "into running a school, a feeding program, an agricultural cooperative," or helping farmers get a better price for their produce. This difficult, and sometimes dangerous, new role has often led parish priests into conflict with the controllers of local economic, political, and military power. The Vatican has taken a less rigid approach to social activism by its priests since April of 1986. It continues to reject Marxist analysis, but permits actions such as passive resistance by the oppressed "to secure structures and institutions in which their rights will be respected." The Philippine clergy is aware that its actions sometimes go beyond Vatican guidelines, but as Archbishop Alberto Piamonte, whose archdiocese includes Negros, noted, "If you don't do anything, you are also taking a political stand."

"NPA Says It Supports Ceasefire Talks." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 19 August 1986, p. 8.

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"The entire NPA is solidly behind the NDF and the CPP on the peace talks," according to a written statement delivered to Manila news agencies. The statement also accused "rightists" of attempting to sabotage the talks in a bid to seize power.

"Philippine Communist Purges Uncovered." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 18 August 1986, p. 7.

The Philippine military claims that mass executions by the NPA have claimed the lives of some 300 guerrillas in recent months. NPA defectors have reportedly led authorities to clusters of mass graves in Mindanao. The purges were reportedly part of a campaign to rid the NPA of government infiltrators, called "zombies." Some observers are starting to doubt the ability of the CPP to control the NPA. They state that should the Communist panel now engaged in preliminary talks with the government agree to a ceasefire, it could face a showdown with hardline NPA field commanders who want to fight on.

"Philippine Communists Reject Cease-fire Now." New York Times, 13 September 1986, p. A2.

Communist negotiators appeared today to reject President Corazon Aquino's plan for an immediate 30-day ceasefire. A statement by negotiators Saturnino Ocampo and Antonio Zumel called the ceasefire proposal unexpected and unfair, and said it "throws a monkey wrench into the preliminary talks." Only two meetings have been held during the first month of negotiations. Government officials said the President's policy on the insurgency was unchanged and she would resort to force only if peace talks fail.

"Philippine Government Proposes Cease-Fire with Communists." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 8 September 1986, p. 2.

The Philippine Government proposed an immediate 30-day ceasefire in a recent meeting with Communist

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representatives, but the insurgents requested time to consult with their leaders, according to a government official. The NDF panel said it had authority to take up the question of a ceasefire "within the context of a comprehensive political settlement," which "differs fundamentally from the government suggestion." President Corazon Aquino last week expressed alarm over mounting casualties and ordered government panelists to seek an early ceasefire.

"Philippine Military, Separatists Sign Temporary Ceasefire Accord." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 11 August 1986, p. 2.

The Philippine military and the MNLF have agreed to a temporary ceasefire while a government panel visits Saudi Arabia to hold talks with insurgent leaders, according to the Philippines News Agency (PNA). The agreement provides for a halt to hostilities in the Sulu Archipelago while Muslim Affairs Minister Candu Muarip confers with MNLF leader Nur Misuari in Jiddah. Misuari's faction of the MNLF is based in Sulu.

"Six Killed in Clash between MNLF and MILF." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 12 September 1986, p. 4.

Rivalry between two Philippine Muslim factions erupted into a gunbattle in Lanao del Sur, Mindanao, this week in which six persons were killed. The clash was between members of the MNLF faction led by Nur Misuari and members of the MILF, a splinter group of the MNLF led by Misuari's former vice chairman, Hashim Salamat.

"Talking Peace with the Moros." Asiaweek (Hong Kong) 14 September 1986, pp. 10-11. DS1.A715

The article reviews the events surrounding the meeting between President Corazon Aquino and MNLF leader Nur Misuari on 5 September. The point is made that falling

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oil prices have lessened the leverage on Manila of Misuari's strongest Middle Eastern backers, Saudi Arabia and Libya.

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"Communist Rebel Activities Decline 20 Pct." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 10 October 1986, p. 12.

Philippine Armed Forces Chief General Fidel Ramos told a cabinet meeting in early October that there had been a 20 percent drop in Communist rebel activities. Ramos met with President Corazon Aquino and her cabinet to present a six-point national strategy for dealing with the insurgency, including programs for amnesty and rehabilitation. Aquino reportedly gave her approval of Ramos' recommendations.

"Enrile Says Communist Insurgency 'Really Alarming'." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 26 September 1986, p. 1.

Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile reports that there has been a steady growth of NPA forces and the Philippine military is suffering from continuing attacks by the rebels. Speaking to a businessmen's group, Enrile said the NPA had been imposing taxes on landowners and raiding police and military establishments. "They even go to the classrooms every now and then to lecture to young students about the virtues of their future system," he said. Meanwhile, the Philippine military reported last week that 729 guerrillas, 569 soldiers, and 525 civilians were killed in fighting this year--an average of 7 people a day. In 1985, the military said, 15 people were killed daily.

Jones, Gregg. "Aquino Defends Rebel Arrests." Guardian (Manchester), 2 October 1986, p. 10.

President Corazon Aquino has rejected Communist guerrilla demands for the release of NPA commander Roldolfo Salas. "It's a simple arrest. We can't have one set of rules for Communist Party officials and another set of rules for criminals," stated a top Aquino administration official. The status of peace talks between the government and the guerrillas remained in doubt after the arrest of Salas, popularly known as Commander Bilog. The NPA issued a statement denouncing the arrests as a "deliberate action of the military to derail the peace negotiations by

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taunting us to abandon the negotiations." A presidential spokesman said President Aquino commended the military for the capture of Salas and ruled out releasing the guerrilla leader.

"Kidnapped Swiss Tourist in Philippines Freed." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 11 October 1986, p. 1.

A Swiss tourist kidnaped and held in captivity for nearly 3 months by Muslim bandits on Jolo Island was released to Philippine Government officials in early October. Hans Kunzli and a Filipino woman companion were abducted from a beach in July. The woman was released with instructions to relay a demand for ransom, which both the Philippine and Swiss governments refused to pay. The kidnaping was part of a series of abductions by various Muslim groups in the southern Philippines during the summer of 1986, some of which were blamed on MNLF factions.

Kirk, Donald. "Marcos' Bitter Legacy: Fear Haunts the Sugar Islands" Soldier of Fortune (Boulder, Colorado), November 1986, pp. 50-53, 85, 86, 88. G539.S64

The author traveled the roads and backroads of Negros Island in order to assess the situation since the departure of most of the wealthy sugar barons, "supercronies" of former President Ferdinand Marcos. He found the small farmers and peasants of the island in desperate circumstances, caught between the remnants of the private armies of the sugar barons and the NPA. The Philippine military has so far been unable (or unwilling) to disarm the private militias, which were often armed under the guise of Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) during the Marcos regime. Depredations by the CHDF troops drove many of the islanders into the arms of the NPA, according to the author. He cited the 1985 Escalante massacre, in which CHDF and Philippine Constabulary troops fired into a crowd of demonstrators killing 20 people, as providing "fertile recruiting ground for the Communists." Sidebar articles warn about the gun manufacturing industry that flourishes in Danao, Cebu, and also survey the

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somewhat improved situation in Davao City, Mindanao, where the Commusists seem to be losing ground.

"MNLF Leader Refused Entry to Zamboanga City with 1000 Armed 'Bodyguards'." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 10 October 1986, p. 1.

The Philippine military refused to allow MNLF leader Nur Misuari to enter Zamboanga City unless his more than 1,000 "bodyguards" left their weapons outside. Misuari had been invited by Zamboanga mayor Julio Cesar Climaco to meet with local leaders on MNLF demands for an independent Muslim state in the southern Philippines. Meanwhile, the rival MILF ended a 4-day conference by calling for settlement of Philippine Muslim claims in a conference under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

"MNLF Warns Against Ceasefire Talks." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 6 October 1986, p. 8.

Al Haj Murad, vice chairman of the MILF has warned the Philippine Government that peace negotiations with the MNLF will not succeed unless the MILF is also included in the talks. In an interview aired on state-run television, Murad said any agreement entered into by Manila and the MNLF would not be binding on the MILF and that MILF forces would continue to fight. Government negotiator Agapito ("Butz") Aquino said recently that other separatist groups would not be excluded in peace talks with the MNLF, which are expected to be held in Saudi Arabia next month. Meanwhile, in Zamboanga military intelligence sources reported that male Muslim students were being recruited by the Bangsa Moro Army. In another related development, Armed Forces Chief General Fidel Ramos denied reports that Muslim warlord Ali Dimaporo and Provincial Governor Tarhata Lucman had joined the separatist movement led by Nur Misuari.

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"Philippine Moslem Fronts Meet to Solve Dispute." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 27 September 1986, p. 4.

Leaders of the various MNLF factions are expected to meet next month to resolve their differences before beginning negotiations with the Philippine Government. The MNLF reportedly has almost finalized the list of its panel members for the negotiations, which will probably be held outside the Philippines under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Possible locations for the talks mentioned so far include Saudi Arabia, Spain, Japan, or an ASEAN capital. Noted Mindanao Christian leader Homobono Adaza reportedly is being considered by the MNLF to represent the Christian settlers on the negotiations panel.

"Sison Says No Coup for 2 Years But Communists Will Prevail." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 11 October 1986, p. 1.

Founder and former head of the CPP Jose Maria Sison stated in Bangkok recently that he does not think there will be a coup against President Corazon Aquino for at least 2 years, because the United States will oppose it. He did, however, predict victory for the Communists by the late 1990s. With regard to the current negotiations between the government and the CPP, Sison said Aquino might in the near future win "certain limited but significant agreements" but the Communists would prevail in the end. Sison was in the Thai capital to receive the 1986 Southeast Asian Writers award for the Philippines.

"Talks with Moslem Rebel Leader to Begin Soon: Emissary." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 3 October 1986, p. 7.

The Philippine Government and the MNLF are "inching toward peace," according to presidential emissary Agapito ("Butz") Aquino, brother-in-law of President Corazon Aquino. MNLF leader Nur Misuari has been meeting with other Muslim leaders on Mindanao prior to scheduling of talks with the government. He is also expected to meet

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with Hashim Salamat, leader of a breakaway MNLF faction, somewhere in the Middle East later in the month. The presidential emissary reports that Misuari has become "quite reconciliatory" in his talks with the other Muslim leaders. "He talks about the struggle for freedom and has not mentioned any more independence or secession," Aquino told reporters.

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"Aquino Defends Conciliatory Policy Towards Rebels." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 29 October 1986, p. 4.

Speaking at a nurses convention in a military camp housing the Defense Ministry and Armed Forces headquarters, President Corazon Aquino defended her policy toward the Philippine Communist movement. The insurgency, she said, "is a lingering illness I have sought to remedy through dialogue, consultation, and the promise of reconciliation.

Should it prove incurable as a cancer, then it must be removed by the more drastic surgery of warfare. She stressed, however, that "I am bound by my Christian convictions to save rather than destroy life." Prevention is better than cure, she noted, "especially if the remedy is as bitter as pitting Filipinos against Filipinos."

"China to Judge Nature of 17-Year-Old Maoist Insurgency in Philippines." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 24 October 1986, p. 12.

Chinese Vice Premier Tian Jiyun, during an October visit to Manila, described as "totally groundless" a claim by the Philippines Armed Forces that Beijing was supporting the outlawed CPP and NPA. He said he would leave it to the Filipino people to judge the nature of the Communist insurgency in their country. The vice premier confirmed Chinese Government support for the government of President Corazon Aquino. On the issue of US bases in the Philippines, Tian stated, "We still hope that a country should not establish military bases in another country, but when you discuss specific bases like the ones the US has in the Philippines....I think it is for the government and its people to make a wise judgement."

Dalton, Keith. "Cardinal Backs Manila Talks with Communists." Times (London), 5 November 1986, p. 11.

Jaime Cardinal Sin, the Philippines' most influential church leader, stated yesterday that President Corazon Aquino is "on the right track" in her negotiations with the Communists. A civilian-military panel is currently

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drafting the governments's response to the rebels' 100-day ceasefire offer. Members of the panel were optimistic that a ceasefire agreement would be reached. Meanwhile the Philippine News Agency reported that at least 58 rebels were killed recently in a 5-day military offensive that represented the most intense fighting since Aquino came to power.

Jones, Gregg. "Aquino Takes Tougher Line Against Communists." Guardian (Manchester), 23 October 1986, p. 12.

President Corazon Aquino warned Philippine Communists in a speech yesterday that she will take military action if a breakthrough in peace talks is not reached quickly. An Aquino advisor predicted that she would increase military pressure on the NPA by December. In her speech Aquino also stated that she had resolved a serious dispute with Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. A senior Defense Ministry source, commenting on the president's warning to the Communists, said that Aquino had "said all the right things," but expressed scepticism about whether she would follow up her warning.

Richburg, Keith B. "Philippine Government, Rebels Sign Cease-fire." Washington Post, 28 November 1986, pp. A35, A39.

The Philippine Government and Communist rebels signed a ceasefire agreement today, outlining details of a 60-day truce that will begin on 10 December and extend through the 2 February scheduled date of the plebiscite on the new constitution. The Communists appeared to have made significant concessions in signing the document, including: not demanding the dismantling of the Civilian Home Defense Force, not objecting to Philippine Army patrolling of Communist controlled areas, and giving up their demands that they be allowed to continue collecting "taxes" from individuals and businesses during the truce, and that the military stop importing weapons from the United States. Both sides have hailed the ceasefire agreement, while acknowledging that the next stage of

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negotiations, to begin within 30 days, will be much more difficult.

Richburg, Keith B. "Philippines Debates Keeping Controversial Civilian Militias." Washington Post, 13 November 1986, pp. A31, A33.

A major point of contention in the ceasefire talks between the Philippine Government and the Communist rebels is the issue of disbandment of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), which consists of paramilitary units used widely in the government's counterinsurgency campaign. The military has strongly resisted any dismantling of the CHDF as a move that would severely tax the already overextended regular army units. The CHDF has come under extreme criticism for human rights abuses and the use of such units as private security forces for the landed elite. Since taking over as Armed Forces Chief of Staff in February, General Fidel Ramos has moved to reform the CHDF, including instituting new standards for recruitment and disarming some local units that were illegally issued arms during the regime of former President Ferdinand Marcos.

Richburg, Keith B. "Rebels Who Surrender Are a Burden to Manila." Washington Post, 7 November 1986, p. A34.

One of the toughest problems the government of President Corazon Aquino faces is what to do with Communist rebels who surrender. Aquino stated in an interview last month, "We have to assume that if they come back we will be able to take care of them. They really do not ask for much." Any amount of cash, however, is difficult for the financially-strapped Manila government to come up with. In some farming areas private landowners have voluntarily made available small plots of land for rebels who surrender. But many surrenderees prefer the protection of military camps, where they provide valuable intelligence information and help persuade others to surrender. So far no funds have been released from a government-proposed

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\$50,000 program aimed at helping returned rebels move back into the mainstream of society.

Richburg, Keith B. "Thousands March in Manila; Rebels Say Talks Canceled." Washington Post, 21 November 1986, pp. 29-36.

More than 100,000 leftist demonstrators marched peacefully through Manila today behind the flag-draped coffins of Philippine labor leader Rolando Olalia and his driver, who were killed last week. Two days before his death, Olalia had announced that his union, Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement), would lead a general strike in the event of any military coup against President Corazon Aquino. His new left-wing political party, Partido ng Bayan, also recently announced that it would support the new draft constitution in the coming February plebiscite, because of increasing attempts by some sectors of the military to destabilize the government. The military has accused Olalia's union of being a Communist front. In related events, Aquino announced recently that she will set a deadline for reaching a truce with the Communist rebels.

Richburg, Keith. "Moslem Assails Delay." Washington Post, 30 November 1986, p. A29.

In an interview in Jolo with the Washington Post, MNLF leader Nur Misuari expressed frustration at the slow progress being made toward scheduling peace talks between the Philippine Government and the Muslim insurgents. Misuari also objected to the provision in the new draft constitution calling for autonomy for the Muslim areas of Mindanao. Approval of the constitution in the plebiscite scheduled for 2 February would make the upcoming peace talks an "exercise in futility," according to Misuari. Misuari is reportedly attempting to form a coalition with the Mindanao Independence Movement, a new group led by former member of parliament Reuben R. Canoy.

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"Six Hundred Die in Left Purge." Guardian (Manchester), 9
October 1986, p. 10.

The commander of the northern Mindanao military region, Brigadier General Mariano Adalem told a military command conference yesterday that the NPA had killed 600 of their own men this year in an attempt to purge the movement of informers. General Adalem said the mass executions had frightened many prospective recruits, and intelligence reports indicated the NPA regretted the killings. There was also a report that MNLF kidnapers of a Swiss tourist held for more than 2 months in the southern Philippines have agreed to release him for a ransom of \$10,000.

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Gritz, Almerigo. "The Philippines: A Guerrilla War at the Crossroads." Military Technology (Bonn), no. 9, September 1986, pp. 124-34.

The problems the Philippine military faces in countering the Communist insurgency are well-stated in this excellent article. Strengths and weaknesses of both sides are reviewed. The author stresses the military's need for more helicopters, better communications equipment, and more training. On the political side he praises the Aquino government for "acting in a direction which will deprive the guerrilla movement of discontentment-fuelled participation, reducing it to the hard core of entrenched Communists...." This, he says, is the first time a serious effort has been made to "hollow a Communist insurgency from within, simply by acceding to the logical and acceptable part of their demands."

"Jailed Salas Seeks Release, Says He Is Part of Peace."
Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 13 November 1986, p. 7.

Jailed NPA commander Rodolfo Salas has asked to be released from prison in order to take part in the peace talks between the Communist guerrillas and the Philippine Government. The NDF claims that Salas was one of their consultants in the negotiations. Salas' defense lawyers have accused the Philippine military of attempting to scuttle peace negotiations by arresting Salas and questioning the credentials of insurgent negotiators. State Prosecutor Luis Victor said he would not object to the release of Salas, "if the political leadership so decides."

Jones, Clayton. "Aquino's 1st Major Land Reform Plan."
Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 17 November 1986, p. 9.

President Corazon Aquino has announced a land reform plan for the poverty-stricken, sugar-producing island of Negros. According to the plan, designed by provincial governor and sugar farmer Daniel Lacson, heavy debts of most of the landowners will be wiped out in exchange for

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granting land to the landless. The first 10 percent of land acquired would be given directly to idled sugar workers, with an average of 1,000 square meters per family. Some of the land will be used to resettle Communist guerrillas who surrender. Additional land will be used to set up government-private "nucleus estates," on which land will be leased to individual farmers to grow such plantation crops as coffee and palms. As part of the program, the Philippine National Bank has announced it will sell 25,000 acres, acquired through foreclosures, to landless workers at cheap prices with a 15-year loan at 8 percent. Farmers would not be able to sell the plots and would have to show productive use of the land within three years, or they would lose it.

Jones, Gregg. "Philippine Army Charges Truce Broken."
Washington Post, 16 December 1986, p. A26.

President Corazon Aquino ordered an investigation into an alleged attack by Communist guerrillas on a Philippine Government patrol. Military officials claimed about 100 rebels attacked a 19-man government patrol on the island of Panay about a week after the beginning of the ceasefire on 10 December. No casualties were reported, and Communist officials suggested the incident could be a military hoax. A national commission monitoring the ceasefire will meet in Manila next week to mediate the dispute over whether the guerrillas will be allowed to carry their weapons in towns. Aquino has ordered the commission also to investigate the Panay incident.

"Manila Bars Power-Sharing with Insurgents." New York Times, 23 December 1986, p. A5.

Communist demands for an ultimate share of power, the removal of the US bases, a new constitution, and a merging of armed forces are all nonnegotiable, presidential spokesman Teodoro Benigno stated in a television interview on 22 December. Peace talks between the Philippine Government and the Communists are scheduled to begin on 6 January, and the rebels are expected to ask that the items

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that the government rejected be part of the agenda. Chief government negotiator Teofisto Guingona said at a news conference that legalization of the CPP could be one of the topics discussed in peace talks. Political commentators saw his statement as the clearest indication yet that the government might be moving toward legalizing the CPP.

"Moslem Leader Does Not Find Support He Sought for Independent State." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 12 November 1986, p. 4.

In his recent 8-week tour of the southern Philippines, MNLF leader Nur Misuari did not find broad support for his goal of setting up an independent state composed of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. No prominent independent Muslim leader publicly endorsed Misuari's "Bangsa Moro Republic" during his tour, which President Corazon Aquino authorized following the 5 September meeting between them. MNLF sources said they expect Misuari will accept autonomy while continuing to negotiate for secession. The consensus among moderate Muslim leaders is that most Philippine Muslims want more access to political power and economic resources and favor autonomy over secession.

Mydans, Seth. "Philippine Rebels Challenge Manila." New York Times, 12 December 1986, P. All.

As part of a well-organized NDF propaganda offensive, journalists were invited to a ceasefire celebration in the small town of Samal, near Subic Bay Naval Station. Communist negotiators Saturnino Ocampo, Carolina Malay, and Antonio Zumel spoke to the several hundred cheering townspeople, and a company of armed NPA guerrillas marched into the town chanting revolutionary slogans. Speaking on television, Philippine Armed Forces Commander General Fidel Ramos called the display a violation of the ceasefire, saying that firearms in a populated area were taboo. The Communist leaders responded saying that Samal is a "liberated" town, where the NPA has moved with

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impunity for years. "There are areas in many parts of the country, particularly central Luzon, where the NPA is in the towns, not only the hills," according to Ocampo. "The government is asking us to step back from a position that is already established," stated Malay.

"Philippine Armed Forces to Boost Airpower Against Insurgents." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 4 November 1986, p. 8.

The Philippine Armed Forces will buy at least 50 more gunship and transport helicopters to boost its airpower against Communist insurgents, according to Brigadier General (ret) Mario Espina, assistant defense secretary for installations and logistics. The new helicopters will provide each of the Armed Forces' 12 Regional Unified Commands (RUCs) the capability of airlifting one company of combat troops at a moment's notice. The NPA has lately been massing company-sized forces in attacking government installations and military targets, according to Espina.

Sicam, Paulynn. "Filipino Soldiers, Rebels Lay Down Guns." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 10 December 1986, pp. 11, 16.

A 60-day ceasefire between Philippine Government forces and the NPA went into effect on 10 December, as a result of last minute compromises by both sides. According to the agreement, the guerrillas may retain their weapons but not bring them into populated areas. If NPA and government patrols meet in the hinterlands, "neither side shall commit any hostile acts against the other in keeping with good faith." During the ceasefire period, negotiators from both sides will attempt to create a more lasting settlement, discussing such issues as NPA taxation of businesses.

"Truce Panel Cites Philippine Rebels". New York Times, 28 December 1986, p. A15.

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The National Ceasefire Committee ruled today that the Communists had violated the truce by displaying firearms at a rally in Bataan Province near Subic Bay Naval Station. Of the 29 incidents reported by the military since the ceasefire began on 10 December, this was the first to be ruled a violation. No sanctions were called for, because of mitigating circumstances and the fact that the display of arms did not lead to violence. Also, no procedures for imposing sanctions have yet been worked out. The panel, headed by Bishop Antonio Fortich, is composed of representatives of the government and the NDF, as well as two civilians.

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Jones, Gregg. "Moslem Rebels Stage Attacks in Southern Philippines." Washington Post, 15 January 1987, p. A34.

Philippine Government authorities have blamed the MILF for a recent wave of bombings and attacks that killed 1 and wounded 17 others in the southern Philippines. The MILF is reportedly angered by President Corazon Aquino's decision to exclude it from peace talks held in early January with the MNLF in Saudi Arabia. Two battalions of Philippine Army troops (about 1,500 men) were airlifted to central Mindanao to restore order in the four affected provinces, including North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Lanao del Sur.

Jones, Gregg. "Philippine Peace Talks Resume." Washington Post 14 January 1987, p. A20.

Both Philippine Government and Communist negotiators have been frustrated by the slow pace of negotiations and say that substantial progress will have to be achieved in order to justify an extension of the ceasefire, which is scheduled to expire 8 February. Rebel negotiator Saturnino Ocampo said that discussion of the government agenda is contingent on the government's willingness to discuss at least some of the ten-point list of "priority measures" submitted by the Communists. The list included such items as the release of captured NPA leader Rodolfo Salas, the repeal of "repressive decrees" issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos, and abolition of the Civilian Home Defense Forces, which has been widely accused of human rights abuses.

Jones, Gregg. "Slum District's Residents Eject Filipino Communists as Killers." Washington Post, 2 January 1987, p. A24.

The disenchanted residents of the Agdao slum district of Davao City are moving to oust Communist guerrillas from their streets. Many residents of the area, sometimes known as Nicaragdao, originally supported the presence of the NPA, which imposed law and order, banned drunkenness, gambling, and drugs in the overcrowded slum area that had

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become a haven for criminal syndicates and thugs. The guerrillas, who came to Agdao in 1982, have become increasingly repressive, according to the residents, forcibly collecting taxes and performing summary executions on an arbitrary basis. To combat the NPA, some of the citizens have formed a militia unit called Alsa Masa, meaning "against the mass base". Critics of the militia say that it is worse than the NPA and condemn it as a creation of the military and wealthy right-wing extremists.

Mydans, Seth. "In Philippines, More Than Just a 'Peaceful' Killing." New York Times, 9 January 1987, p. A4.

Violence and killing seem at times to be a way of life in some parts of Mindanao. The author visited the town of Salvador, where 8 people were killed and 158 injured when a grenade was thrown into a Roman Catholic church during a wedding last fall. The incident may have been tied to some sort of vendetta, according to local residents. Banditry, cattle rustling, Muslim-Christian vendettas, political rivalries, and summary executions, if not everyday fare, are at least common occurrences in this part of the Philippines. All of this complicates attempts by the Philippine Government to end the 18-year-old Muslim insurgency problem.

Mydans, Seth. "In Truce, Filipino Rebels Press a Political War." New York Times, 18 January 1987, pp. 1, 16.

The techniques and progress of NPA organization in the northern Luzon province of Pangasinan is discussed in this lengthy, informative article. The Communists claim to have influence in more than 40 percent of the towns and villages of Pangasinan. NPA organizers interviewed by the author claimed to have made gains in such areas as winning lower farm rents, increased wages for labor, and reduced interest rates for loans. Organizers admitted they have had problems recruiting this year, with many prospective recruits asking why they should take up arms against President Corazon Aquino. Also, since the ceasefire, a

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number of guerrillas have accepted Aquino's invitation to surrender and return to their homes.

Mydans, Seth. "Manila and Rebels Reach Agreement on Talks." New York Times, 7 January 1987, p. A10.

The Philippine Government and Communist negotiators agreed today to talk about "food and freedom, jobs and justice," a general framework drawn up by government negotiator Jose Diokno, who is too ill to attend the talks. The negotiations between the government and the Communists had been stalled, because the government had previously limited the talks to the two topics of land reform and industrialization. The government also dropped its requirement that the new Philippine constitution be accepted as the sole guideline on any subject taken up in the talks.

"Philippine Govt, MNLF Reach Agreement." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 5 January 1987, p. 1.

The Philippine Government and the MNLF agreed at a meeting in Jiddah this week to discuss autonomy for the southern Philippines. In signing the agreement, MNLF leader Nur Misuari made significant concessions in agreeing to accept autonomy, rather than independence, and in agreeing to hold future peace talks in the Philippines. Misuari noted that some of the provisions of the Tripoli accord will be incorporated in the new agreement. Misuari also stated that he had received the approval of the Dimas Pundato faction on the agreement and said the MILF faction led by Hashim Salamat would be briefed when the talks reached a final stage.

Richburg, Keith B. "Communists Open Newly Legal Office in Manila." Washington Post, 31 December 1986, pp. A14, A16.

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The CPP recently opened its new, legal headquarters in the National Press Club Building in Manila, treating journalists and other guests to a roast pig feast. The office is part of the new higher profile and propaganda program of the 18-year-old organization, that includes taking reporters on weekly bus tours to meet locally-based rebels. Meanwhile the ceasefire continued, on a precarious basis, with both the Communists and the military citing numerous alleged violations.

Richburg, Keith B. "Manila, Moro Rebels Sign Peace Pact." Washington Post, 5 January 1987, p. A22.

The Philippine Government and the MNLF agreed this week to to hold a plebiscite on the question of autonomy in the southern islands of the Philippines, including Mindanao, Jolo, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan. A six-member joint commission will meet in Manila on 9 February to discuss arrangements for the plebiscite, in which Christians as well as Muslims will be allowed to vote. The agreement also called for "the immediate formulation and implementation of an economic and social development program" for the region. Under the proposed autonomy, which will be offered on a province-by-province basis, the local residents will have control of education, local laws, and the judicial system.

Richburg, Keith. "Optimism Marks Talks in Mindanao." Washington Post. 9 January 1987, pp. A1, A29.

Local political and military officials in Davao City, Mindanao, met this week to work out details of a cooperative effort to rid the city of bandits and other armed criminals. While talks between the national government and the national leadership of the Communist movement have been stalled, their local counterparts in Mindanao, which has taken the brunt of the fighting, are looking for their own solutions. In Cagayan de Oro in northern Mindanao, the three top Communist leaders are living in the governor's home during the current ceasefire. The governor and the top NPA leader of the

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province are cousins from the same town, a factor that often carries more weight than political ideology in Mindanao's more traditional society. Local officials and insurgent leaders are vowing to work toward a lasting peace, even if national negotiations break down. Some observers are less optimistic, however, noting statements by the Mindanao NDF leadership that they will always be bound by the decisions of the national NDF leadership.

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Grilz, Amerigo. "New People's Army: Waiting to Strike Again."
Soldier of Fortune (Boulder, CO), January 1987, pp. 54-61.
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A war correspondent--fresh from following conflicts in Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Burma--the author heads out with a group of fellow correspondents to the countryside around Bacolod, Negros, to view the NPA in action. The article describes the work of a Political Organizing Team (POT) in setting up a Communist organization in a new area. Later on, the correspondents spend about a week living and moving about with an NPA unit, observing their training and tactics. The rebels admit that two of the biggest problems they face are the increased use of helicopters by the military and the popularity of President Corazon Aquino with the Philippine people.

Jones, Clayton. "Aquino's New Tactics to End Rebellion."
Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 19 March 1987, pp. 9, 11.

On 2 March 1987, the government of President Corazon Aquino announced an amnesty program under which those who have violated existing laws "in furtherance of their political beliefs" can turn themselves in, sell their weapons to the government, and receive amnesty and assistance in finding jobs. The program is aimed at both Muslim and Communist insurgents, but does not include soldiers who rebelled against the Aquino government in 1986 or captured rebels or those under investigation. The government expects that as many as 5,000 guerrillas will surrender under the program. At the same time, President Aquino has instituted a crack down on private armies, thus hoping to weaken the position of both the left and the right while maintaining her government on a center course.

The NPA reportedly has held seminars criticizing the amnesty program, which have also served to help advertise it among the NPA ranks.

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Jones, Clayton. "Dating Dos and Don'ts in the Philippines, Rebel-style." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 11 February 1987, p. 1.

Social customs and etiquette under the Philippine Communist movement are highly regulated and rather conservative, according to the author. Permission from the party must be obtained to date, marry, have children, and permission to divorce is granted only at high party levels after a year's wait. Party rites have been established for major events, such as marriages and funerals, in order to replace the usual Catholic ceremonies. Some party members, however, have opted for dual ceremonies, performed by both church and party.

Jones, Clayton. "Filipino Muslim Feud Could Derail Aquino Reconciliation Plan." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 22 January 1987, pp. 9, 10.

Feuding and fighting continue between the two major Muslim insurgent groups in the southern Philippines. The MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, is based primarily in southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and advocates "Islamic socialism." The MILF, a splinter group from the MNLF led by Hashim Salamat, draws most of its support from western Mindanao and traditional, conservative Muslims. According to the author, the MILF has grown bigger and stronger than the MNLF in recent years. As the major Muslim country in the region, the Government of Indonesia reportedly has offered its good offices to help settle the dispute. Factionalism, a perennial problem among the Philippine Muslims, has been greatly exacerbated by the government of President Corazon Aquino and its somewhat haphazard manner of dealing with the various Muslim groups. reportedly

Jones, Clayton. "Filipino 'Village Spies' Help Army." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 23 March 1987, p. 1.

The government of President Corazon Aquino has instituted in southern Mindanao a new counterinsurgency program that enlists the assistance of villagers as vigilantes against

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the spread of Communism. Under the program, called Nakasaka (People United for Peace), villagers are encouraged to man check points and keep the Philippine military informed about the movements of the NPA. The vigilantes are only allowed to carry homemade "defensive" weapons, such as slingshots, sticks, bows and arrows, and fake guns. Under the Nakasaka program, devised by Colonel Jesus Magno, villagers are encouraged to "say no" to NPA demands. Nakasaka is contrasted with Alsa Masa, an armed vigilante group operating in Davao City, Mindanao. Aquino is reportedly suspicious of armed groups and has moved to disarm a number of private armies.

Jones, Clayton. "Moment of Truth for Filipino Army." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 13 February 1987, pp. 1, 12.

Under the government of President Corazon Aquino there have slowly been some improvements made in the capabilities of the Philippine military. Among the changes have been the establishment of a new training camp, redeployment of battalions farther into rebel territory, faster logistical support, better communications, and efforts to check corruption. Aquino has also moved to improve relations with the military by meeting with officer groups that have been critical of her policies and by establishing a committee to investigate human rights abuses by the guerrillas. The article discusses continuing divisions in the Communist leadership between the "militarists," who seem to hold power at the moment, and the "rectificationists," who advocate using the Aquino "reformist" government to reestablish alliances with the middle class and intellectuals that existed during the Marcos era.

Jones, Gregg. "Aquino Orders Militia, Private Armies Disbanded." Washington Post, 17 March 1987, p. A19.

President Corazon Aquino has ordered the disbandment of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), all private armies, and other armed groups as stipulated in the newly-ratified constitution. The 45,000-man CHDF has been

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used extensively against the Communist insurgency, but it has also been accused of widespread civil rights abuses through the years. The disbandment order applies to an estimated 260 private armies around the country, as well as several civilian vigilante groups. Two of these in Mindanao, Alsa Masa and Nakasaka, are sanctioned and supported by the military and have received high praise from military leaders for their counterinsurgency efforts.

Jones, Gregg. "Aquino Outlines Tough Policy." Washington Post, p. A13. 23 March 1987

Philippine President Corazon Aquino, in a speech to graduating cadets of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), vowed to "end all threats to freedom" by the end of her term in 1992. Speaking later to army commanders, she pledged military and police action against "the terrorism of the left and the right." These remarks followed a week in which 37 soldiers were killed in two NPA ambushes and a bombing at PMA killed three other soldiers in a grandstand where Aquino was scheduled to speak a few days later. Suspicion about the PMA bombing has shifted from the Communists to disgruntled military groups.

Martin, Richard. "A Pause in Muslim Struggle." Insight (Washington, DC), 19 January 1987, pp. 18-19.

The author presents a brief, but informative, background of the Muslim struggle for autonomy in the southern Philippines, from the early Spanish period up to the present. Reviewing the present situation, he states that the MNLF controls about 25,000 men in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, and two other Muslim factions have smaller followings. Nur Misuari, leader of the MNLF, spent the latter part of 1986 touring the towns and villages of the region, from which he had been absent for many years during his exile in Libya. The author describes Misuari as a devout Muslim with a rigid anticapitalist political philosophy. Peace talks in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, in January 1987, resulted in an accord between the MNLF and the Philippine Government

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under which the MNLF agreed to accept autonomy for the southern islands. Misuari has defined autonomy as "the creation of a state within a state." The government, however, has a more narrow view of the powers of the proposed autonomous region. Further negotiations are planned to work out the conceptual differences between the two sides.

"MILF Leader Threatens to Join Communist Rebels." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 11 February 1987, p. 1.

Salamat Hashim, a leader of the MILF, told a Saudi Arabian newspaper recently that his group was seeking to forge an alliance with the Communist-led NPA in its struggle against the Philippine Government. Observers noted, however, that such an alliance would be difficult, because a large part of foreign support for the MILF comes from Muslim nations opposed to Communism

"Mindanao Rebels Agree to Ceasefire As Aquino Opens Campaign." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 19 January 1987, p. 4.

President Corazon Aquino visited southern Mindanao following a week of Muslim violence in that area. During her visit, an informal ceasefire was forged between the government and the MILF, the Muslim group reportedly responsible for recent attacks and bombings.

"Mrs. Aquino Intent on Mindanao Visit as Fighting Leaves 30 Dead." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 17 January 1987, p. 1.

The Philippine military has gone on the offensive against the MILF in southern Mindanao following a series of attacks by the rebel group on remote towns and villages. At least 30 people have been killed and 57 wounded in fighting between the military and the Muslim group, which is estimated to number 3,000 guerrillas. Eight other people were killed in fighting between the MILF and the

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MNLF. The MILF has stated that it is waging rebellion to protest its exclusion from talks between the government and the MNLF.

Mydans, Seth. "Aquino Demands Military Victory over Insurgents." New York Times, 23 March 1987, pp. A1, A8.

"The answer to the terrorism of the left and the right is not social and economic reform but police and military action," Philippine President Corazon Aquino told the graduation class at the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio following a week of terrorist and insurgent attacks that killed more than 100. "My offers of peace and reconciliation have been met with the most bloody and insolent rejections by the left and the right," according to Aquino. She gave her "solemn oath" that the Communist insurgency and other threats would be defeated by the end of her 5-year term in office. In a later address to army commanders, Aquino criticized the slow delivery of promised counterinsurgency aid.

Mydans, Seth. "Insurgents Reject a Return to Talks in the Philippines." New York Times, 8 February 1987, pp. 1, 5.

Communist negotiators announced on 7 February that they would not return to the conference table and the 60-day ceasefire would be allowed to expire without renewal. According to some observers, this move indicated the victory of the hardliners in the Philippine Communist movement. It was also viewed as something of a victory for the Philippine military, which is now expected to be given freer rein in combatting the insurgency. Armed Forces Chief General Fidel Ramos said his troops would "hit hard" at the rebels after the ceasefire ended, but that all local ceasefires would still be honored. In abandoning the peace talks, the Communist negotiators said that they were convinced that the government was "not serious about negotiating a durable and just peace."

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Mydans, Seth. "Manila Reports Attacks by Moslems in Mindanao." New York Times, 15 January 1987, p. A9.

The MILF has been blamed for 14 recent attacks in southern Mindanao, according to Philippine military officials, who said they had received a warning statement from the MILF before the incidents. One person was killed and 12 others wounded during the attacks, which included the burning of the Maguindanao provincial capital building, two hotels, four bridges, the cutting of powerlines, and the throwing of grenades into several public places. Speaking from his headquarters in Saudia Arabia, MILF head Hashim Salamat claimed his group was responsible for the attacks, according to Associated press reports. Philippine Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Eduardo Ermita stated in Manila, however, that there were indications that the MNLF was involved in some of the incidents.

Mydans, Seth. "Mystery in Manila: Singlaub's Quest" New York Times, 18 February 1987, p. A8.

Speculation on the purpose of a visit to the Philippines by retired US Army General John K. Singlaub has ranged from hunting for Japanese treasure to laying the groundwork for an unofficial counterinsurgency program to combat the NPA. Singlaub reportedly has requested permits to hunt for treasure in 209 locations in the Philippines. He has also met with a number of right-wing Philippine groups and former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Some military sources speculated that Singlaub was looking for the famous World War II cache of gold reportedly ordered buried by General Yamashita, which he plans to use to finance an anti-Communist campaign in the Philippines.

"Ramos Urges Tougher Stance on Insurgents." Washington Post, 19 March 1987, p. A38.

Following the bombing of the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio, Armed Forces Chief General Fidel Ramos warned President Corazon Aquino that her government must take a

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firmer approach to battling the Communist insurgency. Ramos warned that the bombing incident, which resulted in the deaths of three soldiers, may indicate the beginning of an escalation of attacks on civilian government officials by the insurgents. The explosive device was planted in the roof of the grandstand where Aquino was expected to speak a few days later.

Richburg, Keith B. "Cease-Fire Ends between Manila, Rebels." Washington Post, 9 February 1987, p. A15.

Philippine government negotiator Teofisto Guingona said that the government will continue to pursue peace talks with the Communists despite the collapse of negotiations and the expiration of the ceasefire on 9 February. As the ceasefire expired, the government of President Corazon Aquino unveiled an extensive land reform program, which would involve the redistribution of 24.7 million acres of government-owned land, including 123,000 acres of land formerly owned by associates of former President Ferdinand Marcos. Land reform has been one of the major demands of the Communist movement.

Richburg, Keith B. "Philippine Communists Seen Hurt by Cease-Fire." Washington Post, 17 February 1987, pp. A9, A14.

The Philippine Government won the propaganda battle for the support of the middle class during the 60-day ceasefire, according to observers in Manila. In the early stages of the ceasefire, as the CPP opened its first legal office in Manila and Communist leaders appeared on television talk shows, it appeared that they were scoring a major propaganda victory. As the novelty wore off, however, and the government seemed to be more flexible and willing to negotiate than the Communists, popular opinion swung heavily in favor of the government of President Corazon Aquino. The Philippine military, however, probably lost some support since its recent offensive in Nueva Ecija Province, in which 16 of 18 casualties were civilians, including 6 small children.

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"Twelve Dead in RP Govt-Rebel Clash." Indonesian Observer
(Jakarta), 11 February 1987, p. 1.

Eleven rebels and one soldier were killed in recent fighting between Philippine Government troops and the NPA in Mindanao. This was the first major encounter between government and Communist forces since the expiration of the ceasefire and the approval of the new constitution by a landslide, both in early February.

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"Aquino Says Constitution Must Be Foundation of Settlement with Moros." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 9 April 1987, p. 1.

Habib Hashim, chief MNLF negotiator in talks between the Philippine government and the Muslim organization, has urged President Corazon Aquino to declare a Muslim autonomous government in Mindanao before the new Philippine Congress is elected in May. Hashim stated that the MNLF fears the new Christian-dominated Congress will enact an autonomy system that will fall short of Muslim aspirations. He claimed that the MNLF agreed to drop its demands for secession and enter into talks after government emissaries agreed to negotiate autonomy for all 23 southern provinces. Aquino stated recently that the constitution must be the foundation for any agreement with the Muslims. The constitution, ratified in February, calls for "self-rule in Muslim Mindanao." Chief government negotiator Emmanuel Pelaez has stated, however, that the administration defines Muslim Mindanao as ten of the provinces on Mindanao.

Chapman, Dan "Philippine Politics." Editorial Research Reports (Washington, D.C.), vol. 1, no. 5, 6 February 1987, pp. 54-63.

The author assesses President Corazon Aquino's first year in office and gives a guardedly optimistic report. The Communist insurrection is viewed as the greatest threat to the stability of the government, with the Muslim insurgency a distant second. Land reform and the US bases are the two viable issues the Communists have left to them since the demise of the Ferdinand Marcos regime. The Aquino government seems to be on the verge of tackling the land reform problem, but the base issue still has the potential to polarize the country. Communist threats to obtain more sophisticated weaponry from the Soviets are viewed by many observers as wishful thinking.

"Indonesia Opposes Moro Separatism." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 23 May 1987, p. 2.

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Although Indonesia favors the MNLF demand for autonomy in Mindanao, it opposes any efforts to separate the region from the national state of the Philippines, according to the Minister of State and State Secretary Sudharmono. "The Moro issue is the internal affair of the country and we support the idea of an autonomy but oppose separatism," Sudharmono assured Philippine Government negotiator Emmanuel Pelaez who is touring the region seeking support from members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Pelaez also solicited Indonesian support for its Muslim policy in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

Jones, Gregg. "Rebels Denounce Poll Results." Washington Post, 18 May 1987, pp. A22-A21.

Philippine Communist guerrillas have denounced President Corazon Aquino's sweeping victory in the May congressional elections, which they say have frustrated "the people's will for change." According to NDF spokesman Saturnino Ocampo, "The National Democratic Front believes that armed struggle is still the main form of struggle for the people to achieve fundamental change in Philippine society." Of the seven candidates fielded in the senate race by the left-wing People's Party, which was founded by former Communist guerrilla leaders, one was ranked 52nd in the nationwide balloting for 24 seats. The Communists accused the military of preventing hundreds of thousands of rural supporters from voting for leftwing candidates. Ocampo admitted that the Senate candidacy of NPA founder and former head Bernabe Buscayno had hurt morale among the guerrillas. During his campaign Buscayno had stated, "People are in no mood to support armed struggle, except for those who are currently under armed repression.... The people want peace. They want to give Cory and democracy a chance."

Lewis, Neil A. "Shultz Endorses Philippine Paramilitary Groups." New York Times, 17 June 1987, p. A12.

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US Secretary of State George P. Shultz gave a cautious endorsement of Philippine paramilitary groups that are being used to fight Communists in that country. Speaking in Manila, Shultz stated, "As far as the citizens' groups are concerned, as I understand it, they are being organized within the framework of government authority. They are not sort of free-floating vigilante groups, and President Aquino has supported that approach and we support what she is standing for." Both Philippine and US officials have expressed reservations about the groups, some of which have at times espoused unnecessary violence and cult-like initiation rituals.

"Manila Rules out Alien Advice in Anti-rebel War." Muslim (Islamabad), 10 March 1987, p. 4.

Philippine Defense Secretary Rafael Ilete told reporters that foreign soldiers or advisers would raise a storm of protest from "nationalist sectors" of Philippine society that already oppose the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. He said the Philippine military was adopting portions of counterinsurgency strategies used in other countries, "but not necessarily bringing in the foreigners to teach us how to do it." Ilete gave no indication that the United States had offered the Philippines any military advisers.

Mydans, Seth. "Aquino Offers Amnesty to Rebels in Next 6 Months." New York Times, 1 March 1987, p. 5.

President Corazon Aquino announced that the "national reconciliation and development centers" were being set up around the country in a formal offer of amnesty to all rebels, Communist or Muslim, who surrender in the next six months. The amnesty, according to Economic Planning Secretary Solita Monsod, will not apply to rebels in detention, such as Communist leader Rodolfo Salas. The amnesty program will include payment in cash or in kind for surrendered weapons, government assistance in job training and placement, and relocation for rebels who might fear reprisals from their former comrades-in-arms.

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At least eleven bishops reportedly have been asked to head regional committees seeking local agreement with rebels. The Communists have been sharply critical of all past amnesty plans as failing to address the root causes of the insurgency.

Mydans, Seth. "Grenades and Shrapnel for the Priests Who Dare." New York Times, 23 May 1987, p. 4.

In the Philippines, where 85 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, the clergy has historically played a high profile role in dealing with social problems. Priests have often been involved in providing assistance in everything from medical care to the organizing of economic cooperatives. In recent years, however, the military and the landowners have put increasing pressure on the clergy to stay out of the social action field, denouncing those who haven't as Communists. One priest recently expressed his frustrations saying, "Nowadays if you work with the poor you're suspect. If you espouse land reform you are destabilizing the status quo. If you support human rights you're a subversive. So my problem now is, what kind of work can I do not be called a Communist?"

Mydans, Seth. "Philippine Rebel Seeks Senate Seat." New York Times, 3 May 1987, p. 4.

The founder of the NPA is seeking to join the mainstream of Philippine politics and help change the Philippine social order through the democratic process. Bernabe Buscayno, who founded the Communist guerrilla fighting force nearly 20 years ago, is running for a Senate seat in the May congressional elections. Wounded seven times and imprisoned for ten years, Buscayno was among the political prisoners freed by President Corazon Aquino in early 1986.

Buscayno and CCP founder Jose Maria Sison together founded the new leftwing Partido ng Bayan, or Party of the People. Buscayno, who appears now to be committed to peaceful change, states that if he loses this election, "We will try again; then we will try again and again and again." Speaking to a Manila Rotary Club group Buscayno

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stated, "The conditions of the Philippines are changing and it is very natural that the form of struggle will change also....I think the solutions must be Filipino solutions, not Communist ones."

Mydans, Seth. "War Returns As Ceasefire Ends." New York Times, 8 April 1987, p. A9.

The new aggressive military policy called for by President Corazon Aquino following the failure of peace negotiations with the Communists has resulted in few victories but many refugees. On Mindanao military attacks in the Davao area have forced 23,000 people from their homes while resulting in few rebel deaths. In Kalinga-Apayao Province in northern Luzon, F-5 fighter jets were used for the first time to bomb a rebel camp that turned out to be unoccupied. Thousands of civilians were forced to flee the area during the 5-day offensive. Vigilante groups have sprung up in many areas with military support. Villagers reportedly tend to group the NPA, the military, and the new vigilantes into one category: Filipinos with guns.

"Philippines Plans Autonomy for Moslem Region." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 20 May 1987, p. 1, 8.

The Philippine Government will create an autonomous region in the Muslim-dominated southern part of the Philippines even if such arrangement does not meet all of the demands of the MNLF, according to Emmanuel Pelaez, chief government negotiator in talks with the MNLF. "Regardless of whether the MNLF returns to the now stalled talks, the legal process to create an autonomous region will be accelerated," he told reporters in Kuala Lumpur. Pelaez stated that creation of such a region was a commitment made in the constitution ratified on 2 February 1987. Pelaez, who is also the ambassador to the United States was touring the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to explain what was being done to meet the demands of the MNLF and other Muslims in Mindanao.

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"Philippines Police Hunting 'Sparrows'." London Times, 8 June 1987, p. 8/

Philippine President Corazon Aquino ordered intensified military and police operations against Communist hit-men known as "sparrows." Sparrow units are small well-trained, well-armed NPA groups whose usual targets are policemen. Aquino directed elite police squads, who act under her direct orders, to hunt down the assassins of six policemen and one soldier killed in the last week. Known as eagles, the police squads assigned the task of tracking down sparrows, are marksmen trained in judo and karate.

"Rebels Call for Stronger Armed Struggle." Muslim (Islamabad), 9 March 1987, p.5

A joint statement issued by the CPP and the NPA rejected President Corazon Aquino's offer of amnesty, saying it was "no less malicious and deceptive" than one proclaimed by former President Ferdinand Marcos. The NDF, however, stated that it was willing to resume peace talks with the government on the terms laid down by the late human rights crusader and government negotiator, Jose Diokno. To Diokno's formula of food and freedom, jobs and justice, the NDF would add land and liberation, it said. They urged the government to resume talks on a broader framework. Armed forces chief General Fidel Ramos recently stated, however, that if the NDF was sincere about talks, it should drop its collection of taxes as a precondition to resuming negotiations.

"Rebels to Match Military's Weaponry." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 6 May 1987, p. 1.

NDF leader Saturnino Ocampo said in a recent interview at a Manila "safehouse" that the insurgents will "find ways to procure equivalent armaments" to neutralize the Philippine Government's current counterinsurgency campaign. The Philippine Government has asked the United States for more than 100 helicopters to improve its mobility in fighting the rebels. When asked whether he

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thought the United States would intervene in the Philippines as it did in Vietnam, Ocampo replied, "In the event that they {the Philippine Government} cannot entirely depend on the capability of the armed forces to defeat the revolutionary forces, I think they might get involved." Ocampo said the NDF would not rule out negotiations for a political settlement and acknowledged that the government of President Corazon Aquino, because of its wide popular support, was more difficult to deal with than the government of former President Ferdinand Marcos. "If she manages to maintain the popular support, then we have a problem," he said.

"Rebels Warn of 'Total War' in South." Indonesia Times
(Jakarta), 19 May 1987, p. 1.

A senior MNLF official has warned that the Muslim insurgents will again declare war on the government of President Corazon Aquino if it betrays its promise of autonomy for the Muslim areas of the southern Philippines. Floro Falcon, who serves as an MNLF representative in the peace negotiations with the government, is a renegade priest who claims that the Aquino government is trying "to ostracize and isolate the Moro struggle for self-determination by disregarding Christian participation in liberation." Falcon claims that the MNLF, in its bid for autonomy, has the support of the Christian population, which holds the majority in 18 of 25 of the southern provinces.

Richardson, Michael. "Successes for Aquino, but Old Problems Remain and New Ones Pile Up." Pacific Defence Reporter (Kunyang, Victoria, Australia), vol. 23, no. 10, April 1987, pp. 9-17.

A report by the Philippine Constitutional Commission, which drew up the recently ratified national constitution, warns President Corazon Aquino that the people expect the government to institute a program of rural and urban land reforms and a program to alleviate unemployment and underemployment. The Philippine Government has instituted

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a rebel amnesty program, which is reported to be influenced by the successful counterinsurgency program of Thailand. Under that program, rebel strength was cut from a peak of 12,000 in 1980 to less than 600 in 1987. The Philippine military reportedly is in favor of the new program, which will offer amnesty and government assistance to rebels who surrender as well as regional and local ceasefires.

Richburg, Keith. "Former Guerrilla Chief Hurt in Manila Ambush." Washington Post, 10 June 1987, p. A20.

The founder and former head of the NPA, Bernabe Buscayno, was slightly wounded in an ambush in a Manila suburb as he was leaving a television studio where he had appeared on a talk show. Buscayno ran unsuccessfully for the Senate in the May elections, having emerged as a prominent leftwing politician since his release from prison by President Corazon Aquino in early 1986. More than a dozen lawmen have been shot in Manila in recent days by Communist hit squads, called sparrow units. The NPA, however, disclaimed any responsibility for the attack on Buscayno, in which a cameraman was killed and three of the leftist leader's aids were wounded.

"Vigilante Gunmen Banned by Aquino." Times (London), 17 March 1987, p. 8.

An order signed yesterday by President Corazon Aquino disbanding armed civilian vigilante groups is reportedly unpopular with the Philippine military. The order includes the 70,000-man Civilian Home Defence Force established under the Ferdinand Marcos regime. The military views the various vigilante groups as key weapons in the fight against Communist rebels. Human rights groups, however, have for years protested the activities of the powerful armed civilian groups.

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Weiser, Beat U. "Guns and Sugar in the Philippines." Swiss Review of World Affairs (Zurich), vol. 37, no. 1, April 1987, pp. 25-28. D839.S9

The author visits an NPA training camp deep in the forests of Negros and reports on his impressions. He finds the rebels determined to keep up their armed struggle but definitely lacking in any clear idea of what sort of better society they are working toward. Several guerrillas mention Taiwan as a possible model for development in the Philippines. The author also observes the impoverished living conditions of the sugar workers on the island, which is often described as a social volcano. Less than 60 percent of the former sugar lands are now under cultivation as a result of the decline in the world sugar market. Some former haciendas have been taken over by their workers, who have turned the sugar lands to subsistence vegetable raising. The vast majority of sugar workers, however, are without land or jobs, other than seasonal work at below minimum wage rates.

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Cumming-Bruce, Nicholas. "Manila Reaches Deal with Muslim Rebels." Guardian (Manchester), 7 May 1987, p. 6.

Philippine Government negotiators announced on 6 May an agreement with MNLF leaders on forming a joint commission to draft an autonomy package for the southern provinces of the Philippines. Government chief negotiator Emmanuel Pelaez announced after meeting with MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari that the joint commission would draft an autonomy agreement for consideration by the new Congress when it convenes in July.

Jones, Gregg. "Filipino Rebels Pit Guile Against Guns." Washington Post, 10 August 1987, p. 18.

The NPA has developed sophisticated land mines in the past two years that they have been using with deadly effectiveness to stop government convoys and seize arms and equipment. The author contrasts the poorly-trained, ill-fed, unmotivated Philippine government forces with the well-trained, highly-motivated NPA. Whereas there is a wide gulf in living standards between the government's military officers and enlisted men, among the NPA leaders and soldiers share the same living conditions and duties. Philippine peasants continue to be more supportive and hospitable toward the NPA than toward government troops. NPA units are usually warned of advancing government patrols, so they seldom are forced to fight.

Jones, Gregg. "Philippine Communists Press for Insurrection." Washington Post, 10 July 1987, pp. 18, 20.

After spending a week with NPA guerrillas and CPP officials, the author made a number of observations about the direction of the Communist movement. First, despite efforts to depict the guerrilla struggle as being led by the politically diverse NDF, in reality it is the CPP that is in control. Second, although senior party officials have concluded it is necessary to make tactical alliances with non-Marxist moderates, this is creating tension with more doctrinaire party officials, who fear a compromise of Marxist-Maoist principles. Third, as a result of the

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party's disastrous boycott of the 1986 presidential election, greater criticism of party decisions is being tolerated and regional Communist officials are being allowed greater input in the policymaking process.

"Less War--More Plots." Asiaweek (Hongkong), 19 July 1987, pp. 14-18. DSI.A715.

In the wake of rising terrorism and lawlessness, some of it at least attributable to the NPA, President Corazon Aquino has called on the military and police to crack down on the offenders. Although casualties due to insurgency have declined in the countryside since the ceasefire with the NPA expired, urban terrorist incidents have proliferated. The NPA claims to have killed 23 policemen in Manila this year, including 3 suburban police chiefs.

"Manila Govt Delegation Fails to Persuade MNLF to Compromise." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 28 July 1987, p. 1.

A Philippine Government delegation returned home from Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, this week after failing to reach an agreement with the MNLF. Vicent Jayme held several rounds of talks with MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari and chief negotiator Habib Hashim during his 5-day visit. The talks were sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which supports the implementation of the Tripoli Accord of 1976. The Philippine Government maintains that it wants to implement the Tripoli agreement, but according to its own interpretation, by which the Philippine Congress would legislate the terms of self-rule and then submit them to the affected provinces in a referendum.

"Mindanao Problem." Solidarity (Manila), no. 110, January-February 1987, pp. 79-154.

Included in this issue of the journal are the proceedings and papers presented at a seminar on the Mindanao problem

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held in the Philippines in July 1986. Paper topics included: roots of Muslim-Christian conflict, Muslim-Christian relations, poverty and landownership in the southern Philippines, and the Philippines' claim to Sabah.

"Misuari Willing to Meet Aquino Again." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 15 August 1987, pp. 1,7.

MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari said in an interview published in Manila this week that he would agree to a second meeting with President Corazon Aquino "if it will serve the cause of peace" by opening up top-level negotiations on a political settlement. Misuari continued to insist in the interview that Aquino unilaterally declare autonomy for 13 Muslim-populated provinces without first holding a plebiscite as the government has insisted. Misuari also stated in the interview that the Philippine military was preparing to launch a full-scale war in Mindanao and nearby islands.

"MNLF Blamed for Fire in Mindanao." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 6 June 1987, p. 1.

Suspected Muslim rebels set fire to dozens of businesses and residences in early June in Iligan City, the capital of Lanao del Norte Province, in Mindanao. "The fire was believed done by Muslim rebels belonging to the MNLF in fulfillment of their threat to escalate terrorism in Mindanao," President Corazon Aquino told reporters. "We are afraid this could be the start of a campaign by Muslim rebels to sow terror mostly in areas inhabited by Christians," Aquino stated.

"MNLF Chief Says Govt Pushing Him to War." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 30 July 1987, pp. 1, 7.

"The peace process has come to an end. I believe that right now we are in a state of war with the Aquino

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government," MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari told the Philippine Inquirer by telephone from Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. Misuari told the newspaper that a final decision on resuming hostilities will depend on the outcome of a meeting next week of the Central Committee of the MNLF. "Tell Cory Aquino not to play with the lives of our women and our children. As a sovereign people, we always have the right to fight back," Misuari said. The Philippine military says 208 people, including rebels, soldiers, and civilians, have been killed in clashes this year.

"MNLF Demands 'Unreasonable': Pelaez." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 3 June 1987, p. 1.

Philippine Government negotiator Emmanuel Pelaez described as "unreasonable" MNLF demands after meeting with MNLF negotiator Habib Hashim in early June. Pelaez said the MNLF has refused to recognize the newly ratified Philippine constitution, which specifies that any grant of autonomy should be made under a law enacted by Congress and ratified in a plebiscite in the areas affected. The MNLF demands include that the proposed plebiscite on autonomy be deferred for 5 years and that President Corazon Aquino issue a decree appointing a provisional government for the 23 southern provinces headed by MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari. Pelaez said the MNLF proposal meant "one man dictatorship."

"Moslem Rebels Help Troops Fight Communists." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 3 June 1987, p. 1

MNLF rebels came to the aid of Philippine troops ambushed by NPA guerrillas in early June and helped the government troops kill 15 of the insurgents, according to a government military report. The report said the clash on Mindanao was the first time the MNLF had joined forces with the Philippine Army against the NPA.

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"Moslem Rebels Smuggling Arms into Southern Philippines."
Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 11 August 1987, pp. 1,7.

Muslim rebels have smuggled thousands of weapons into the southern Philippines since peace talks began in late 1986 between the MNLF and the Philippine Government, Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff Maj Gen Eduardo Ermita told reporters in Manila. Speaking at the same news conference, MNLF spokesman Sharif Zain Jali said there were "thousands" of high-powered firearms taken back to Mindanao last year by Muslim rebels who returned to the country from Sabah, Malaysia, for talks with the government.

"Mrs Aquino Sets Mechanism for Regional Autonomy." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 16 July 1987, pp. 1, 3.

President Corazon Aquino this week created a regional administrative framework to prepare for the granting of autonomy to five Northern Luzon provinces (Abra, Benguet, Kalinga, Apayao, and Mountain Province) under the "Cordillera Administrative Region." Former priest and NPA commander Conrado Balweg, who spearheaded the drive for regional autonomy, was absent from the ceremony held at the presidential palace. Balweg has been in hiding since he survived an ambush last month that has been blamed on either the NPA or right-wing extremist. In addition to the creation of a 250-member regional assembly and a 29-member executive board, Aquino's order provides US\$250,000 for operating expenses and the authority to make social and economic policy for the region. Negotiations were continuing on a proposal to create a regional paramilitary peace-keeping force. Negotiations for a similar autonomous regional unit for the southern Muslim provinces broke down in May.

"Muslim Rebels Want New Talks." Guardian (Manchester), 2 June 1987, p. 12.

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Chief government negotiator Emmanuel Pelaez announced that the Muslim rebels have proposed a resumption of talks on autonomy in the southern Philippines. The chief rebel representative, Habib Hashim, had proposed that talks should be held in Saudi Arabia on 18-19 June with the participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Talks collapsed in May when Muslim rebels rejected a government proposal to grant autonomy to 23 southern provinces only if residents endorsed autonomy in a referendum. Hashim assured Pelaez that there would be no violence as long as talks continue, and Pelaez agreed to study the MNLF proposal.

Mydans, Seth. "Land Plan Paralyzes Philippine Isle." New York Times, 2 August 1987, p. 3.

Although there is general agreement that some form of land redistribution is necessary in the Philippines, if only to stave off Communist insurgency, there is little consensus on how it should be accomplished. The island of Negros is described by some as a social volcano waiting to erupt unless there is some progress in land reform soon. Demonstrations have been staged by peasant farmers who feel that government plans for reform do not go far enough and by planters who have threatened to defend their land by force. Although President Corazon Aquino has issued a decree calling for redistribution of all farmlands, the sensitive details of timing and size of holdings has been left to the new Philippine Congress to sort out.

"New Threats of War If Autonomy Not Settled before Next Week." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 21 July 1987, p. 1.

Firdausi Abbas, leader of the Bangsa Moro Islamic Party said in a recent interview that commanders of three major rebel groups were making preparations independently to resume fighting if the issue of regional autonomy for the southern Philippines is not resolved by the time the Philippine Congress convenes in late July. MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari issued a similar warning in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, last week.

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"NPA Guerrillas Kill 3 Policemen, 2 Soldiers." Indonesia Times
(Jakarta). 1 August 1987, p. 1.

Three Philippine policemen and two soldiers were killed in separate attacks by the NPA near Manila this week. The incidents, which are becoming increasingly common, netted the rebels three pistols and two M-16 rifles. NPA attacks have increased significantly since the 60-day ceasefire expired in February.

"OIC Favors Holding of Negotiations in Philippines." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 1 July 1987, p. 4.

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) has told the MNLF to respect the Philippine Government's territorial integrity by holding autonomy talks in the Philippines, according to government negotiator Emmanuel Pelaez. Libyan ambassador to the Philippines Salem Adem met with Pelaez to relay the OIC's support for the government's proposal of a referendum to consult the people of the southern provinces on the question of autonomy. Adem stated that the OIC was trying to "help both sides come together to reach a compromise and to solve this problem without bloodshed."

Olivera, Baldomero T. "Muslim Separatists Turn into Major Problem for Cory." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 18 July 1987, p. 4.

The author recaps the events leading to negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine Government and explores the causes of failure of the talks. Many observers have concluded that a peaceful solution in the near future is unlikely because the government will continue to insist on the constitutional mandate to settle the territorial issue in a plebiscite, which the MNLF will not agree to because Christians now outnumber Muslims in all but three or four of the provinces under dispute.

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"Peace Talks with MNLF Resume." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 2 June 1987, p. 1.

MNLF and Philippine Government negotiators met on 1 June for the first time since talks broke down 9 May. The negotiations were revived again amid rising tension and sporadic clashes between the MNLF and the military in the southern Philippines. Chief MNLF negotiator Habib Mujahab Hashim has proposed that the talks be held in Saudi Arabia under the auspices of the 46-member Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The Philippine Government would prefer that talks be held in the country, although chief negotiator Emmanuel Pelaez has said he would go anywhere to talk peace.

"Philippine Moslem Rebels Gain OIC Support." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 25 May 1987, p. 1.

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) supports the MNLF in its position that the Philippine Muslim problem should be solved on the basis of the 1976 Tripoli Accord, according to OIC spokesmen. The OIC-mediated accord between the MNLF and the Philippine Government granted autonomy to 13 provinces in the southern Philippines. The MNLF now is demanding autonomy for 23 provinces, but the government has expressed its willingness to discuss self-rule for only 10.

"Philippines Grants Autonomy to Northern Provinces." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 11 June 1987, p. 1.

Muslim guerrilla commander Muslimen Sema, who holds the title of brigadier general in the MNLF, confirmed in an interview with the Manila Bulletin that the MNLF has received new assault rifles and mortars from abroad. He was photographed displaying a new Russian-made AK-47 assault rifle in a jungle hideout. Sema did not disclose who supplied the arms, although Libya is believed to be the MNLF's main arms donor. The Philippine Government recently rejected MNLF proposals to resume peace talks in

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Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, saying it wants the talks resumed in the Philippines instead.

"Ramos Calls for Tougher Laws Against Communist Rebels."
Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 30 June 1987, p. 1.

More than 40 policemen and military officers have been killed in the Manila area this year by Communist assassination teams known as sparrow units, who have vowed to settle blood debts against law enforcement officials. Philippine Armed Forces Chief Gen. Fidel Ramos has called for tougher laws against suspected Communists. Vice Chief of Staff Lt. Gen Salvador Mison has drafted a National Security Act to be presented to the new Congress.

"Ramos Halts Offensive Against Moslem Rebels." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 28 July 1987, p. 1.

Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos ordered a halt this week to operations against Muslim rebels while a government mission held talks with MNLF negotiators in Saudi Arabia. Four days earlier two marine battalions and a flotilla of navy gunboats were sent on an offensive against a 500-man MNLF force reported to be holding 300 families hostage in the Sibuco region of Mindanao's Zamboanga Peninsula. The rebels were reportedly planning to use the hostages as shields while escaping advancing government troops.

Reid, Robert H. "Sense of 'Drift' Pervades Philippines."
Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 3 July 1987, p. 3.

Philippine newspaper columnists have complained that the government of President Corazon Aquino has lost its momentum and begun to drift. They cite especially the unsolved problems of urban terrorism, lawlessness, the lack of a land reform program, broken down peace talks with the Communists, and stalled negotiations with the MNLF. The government amnesty program, under which US\$50

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million was earmarked for rehabilitation projects, has so far been mostly on paper. Only US\$1 million has been spent so far in the effort to provide former rebels with new jobs and homes. The government claims more than 1,300 NPA regulars have surrendered, but admits that the surrenderees turned in less than 200 weapons.

Richburg, Keith B. "Philippine Political Crimes Unsolved."
Washington Post 8 August 1987, p. 13, 14.

A variety of shadowy forces has been blamed for a rash of killings and kidnappings in the Manila area over the past year. Suspects in the August killing of Cabinet Secretary Jaime Ferrer range from NPA death squads to a Muslim organization known as Holy War of Allah to various political enemies of Ferrer. Ferrer's killing joins a long list of unsolved political crimes. President Corazon Aquino has replaced the director of the intelligence agency with retiring Army commander Gen Rodolfo Canieso, known as a tough disciplinarian, in an effort to put an end to the urban terrorism plaguing the country.

Rosenberg, David A. "Philippines: Aquino's First Year."
Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 86, no. 519 (April 1987), pp. 160-63, 184-86. D410.C82

In this overview article of President Corazon Aquino's first year in office, the author recaps progress, or lack thereof, made in dealing with the country's two insurgencies. Aquino's policy of reconciliation has caused problems for the Philippine military and rebels alike. The military has perceived it as weakness, and the CPP has been split into factions over how to respond to offers of negotiations and ceasefires. One critical question facing the rebel leadership has been how much to compromise on land reform goals. The author points out that, so far, Communist "land reform demands have been modest, usually limited to raising the share of the crop for tenant farmers or raising worker wages."

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Tapia, Cesar F. "The Moro National Liberation Front."
Solidarity (Manila), no. 110, January-February 1987, pp.
138-40.

The author concludes that the MNLF movement has lost steam as indicated by its sagging power and lack of logistical support from foreign countries previously sympathetic to its cause. The MNLF does, however, retain the capability to disrupt the currently stable situation in the southern Philippines. The author sees the key to the final settlement of the problem to be the acceptance of one of the Muslim leaders as spokesman for all of the factions in dealing with the Philippine Government.

"Urban Terrorism Increase in Philippines." Indonesia Times
(Jakarta), 26 June 1987, p. 1

President Corazon Aquino ordered the Philippine military to break off the search for suspected Communist rebels who ambushed a convoy carrying Conrado Balweg, a former priest-turned-guerrilla who broke with the insurgents and agreed to regional autonomy talks with the government last year. Balweg, who heads the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, requested the search be broken off because he feared the presence of government troops could heighten tension in the mountains of Northern Luzon where the ambush took place. The area was reportedly tense over fears that the attack, in which eight of Balweg's followers were killed, could trigger a new war in the region. Meanwhile, terrorist attacks by the NPA continued in Manila and the surrounding urban areas.

van der Kroef, Justus M. "Since Aquino: The Philippine Tangle and the United States." Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies (University of Maryland School of Law), no. 6, 1986, 73 pp.

The author devotes a section of this occasional paper to the Communists and the private armies and their relationship to economic problems in Philippine society.

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He likens the rank-and-file membership of the NPA to that of the various paramilitary home defense forces and private armies of various warlords throughout the Philippines, saying that all of these forces "readily draw on the abundant human jetsam of a permanently floating underclass, rife with unemployment, banditry, and racketeering, in one of Asia's poorest nations. Much of the Communist guerrilla force consists of such elements, who easily drift from one gang to another, dependent on available opportunity, lending little credibility to a picture of a well-organized Communist threat." Another Communist guerrilla weakness the author points out is the serious ideological rift in the leadership of the CPP between hardliners led by Rodolfo Salas and a more moderate faction led by Saturnino Ocampo and Antonio Zumel.

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Burg, Paul. "The Communist Challenge to the Philippines."
Etudes (Paris), May 1987, pp. 581-90. (In French)

The author traces the origins of the Communist movement in the Philippines to the establishment of the Partido Komunista Ng Pilipinas (PKP) in 1930 and its expansion during World War II under the leadership of the three Lava brothers, Jose, Jesus, and Vicente. Under the direction of Luis Taruc the Communist armed forces grew to over 20,000 during the Japanese occupation. In 1968, however, a new generation of Philippine leftists, influenced by Maoist China, broke with the old PKP and founded the CPP under Jose Maria Sison. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Philippines in 1975 changed the orientation of the CPP, which could no longer count on the support of Beijing. China preferred its friendship with Manila to aiding a Communist party with an uncertain future. Beijing had also come to view the US bases in the Philippines as a useful counterweight to the growing Soviet presence in the region. Thereafter, under the leadership of Sison, a Filipino-style of Communism was developed. The Maoist "liberated zone" technique was discarded as too dangerous because it allowed the government to concentrate its troops. Instead autonomous guerrilla fronts were created in all parts of the country. By 1987 the Communists had guerrilla fronts in 80 percent of the country, controlled 20 percent of the villages, and had 23,000 regular NPA troops. The CPP had made land reform one of its major demands. The percentage of landless peasants in the Philippines has risen from 8-9 percent in 1950 to a reported 30-35 percent in 1987. Through this problem the Communists were able to present their greatest challenge to the government of President Corazon Aquino.

Chatel, Francois. "Aquino Survives Coup, but Problems Abound."
Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 1 September 1987, p. 3.

The late August military coup attempt has seriously weakened the position of the government of President Aquino, according to both Philippine and international observers. According to the Philippine Inquirer, Aquino failed to reckon that the rightwing threat, because of its military capabilities, was more immediate than the

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Communist-inspired insurgency in the countryside. The Manila Journal also called for swift action "against all loyalists to the former dictator (Marcos) and his regime in and out of the armed forces." Other observers noted, however, that any action against the rebel soldiers could heighten discontent in a military already disgruntled by what it sees as a lack of support from the government in its drive against the Communist insurgency.

Clad, James. "The Plan That Never Was." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong), 27 August 1987, p. 23 HC411.F18

The author reports on a last-minute offer of autonomy by executive order made by President Corazon Aquino to the MNLF in late July just before Aquino's power to issue such orders by decree. After 27 July all grants of autonomy to the MNLF must originate with the new Philippine Congress. The MNLF reportedly turned down the offer mostly because only 10 provinces were to be covered, whereas the Tripoli agreement had called for 13. In many other areas the offer was rather generous, including approval of a 11-member council with broad financial powers, a guarantee of at least 50 percent of taxes generated within the region, and establishment of a regional security force that would probably absorb some, or most, of the MNLF guerrillas.

Crossette, Barbara. "Filipino Moslems: Feuding and Piracy." New York Times, 11 September 1987, p. A8.

MNLF and Philippine armed forces leaders in Jolo, Sulu Province, recently celebrated together the one-year anniversary of the ceasefire signed here by MNLF leader Nur Misuari and Philippine President Corazon Aquino. Although the situation remains very tense in this seaport of 52,000 people, the ceasefire has continued to hold. Reportedly the 2,000 marines sent to Jolo about a year ago are popular with the people, both Christians and Muslims, who see them as professional soldiers who do not engage in the abuses and corruption attributed to the army troops that preceded them. Many members of the MNLF are

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graduates of Notre Dame College in Jolo, which is run by a Catholic order. The sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram, lives in a Catholic housing project. "Muslims, Christians, and others have been exploited and discriminated against by the people of Luzon and the Visayas," according to an MNLF spokesman.

Fisher, Richard D. "Confronting the Mounting Threat to Philippine Democracy." Asian Studies Center Backgrounder (Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC), 3 September 1987, 1-12.

Despite the military coup attempt in late August, it is not the Philippine military but the Communists who pose the greatest threat to President Corazon Aquino's government, according to the author. The CPP has been damaged but not defeated by Aquino's rise to power, the most serious impact of which has been the drastic reduction in the growth rate of the NPA from 30 percent in 1985 to 9 percent in 1986. Estimated strength of the NPA is now 24,400 armed guerrillas. Although there is little evidence that the Soviet Union is shipping arms to the CPP, the Soviets and the CPP have developed a political relationship that could lead to arms shipments in the future, according to the author. Recently captured CPP Chairman Rudolfo Salas reportedly has said the Soviets began making offers of direct assistance in 1984. The author reports support for the NDF from various European trade unions and political and religious groups. The Communists have expanded their efforts in a number of directions, including labor strikes, political action, and terrorist activities, as well as armed insurgency. According to CPP spokesman Saturnino Ocampo, "armed struggle is still the main form of struggle for the people to achieve fundamental change in Philippine society." The author also details the Aquino government's attempts to deal with the Communist threat and makes recommendations of how the US Government can assist.

"Moro National Liberation Front to Declare Provisional Govt." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 9 September 1987, p. 1.

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The MNLF will proclaim a provisional government "as soon as possible" because peace talks with the Manila government have reached a stalemate, MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari said in a recent interview in Tripoli, Libya. Misuari warned that the MNLF forces, which are currently observing a ceasefire, were ready to resume hostilities, "if the Philippine military launches a new round of genocide against our people." Misuari also praised the 28 August attempted military coup in Manila saying it was "part of a continuing process leading to genuine change" and adding that "changes will come violently." The Muslim leader ruled out, however, the possibility of an alliance between the MNLF and rebel troops headed by Colonel Gregorio Honasan, who escaped after leading the coup attempt.

Mydans, Seth. "Filipino Communists to Escalate Urban Warfare." New York Times, 6 September 1987, p. 22.

The CPP issued a statement yesterday saying they will "take full advantage" of the turmoil following last week's attempted military coup "to hasten the strengthening of the revolutionary forces." The NDF called on the guerrillas to step up attacks against "a divided military." NPA spokesmen said they considered the infighting within the armed forces to be "definitely a positive situation" for the guerrillas, and they planned to escalate their struggle to a new stage of urban warfare. According to Col. Emiliano Templo, deputy commander of the armed forces defense command for Manila, about 100 armed guerrillas in the city work in teams of three or four men under a command structure that mirrors the district divisions in Manila. He stated that this structure includes combat forces as well as staff support for intelligence, propaganda, finance, and logistics.

Mydans, Seth. "Philippine Mutiny Abets Communists, Top General Says." New York Times, 2 September 1987, pp. A1. A7.

Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos stated at a news conference today that last week's mutiny

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and attempted military coup had further reduced the ability of the military to fight Communist insurgency. Ramos urged the government to address the military grievances that had contributed to the uprising. The armed forces chief has complained repeatedly that the government has not acted on his calls for a comprehensive counterinsurgency policy that deals with the economic, social, and political aspects of the problem as well as the military. Ramos also pleaded for higher pay, improved benefits, and better equipment for the military. He also reiterated a frequent complaint of the military that, whereas Communist guerrillas are offered amnesty, soldiers face accusations of human rights violations for their actions in combating the insurgency.

"Philippine Army Halts Operations for Sake of Peace." Straits Times (Singapore), 25 July 1987, p. 9.

Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos announced in early July that he had ordered suspension of armed operations against the MNLF to give a Philippine Government peace mission in Saudi Arabia the "maximum chance of success." The three-person delegation was sent to Jiddah to reopen peace talks with the Muslim rebels and to explain Manila's position to the Organization of Islamic Conference. Muslim rebels had recently seized about 300 families as hostages in order to prevent an assault by several companies of Marines backed by naval patrol boats and helicopter gunships. General Ramos said the operation against the insurgents did not mean a violation of a ceasefire accord reached with the MNLF in September 1986, but was merely a police action against Muslims who had violated local laws.

Steif, William. "The Careful Communists." Progressive (Madison), February 1987, pp. 24-27.

The author recounts his experiences and impressions following a visit to a Communist group in Bulacan Province in the central plains of Luzon. The picture painted by the author was of a typical cross-section of the Filipino

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people: mostly poor, some middle-class; mostly hardworking, some lazy; NPA members who were really merely hoodlums and others who were dedicated to their cause; and both uneducated and college graduates. The primary concerns seemed to be with land reform, education for their children, peace, and a nuclear-free Philippines. There seemed to be a certain resignation about the US bases, a feeling that the United States would never give them up; this appeared to be almost acceptable to those interviewed as long as all nuclear weapons were removed. Another surprising point was that most of those interviewed said they planned to vote for the new constitution because they approved of the large majority of its provisions.

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Clad, James and John Peterman. "Forces for Change." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 26 November 1987, pp. 36-37. HC411.F18

The authors ask the question of whether the Philippine Armed Forces has the capacity to carry out its number one task, that of fighting the NPA. Their answer is probably yes--for the time being. They note the need for improving equipment and meeting the basic needs of the soldiers and their families, applauding the 60 percent across-the-board wage hike granted by the government in December. Important structural flaws remain, however. Most of the military's mid-level officers seem mired in the heavy troop concentration tactics that were successful against the Muslim insurgency in the 1970s. They have not been able to adjust to the "trickier art of counterinsurgency."

The authors also fault the inadequate basic training of enlisted men and note that, although the Philippine Military Academy is topnotch, 90 percent of field officers are ROTC graduates. In the final analysis, according to the authors, the fight will not be won on the battlefield.

The underlying political and economic problems must be solved.

Clad, James. "War in the Streets." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 26 November 1987, pp. 24-25. HC411.F18

The waning months of 1987 witnessed important changes in the tactics of the NPA, including the stepping up of its revolutionary war in Manila and the targeting of US personnel. The NPA's Manila partisan brigade of urban terrorists, currently numbering 200, may be increased to 300 soon, according to the author. On 30 October the NDF issued a warning that US personnel involved in the "total-war concept" (counterinsurgency) would be targeted by the Communists. The Philippine Armed Forces has reacted to the escalation of NPA tactics by stepping up its raids on areas of Manila suspected of harboring sparrow units (small urban terrorist groups). A reported 12 major raids in which more than 2000 people were detained were conducted between March and November 1987.

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Jimenez, Nicanor T. "Good Government and the Insurgency." Solidarity (Manila), no. 111, March-April 1987, pp. 97-100.

The author makes a number of suggestions for dealing with the Communist insurgency in the Philippines. Most important, he states, is removing the causes of the insurgency, which can only be done by instituting good government. He sees landlessness as the greatest economic problem and a major cause of the insurgency. His suggestion for raising the necessary funds for an effective land reform is to establish a fund based on payments from the United States as a result of the American use of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. Grants-in-aid should be given to support security and development programs to help rebuild the economy, promote further growth, insure political stability, and improve the defense posture. Included among these programs would be land reform, massive reforestation, and conservation projects.

Lescaze, Lee. "There's No War in Philippine War Zone." Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 15 October 1987, pp. 1, 7.

The war in the Bicol Peninsula southeast of Manila is heating up according to the Philippine media. On a visit to the region, however, the author finds life going on pretty much as usual. The NPA has reportedly stepped up its assassination of military officers, and the military has responded by sending an additional 2,000 troops to the area. But actual combat between the two sides is rare. Local vigilante groups, who have been armed by the military, often use their guns to bully villagers. It's a tossup over who the villagers fear most: the vigilantes or the NPA.

"Manila Warns Against Foreign Aid to Rebels." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 23 November 1987, p. 4.

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Philippine Defense Secretary Rafael Ileteo stated that he had quietly talked to the ambassadors of some countries that were believed to be sources of funds for Filipino Communist insurgents. This statement followed a recent disclosure by Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos that the CPP was getting substantial aid from European "solidarity" groups for their efforts to topple the government of President Corazon Aquino. Much of the funds were believed by local officials to have been channeled through Dutch sources. National Security Adviser Emmanuel Soriano reported recently, however, that a shipment of Chinese arms bound for an unnamed Philippine group was blocked by authorities in Beijing. In a related development NPA rebels raided last week a banana plantation owned by a US company in Davao del Norte Province causing nearly \$250,000 in damage.

Melchior, Philip. "Manila Rebels Declare War on American 'Meddlers'." Guardian (Manchester), 7 November 1987, p. 7.

The NDF in a statement to international news agencies in early November said that all US military and civilian personnel involved in "meddling in internal affairs" of the Philippines would be "targets for attack." The statement, on letterhead paper and signed by NDF secretary general Saturnino Ocampo, was the first official declaration of what appears to be a new Communist policy. No reference was made in the statement to the killing of two US airmen near Clark Air Force Base last week, which some sources had blamed on the Communists. Ocampo noted further that the United States would "pay a high price for its political-military intervention in terms of American lives and property, unless it stopped its meddling." The killings were part of a wave of mainly street murders in Manila, that claimed the lives of 13, mostly soldiers and policemen allegedly gunned down by NPA sparrow squads. Following the incidents, government supporters ran ads in Manila newspapers calling on Filipinos to report movements or sightings of either Communist insurgents or fugitives of the August military coup.

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Mydans, Seth. "For Aquino, Many Farmers, Too Little Land." New York Times, 18 October 1987, p. 21

President Corazon Aquino's land reform program still faces serious obstacles including lack of funds, resistance of landowners, lack of adequate irrigation and transportation systems, and the competing claims of other national priorities. Studies have shown that land reform programs in other parts of Asia have resulted in higher productivity than tenant farming. Some analysts have pointed out that the most successful Asian land reform programs were conducted under conditions of military control or revolution and note that Aquino missed her opportunity to institute effective reforms during the first year of her administration when she had dictatorial powers.

Mydans, Seth. "In the Big Manila Land Plan, Steps Are Small." New York Times, 18 October 1987, p. 1

The author surveys the age-old problem of landlessness in the Philippines and recent half-hearted attempts at land reform. President Corazon Aquino's land programs have run into stiff opposition in the newly-elected Congress. Many of the provisions have been so watered down that an estimated 82 percent of potential beneficiaries would be excluded from land redistribution through such means as an increase in land-retention limits. In some areas, such as the island of Negros, farmers have taken matters into their own hands, seizing sugar plantations and turning them into rice fields. These actions have been supported by various left-wing farmers groups. Actual government reforms so far have amounted to only a few hundred grants of land, some of it marginal. Landless peasants make up and estimated one-fourth or more of the Philippine population. Communist insurgents have stated repeatedly that land imbalances are at the heart of their movement.

"Nine Dead As Christmas Truce Ends in RP." Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 28 December 1987, p. 1.

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Hostilities flared between Philippine Government security forces and NPA guerrillas in late December ending a de facto Christmas truce and leaving nine people dead. Five NPA rebels were killed by a security patrol in Albay Province and five government soldiers were wounded in a clash in Cagayan Province. Meanwhile in Agusan del Norte Province three insurgents and one soldier died in a firefight when a 60-man NPA force attacked a government platoon. In a related development the CPP made its first-ever radio broadcast in late December over "Radio Sierra Madre, Voice of the Free Philippines" on an unused radio frequency on the FM radio band. The broadcast reported that the NDF had begun setting up parallel "revolutionary governments" at the provincial level. It criticized the human rights record of the current administration and denounced US involvement in "counterrevolutionary activities" in the Philippines.

"Philippines Left Claims US Killings." Guardian (Manchester), 24 November 1987, p. 13.

Secretary General of the NDF Saturnino Ocampo, in a recent BBC interview, admitted Communist responsibility for the killing of three Americans near Clark Air Base in late October. Ocampo stated that the NDF had decided in June that "all US military and civilian personnel involved in the implementation of the total war program are to be targets for attack by the NPA. The attacks on the three American servicemen at Clark Air Base were a response to this policy." Ocampo also claimed in the interview that the NDF has "support networks in more than 25 countries, including Greece, the Netherlands, and 13 other Western European countries. He did not specify, however, what support the rebels were receiving. Ocampo also noted that the Communists were in the process of setting up a provisional revolutionary government as a prototype of the administration they will impose if they gain power.

Porter, Gareth. "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Aquino Was Right." SAIS Review, Summer-Fall 1987, pp. 93-108.

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The author lauds President Corazon Aquino's emphasis on a political rather than a military approach to the Communist insurgency problem in the Philippines. It is doubtful, he notes, that a military campaign against the insurgents could make a significant dent in the NPA "because the NPA has already built a large enough popular political base to replace easily any conceivable combat losses." Moreover, a military offensive is "likely to enhance the cohesion of the insurgent movement, strengthen mass-base support, and push back to armed struggle those cadres who would otherwise like to stop fighting." A conventional military counterinsurgency campaign, according to the author, will lead to the same disastrous militarization of the countryside that occurred in the later years of the Ferdinand Marcos regime when massive abuses of human rights by the military were the primary reason for increased recruitment and mass-base support for the insurgents. Ultimate success against the Communists, according to the author, will depend on the adoption of new programs that will win back the loyalty of those sympathetic to the insurgency. Key among these programs must be land reform. The author suggests a series of steps and phases for the Philippine Government to undertake in ending the insurgency.

Richardson, Michael. "Manila's Road to Ruin." Pacific Defence Reporter, October 1987, pp. 8-10

The NPA did not fail to take advantage of the attempted military coup on 28 August 1987 led by Col. Gregorio Honasan. The following day it declared in a statement: "Intensification of the revolutionary war and other people's struggles is the correct response to the worsening strife among the reactionaries. Let us take full advantage of contradictions within the reactionary ranks." On 2 September NPA forces ambushed and nearly wiped out a government convoy east of Manila in one of the largest losses for the armed forces in 1987. The NPA also expanded their campaign of urban terrorism in Manila and other cities following the coup. Meanwhile, Muslim separatist leaders said they were ready to enter a tactical alliance with the military rebels in order to achieve their demand for autonomy.

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Tasker, Rodney. "Left Quick March." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 8 October 1987, p.14. HC411.F18

The Communists have been exploiting the confusion that has followed in the wake of the August 1987 coup by taking the initiative on all fronts, according to the author. Aggressive NPA activity has been reported in the Bicol region southeast of Manila as well as in Bulacan Province just north of Manila. In the Bicol the NPA seems to have changed its tactics by hitting such economic targets as bridges and power transmission towers, which may have cost them some popularity with the local populace who bear the brunt of such actions. The Philippine military's response was to double its forces in the region, an action that came too late, as most of the guerrillas had already slipped out of the area.

"U.S. Bases Closed." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 19 November 1987, p. 1.

Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base were closed off for two days in November as a result of continuing threats of attacks by local Communist guerrillas. A two-day security exercise was conducted on the bases following the killing of two US servicemen and a US civilian near Clark Air Base. Local Philippine officials said the base closings were in response to threatened attacks on the bases. US officials said the bases were being closed for a routine security exercise.

"Unsuitably Equipped." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 26 November 1987, pp. 37-38. HC411.F18

Equipment used by the Philippine Armed Forces, usually US-supplied, is often either ill-suited for the job of counterinsurgency, too difficult to maintain, or both. The armored personnel carriers in current use, for example, are too slow, too noisy, and carry a 76mm cannon suitable for destroying tanks and bunkers, neither of which the NPA have. The author describes the 16 Sikorsky helicopters bought in 1983 as "camp decorations" because of their delicate maintenance requirements and high fuel

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consumption. The Huey helicopters, T28 aircraft, and other equipment come in for equally scathing criticism from the author, who is fresh from touring four Philippine Government field commands.

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"Army Seizes 20 Top Rebel Leaders in Manila Raids." Times
(London), 5 February 1988, p. 10.

Twenty Communist insurgent leaders were captured in a series of raids in early February, according to Philippine Armed Forces Commander General Renato de Villa. Among the captured leaders was Tomas Dominado, a senior member of the CPP Central Committee. In a related development, Cardinal Jaime Sin, the Archbishop of Manila, accused human rights groups of being infiltrated by Communist insurgents and giving large amounts of money to the guerrillas. Sin specifically accused the National Secretariat for Social Action for channelling funds to the NPA, which were used to buy weapons. The cardinal's statement was immediately refuted by Bishop Antonio Fortich, the senior clergyman on the island of Negros.

"Bad Times for the Communists." Economist (London), 16 January 1988, pp. 32-33. HG11.E2

The author warns that support given vigilante groups by the government of President Corazon Aquino gives the Communists a "powerful new ally in their attempt to depict the Aquino government as no less thuggish than its predecessor." He points out that the insurgency is now in decline in many areas, including its former strongholds in Northern Luzon and Davao City, Mindanao. The people in these areas have turned against the Communists by "regaining their faith in democracy and abandoning the belief that their lot can be improved only by armed rebellion." The canceling of the Chico dam project and a vast timber-cutting program in Northern Luzon by the Aquino government had far more to do with the mountain people throwing out the NPA than did any government military actions. The author warns that government and military support for various vigilante groups around the country is creating organizations similar to the Civilian Home Defence Forces, thug-like paramilitary groups that drove thousands of Filipinos to support the Communist insurgency.

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Hawksley, Humphrey. "Triumphant Ramos Strides into Political Arena." Times (London), 22 January 1988, p. 9.

An NDF official declared that the appointment of General Fidel Ramos as Philippine Defense Minister in late January was another sign that the government was moving further to the right. Ramos, the former military chief of staff came after the sudden resignation of former Defense Minister Rafael Ilete. The appointment prompted speculation that Ramos, who has long been viewed as being more of a politician than a military leader, has his eye on the 1992 presidential race.

Jones, Clayton. "Aquino Seeks Stronger Base from Vote." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 15 January 1988, p. 7.

The Communist-supported leftist People's Party endorsed few candidates openly for the January Philippine local elections. According to the author, this was done to protect Communist-supported candidates from violence as well as to avoid a repeat of the poor showing of Communist-supported candidates in the May Congressional election.

"Land Reform Gets Priority As Manila Congress Opens." Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong), 25 January 1988, p. 7.

Philippine President Corazon Aquino announced on 22 January that her family's 6,000 hectare estate would be included in the government's new land reform program. The announcement was timed to coincide with the first anniversary of the "Mendiola massacre" during which government troops killed at least 12 people marching on the presidential palace to demand "genuine" land reform. In late January, the Congress was still debating various land reform proposals that have been submitted to both houses but not yet brought to the floor for a vote.

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"Military Closing in on Overall Commander of New People's Army."
Indonesia Times (Jakarta), 10 February 1988, p. 7.

The Philippine military has come close to catching the overall commander of the NPA on several recent occasions, an armed forces spokesman noted in February. Romulo (Rolly) Kintanar, the head of the NPA Military Commission and commander of the 25,000-man guerrilla army has been seen several times recently in Manila. His capture carries a reward of \$7,500. The military recently captured 20 ranking members of the CPP as well as a coded list of the party's financial supporters both at home and abroad. In related developments, officials at US installations in the Philippines announced that military exercises were being conducted to counter possible terrorist attacks. At Clark Air Force Base instruction includes dealing with anti-American demonstrators, the taking of hostages, kidnappings, and terrorist bombings. A rebel spokesman recently stated that US Ambassador to the Philippines Nicholas Platt was a "standing target" and that "preparations were ongoing" for his assassination.

Olivera, Baldomero T. "Insurgency Takes Centre Stage after Philippine Elections." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 18 February 1988, 4,5.

Following the local elections held in January, the author sees the Philippine Congress concentrating its efforts on implementing the administration's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP). He sees President Corazon Aquino's CARP as the government's main strategic thrust for a permanent solution to the insurgency problem. The aim of the program is to improve the economic condition of millions of impoverished peasants, thereby eliminating the major cause of the insurgency. Aquino recently announced that her family was registering under CARP its 6,000 hectare sugar estate in Central Luzon.

"Ramos Gets Manila Defense Portfolio." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 22 January 1988, p. 2.

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Former Philippine Secretary of Defense Rafael Ilete said he resigned from that post because the government had allowed the Communist insurgency to grow "alarmingly strong." He is reported to have locked horns with his successor, General Fidel Ramos, on the issue of counterinsurgency. Whereas Ilete advocated a strong military approach to the insurgency, the more politically oriented Ramos prefers a "soft" approach that couples military offensives with social and economic programs in the countryside.

Sicam, Paulynn. "Filipino Local Elections: Free, But Still Violent." Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 5 January, 1988, pp. 7, 8.

Most of the violence and killings preceding the 18 January local elections in the Philippines were unrelated to the Communist insurgency. Rather, they were the result of the traditional pattern of Philippine politics, the hallmarks of which are guns, goons, and gold. The military often blamed kidnappings and shootings on the NPA that were commonly known to be politically motivated and committed by followers of rival candidates. In some areas controlled by the NPA, however, the guerrillas imposed "taxes" of \$500 to \$2,500 in exchange for a permit to campaign in the rebel-controlled areas.

van der Kroef, Justus M. "Philippine Communist: 'A Next Higher Level'?" Issues and Studies (Taipei), vol. 23, no. 11, November 1987, pp. 115-37. D839.I732

The author gives a thorough account and analysis of the relations between the Philippine Communist movement and the government of President Corazon Aquino in the two years since she came to power in February 1986. After detailing the many twists and turns, negotiation and conflict, the author notes that the two sides have entered a new "hard-line" era with sharpened rhetoric on both sides. The Communists, he predicts, despite formidable problems, are readying themselves for a more intensified revolutionary struggle.